Bibliotheca Jainica

VOLUME III

THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS

ORIGINAL TEXTS AND COMMENTARIES

WITH

INTRODUCTION, TRANSLATION, NOTES, ETC.,

EDITED

WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF VARIOUS SCHOLARS

BY

SARAT CHANDRA GHOSHAL, M.A., B.L.,

SARASVATI, KAVYA-TIRTHA, VIDYABHUSANA, BHARATI,

General Editor:—"THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS," ARRAH.





VOLUMES NOW READY.

THE SACRED BOOKS OF THE JAINAS.

	Rs.	a.	p.
I.—DRAVYA-SAMGRAHA, edited by S. C. Ghoshal, Esq., M.A., B.L., (Library edition)	5	8	C
Vol. II.—TATTVÂRTHÂDHIGAMA-SÛTRA edited by J. L. Jaini, Esq., M.A. ...	4	8	0
Vol. III.—PAÑCHÂSTIKÂYASÂRA, edited by Prof. A. Chakravarti, Esq., M.A., L.T.	4	8	0
Vol. IV.—PURUSHÂRTHA SIDDHYUPÂYA, edited by Pandit Ajita Prasad, Esq., M.A., LL.B	4	8	0

APPLY TO,

THE CENTRAL JAINA PUBLISHING HOUSE,
ARRAH.

Printed by
Bishambher Nath Bhargava at the
Standard Press, Allahabad

VOL. III.

श्रीपञ्चास्तिकायसार।

THE BUILDING OF THE COSMOS

OR

PAÑCHÂSTIKÂYASÂRA

(THE FIVE COSMIC CONSTITUENTS)

BY

SVAMI SRI KUNDAKUNDACHARYA

EDITED WITH


Philosophical and Historical Introduction, Translation, Notes and an Original Commentary in English

BY

PROF. A. CHAKRAVARTINAYANAR, M.A., L.T.,
Senior Lecturer in Mental & Moral Philosophy,
PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, MADRAS.



PUBLISHED BY
KUMAR DEVENDRA PRASADA
THE CENTRAL JAINA PUBLISHING HOUSE
ARRAH (INDIA), 1920.





PROF A CHAKRAVARTI M.A L.T
Senior Lecturer in Philosophy
Presidency College Madras

The Indian Press Ltd Allahabad

THE HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

The Age of Kundakunda or Elacharya.

Sri Kundakundacharya the author of our work was a very famous Jaina Philosopher and theologian. He was also a great organiser of Religious institutions. His name is held in great veneration especially by the Digambara Section of the Jainas. Many great religious teachers claimed it an honour to trace their lineage from the great teacher Kundakunda. Several inscriptions that are found in South India and Mysore relating to Jaina teachers begin with *Kundakundanvaya*—of the line of Kundakunda. Students of Jaina literature are familar with such phrases as the following:—

Sri Kundakunda Gurupattaparamparāyām;

Sri Kundakunda Santhanam;

Sri Kundakundakya munindra vamsa.

These are some of the phrases claimed by Jaina writers such as *Sakalabhusana* author of Upadesaratnamala, *Vasunandi* author of Upasakadhyanam, *Brahma nemi datta* of Aurathana Kathakosha. Instances may be multiplied without number, for showing the important place occupied by our author in the hierarchy of Jaina teachers.

Some of the epithets employed to characterise him are also significant of his great importance. Munindra—the Indra among the ascetics, *Munichakravati*—the emperor among the munis, Kaundesa—Lord Kunda, are familiar designations of the great teacher.

The personality of this great teacher as is generally the case with world famous individuals is lost in obscurity and shrouded with traditions. We have to depend upon so many written and oral traditions to have a glimpse of this great person. The early history of India is but a string of speculations and even as such there are very many gaps. Under these circumstances, we have to be very cautious about the history of our author.

The one great landmark in the chronclogy of India is Chandragupta Maurya. This great emperor of Magadha is not only referred to in the various literary works of India but is also mentioned by *foreign historians especially the Greeks. This emperor Chandra Gupta* especially is of peculiar interest to the students of the early history of the Jainas. Lewis Rice and Dr. F. W. Thomas have done considerable service to Indian History by cautiously interpreting several available facts, archæological and epigraphical, relating to that *period. 'The early faith of Asoka' and the migration of Bhadrabahu* with Chandragupta are now accepted facts of History. The tendency among European scholars to post date the historical events and persons ralating to India is a just antidote to the phantastic and legendary notions of Indigenous writers who generally *measure time by milleniums. Nevertheless we have to point out* that the orientalist have sometimes overreached their work. They generally proceed on the assumption that writing is a late acquisition in Indian civilization. The learned arguments put forward on *Panini* by Goldsticker to undermine this assumption have been before the *learned public for some decades. The excavations of Jaina stupas at* Mathura and Mr. K. P. Jayaswal's discovery of Konika's Statue with the inscriptions try to set back the pendulam of Indian chronology to an earlier period. Speaking about the Jaina stupas Sir Vincent Smith writes as follows:—

"The assumption has *generally* been made *that all edifices in* this stupa form are Buddhist. When the inscription under discussion was executed not later than 157 A. D., the Vodva stupa of the Jainas at Mathura was already so ancient that it was regarded as the work of the gods. It was probably therefore erected several *centuries before the Christian era.*"

Again says he,

"Assuming the ordinarily received date B. C. 527 for the death of Mahavira to be correct the attainment of perfection by that saint may be placed about B. C. 550. The restoration of the stupa may be dated about *1300 years later or A. D. 150. Its original erection* in brick in the time of Parasvanath the predecessar of Mahavira would fall at a date not later than B. C. 600 considering the significance of the phrase in the inscription "built by the gods" as indicating that the building at about the beginning of the Christian era was believed to date from a period of mythical antiquity the date B. C. 600 for its

erection is not too early. Probably therefore this stupa of which Dr. Fuhrer exposed the foundations is the oldest known buildings in India".

When we take these historic discoveries with the Jaina traditions that a number of Tirthankaras preceded Lord Mahavira we may not be altogether wrong in supposing that adherents of Jaina faith in some form or other must have existed even anterior to Mahavira and that Mahavira himself was more a reformer than the founder of the faith. If there were Jains influential enough to build stupas in honour of their saints even anterior to 600 B C., will it be too much to suppose that the followers of this religion might have existed in South India even before Badrabahu's migration to the south. In fact it stands to reason to suppose that a large body of ascetics on account of a terrible famine in the north migrated to a country where they would be welcomed by their devoted co-religionists. If the south were instead of a friendly territory waiting to receive the Sangha of learned ascetics a land populated with strangers and of alien faith Bhadrabahu would not have ventured to take with him into strange land a large body of ascetics who would depend entirely upon the generosity of the people. The Jaina tradition that the Pandya King of the South was a Jaina from very early times and that Bhadrabahu expected his hospitality might have some historical background.

Up to the time of Bhadrabahu's migration there was no split in the Jaina fold. That the schism of the Swetambaras arose about the time of Bhadrabahu I on account of the hardships of the famine is more than probable. This fact is evidenced by the complete absence of Swetambaras in the Deccan and South India. The Jains in the South and Mysore always claim to be of *Mulasangha* the original congregration.

One other interesting fact is the Migration of the Digambaras from the south to the north for the purpose of religious propogandism. " One point of agreement comes out clearly and is noteworthy, i.e. the direction of the Digambara migration " It was from the south to the north from Bhadalpur to Delhi and Jaipur. This agrees with the opinion that the Digambara separation originally took place as a result of the migration southwards under Badrabahu in consequence of a severe famine in Behar the original home of the undivided Jaina Community " (Prof. A. F. Rudolf Hoernle. *Ind.*

Ant. Vol. XXI. *Three further Pattavalis of the Digambaras*, pp. 60 and 61.)

Professor Hoernle says that he has not been able to identify Bhadalpur. It is no other than Patalipura or Pataliputra which is the old name of Thiruppappuliyur or modern Cuddalore (Reports on the Archæological Survey of India, Vol. 1906-07—Article on the Pallavas by V. Venkayya) suggests that it is not the above place and identifies it with Tiruvadi a place near Panruti with many Jaina antiquities and remains. This is only a matter of detail. But still the reason given by V. Venkiyya is not quite sound. The fact that Pathiripuliyur is mentioned in Devaram as sacred to God Siva will not conflict with its being also the centre of the Jainas.

Now this Bhadalpur or Patalipura is associated with our author *Sri Kundakunda as we shall show later on.*

Before we proceed further let us make sure about the age in which he lived and worked. For this we have clear evidence furnished in the several Pattavalis preserved by the Jainas both Digambaras and Swetambaras. After Mahavira there had been a succession of teachers as shown below :—

			Years.
I.—Kevalins ...	Gautama	...	12
	Sudharma	...	12
	Jambu	...	38
II.—Sruta-Kevalins,	Vishnu Kumar	...	14
	Nanda Mitra	...	16
	Aparajita	...	22
	Govardhan	...	19
	Bhadrabahu I	...	29
III.—Ten-Purvins...	Visaka,	...	10
	Proshtila	...	15
	Natchatra	...	17
	Nagasena	...	18
	Jayasena	...	21
	Siddharta	...	17
	Dhritisena	...	18
	Vijaya	...	13
	Buddhilinga	...	20
	Deva, I	...	14
	Dharasena	...	14

			Years.
IV.—Eleven Angins	Nakshatra	...	18
	Jayapalaka	...	20
	Pandava	...	39
	Dhruvasena	...	14
	Kamsa	...	32
	Total	...	468

			Years.
V.—Minor-Angins ...	Subhadra	...	6
	Yasobhadra	...	18
	Bhadrbahu, II.		

In the year 2 after the Acharya Subhadra's (accession to the partificate), the birth of *Vikrama* took place; and *in the year 1 of* Vikrama's reign Bhadrabahuji II took his seat on the pontificial chair. Further succession will be evident from the following table :—

" Indian Antiquary" Vols. XX and XXI. The several Pattavalis examined by R Hoernle.

Kundakunda line according to the Digambara Pattavalis as worked out by PROFESSOR HOERNLE.

Serial number.	Names	Dates of accession.		House-holder			Monk			Pontiff			Intercalary days	Total			Remarks.
		Samvat	Christian.	Years.	Months.	Days.	Years.	Months.	Days.	Years.	Months.	Days.		Years.	Months.	Days.	
1	Bhadrabahu, II...	4 Ch. S 14	B.C. 53	24	...	...	30	...	...	22	10	27	3	76	11	...	He was a Brahman by caste.
2	Guptigupta ...	26 Ph. S. 1[illegible]	31	22	...	...	34	...	...	9	6	25	5	65	7	...	A Panwar by caste.
3	Mâghanandin, I ...	36 A. S. 14	21	20	...	...	44	...	...	4	4	26	4	[illegible]	68	5	A Sâh by caste.
4	Jinachandra, I ...	40 Ph. S. 14	17	24	9	...	32	3	...	8	9	6	3	65	9	9	
5	Kundakunda ...	49 P. V. 8	8	11	...	...	33	...	...	51	10	10	5	95	10	15	He had four other names (*abhâva*) viz., Padmanandin, Vakragriva Gridhrapichchha, Elachârya.

If we take this date 8 B. C. as the reliable date of his accession *to the pontificial chair then the date of his birth would be about* 52 B. C. For, only in his forty-fourth year he became pontiff or an *acharya.*

What is his birthplace and scene of his activities? With regard to his birthplace we have no better evidence. Here also we have to depend upon traditions—oral and written. Let us see whether we can have any useful information from these traditions. In a work called Punyasravakatha Sri Kunda Kundacharya's life is cited as an example for *Shastradana* or gift of *Shastras.* The account is as follows:—In Bharatha Khanda in Dakshanadesa there was a district called *Pidatha Nadu. In a town called Kurumarai in this district* there lived a wealthy vaishya by name Karamunda. His wife was Srimati. They had a cow-herd who tended their cattle. His name was Mathivaran. One day when he was driving his cattle to an adjoining forest he saw to his great surprise that the whole forest was consumed by forest fire except a few trees in the centre, which retained the luxuriant green foliage. This roused his curiosity and he went and inspected that place. There he found the dwelling place of some great Muni and also a box containing the *Agamas* or the Jain Scriptures. Illiterate as he was he attributed the safety of *the spot to the presence of the Agamas which he carried home with* great awe and reverence. He put up the *Agamas* in a sanctified place of his master's house and continued to worship the same daily.

Sometime after, a religious monk visited their house. He was offered *Bhiksha* with great veneration by that wealthy vaishya. Just then this cow-herd also offered the *Agamas* to the great *Rishi.* On account of these gifts—food from the Master, and the Scripture from the servant—the *Rishi* was very much pleased and blessed them both. The Master of the house since he had no children was to have an intelligent son and the old and faithful servant would be born as the promised son of the house. The happy event came to pass and the son born to the family became a great philosopher and religious teacher. This was our author. Sri Kunda Kunda.

The story further turns upon his religious tours. The mention of his name as the wisest of mortals in the *Samavasarana* of Sree-Mantharaswami in Purvavideha, the visit of the two *Charanas* to verify the fact, his supposed irreverence to them on account of his

This sloka is interesting to us. The work treats about a female disciple of Elacharya, who was possessed of a Brahma Rakshasa. This possessed disciple was no doubt well-versed in Shastras but would get up on the summit of a small hill called Nilagiri by the side of the village, Hemagramu in which Elacharya lived, and would laugh and weep alternately with all hystorical violence. She is said to have been cured by Elacharya with the help of Jwalamalini Mantra. Fortunately we are able to identify all the places mentioned in the above sloka.

Malaya is the name of that part of the Madras Presidency comprised by portions of North Arcot and South Arcot traversed by the Eastern ghats. The taluks of Kalla Kurichi, Tiruvannamali and Wandewash perhaps form the central tract of this Malaya. Hemagrama which is the Sanskritised form of Ponnur which is a village near Wandewash. Close to this village there is a hillock by the name Nilagiri. On the top of this hillock on a rock there are even now the foot prints of Elacharya who is said to have performed his *tapas* thereon. Even now pilgrims frequent this village once in a year, to perform puja to the foot prints. Further the sloka mentions Elacharya to be 'Dravidagana disa'. We know very well that Elacharya, is another well-known name for Kunda Kunda.

Now this Elacharya is according to Jaina tradition the author of the great Tamil classic 'Thirukkurral'. This is written in the old indigenous "Venba" metre of Tamil language. According to the Jaina tradition this work was composed by Elacharya and given away to his disciple "Thiruvalluvar" who introduced it to the Madura Sangha. This version is not altogether improbable. Because even the non-jaina tradition about the author of Thirukkural appears to be merely another version of this one. The Hindu tradition makes Thiruvalluvar himself the author of the work. He is claimed to be a Saivite by faith and valluva by birth. His birth place is said to be Thirumaylai or Mylapuri or the modern Mylapore the southern part of the city of Madras. The work was composed under the patronage of one Elala Singh, who was evidently the literary patron of Thiruvalluvar.

This Elala Singh of the Hindu Tradition may be merely a variation of Elacharya. Thiruvalluvar figures in both the traditions, in the one as the author and in the other the introducer before the Sangha. That Mylapuri, had a famous Jain temple dedicated to

younger brother of 'Singuttuman Seran' the Chera King of Vangi. The latter work which is merely the continuation of the story of *Silappadikaram* was written by "Kulavanikan Sattanar" a contemporary and friend of Ilangovadi. During the *pratishta* of Devi temple (Silappadikaram) Gajahbhahu I of Ceylon was present, according to Mahavansa, he reigned about 113 A. D. Kural therefore must be *anterior to this date; so this also goes to corroborate the age of* Elacharya or Kunda Kunda.

All these scattered facts of traditions and literary remains produce cumulative evidence to establish that our author was of Dravidian origin. That he was the leader of the Dravidian Sangha and that he was evidently highly cultured in more than one language This use of the word 'Dravida' in the 'Dravida Sangha' must have a specific reference to the Jainas of South India, the Vellalas of the ancient Tamil literature, who strictly followed 'Kollavratam' or 'Ahimsa-dharma, and it is further evidenced by the popular use of the word in the compound, 'Dravida-brahmins' who are strict vegetarians as contrasted with 'Gouda-brahmins' It is a well-known fact that the strict vegetarianism in daily life of South Indian Brahmins who nevertheless perform 'Yagams' involving animal sacrifice is a heritage from early Jaina culture in South India.

The early kingdoms of South India were the Cheras, the Cholas and the Pandyas. It is a well-known historical fact pertaining to South India that the Pandiyas were Jains and were patrons of Jainism. They changed their faith only during the *Sivaite revival* effected by *Appar* and *Sundarar* about the 8th century. That the Cheras were also Jains can be inferred from 'Silappadikana' another great Tamil classic written by a Jaina scholar the younger brother of the Chera king (who was a contemporary of Gajabahu of Ceylon). The Cholas were also off and on the Patrons of Jains though in later days they were associated with Sivaitism. These three *kingdoms were known about the time of Asoka. The court language* in all the three was probably Tamil. Can we suppose that Sri Kunda Kunda belonged to any one of these kingdoms. Our above discussion would lead us to such a supposition and yet there is an important stumbling block in our way.

The work that is translated here is in Prakrit Further all the commentators of 'Prabhauitatraya'—

Panchastikaya, Pravachanasara and Samayasara—mention the fact that these works were written by Kunda Kundacharya for the benefit of his royal disciple Shivakumara Maharaja. Who this Shiva Kumara Maharaja was and over what kingdom he ruled the commentators are silent about. We are once again compelled to have recourse to hypothesis. This Siva Kumara Maharaja must have been a follower of Jaina faith and must have had prakrit as his court language. Further he must have been somewhere in the south in order to have Sri Kunda Kunda as his religious teacher. This name does not occur in the dynastic geneology of the three Tamil Kingdoms—the Cheras, the Cholas and the Pandiyas. Further there is no evidence that any prince of these dynasties had prakrit as his court language.

Before we proceed to state our theory we have to dispose of the theory proposed by K. B. Pathak as to the identification of Sivakumara Maharaja.

The Indian Antiquary, Vol. XIV, 1885, page 15. Kunda Kunda was one of the most celebrated Jaina authors. The works attributed to him are the Prabhritasara, the Pravachanasara, the Samayasara, the Rayanasara and the Dvadasanupreksha.

These are all written in Jaina Prakrit Balachandra the commentator who lived before Abhinava Pampa says in his introductory remarks on the Prabhritasara that Kunda Kundacharya was also called Padmanandi and was the preceptor of Siva Kumara Maharaja. I would identify the king with the early-Kadamba King Sri Vijaya Siva Mrigesa Maharaja. For in his time, the Jainas had already been divided into the Nirgranthas and the Svetapatas, and Kunda Kunda attacks the Svetapata sect when he says, in the Pravachanasara that women are allowed to wear clothes because they are incapable of attaining Nirvana.

" Chitte Chinta mayathamba tasim na nivvanam

चित्ते चिंतामाया तम्हा तासिं णणिव्वाणं।

Another interesting fact that we learn from his works is that, in the time of this author Jainism had not spread far and wide in these parts and that the body of this people worshipped Vishnu for he tells us in the Samayasara.

लोयसमणाण मेयं सिध्धंतं पडि ण दिस्सदि यिसेसो।

लोगस्स कुणदि यिण्हु समणाणं अप्पमो कुणदि॥

" So no difference appears between the people and the Sramanas in respect of the Siddhanta (in the opinion) of the people, Vishnu makes (every thing) (in the opinion) of the Sramanas the Soul makes (every thing). On these circumstances, as well as on the place assigned to him in Jaina Pattavalis and on the fact that his writings are considered by Jaina scholars, both in Dharwar and Maisur, to be the most ancient Jaina works now extant I base my opinion that Kunda Kundacharya was a contemporary of the early Kadamba King Siva Mrigese Maharaja.

The reasons cited by K. P. Pathak are all right. Kunda Kunda is later than the Svetambara Schism which is believed to have taken place about the time of Bhadrabahu, I And perhaps at the time of Kunda Kunda the ordinary masses followed the vedantic form of Vishnava cult. But still these facts do not form a cogent reason for identifying Siva Kumara Maharaja with the Kadamba King Siva Mrigese Varma. Mysore and Coorg by Lewis Rice, page 21 "The Kadambas were rulers of the west of Mysore from the 3rd to the 6th century." And Siva Mrigesa Varma ruled about the 5th century A. D. But the pontificate of Sri Kunda Kunda began in B. C. S. *The early dynasties by J. F. Fleet, page 288 of the* Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. I. "and this is altogether too ancient, a period for the early Kadambas" further we do not know whether the Kadambas were acquainted with Prakrit language. Under these circumstances we have to seek elsewhere as to the whereabouts of Siva Kumara Maharaja, the disciple of Sri Kunda Kunda.

Conchipuram was the capital of the Pallava kingdom. The Pallavas ruled over Thonda Mandalam and also over a part of the Telugu country up to the river Krishna. Thonda Mandalam or Thondainâdu was the name given to the land along the east coast between the two Pennars, South Pennar in South Arcot and North Pennar in Nellor and to east of the ghats. This land was divided into several nadus and each nadu into several kottams. It was the land of the learned. Several great Dravidian scholars such as the author of the Kurral, the great tamil poetess Avvai, the Sweet Puhazanthi the author of Nalavenba, all belong to Thondimandalam. Throughout the Tamil literature there are references to the literary merits and the culture of the inhabitants of Thondinadu. Concheepuram the capital of Thondinadu must have been a great centre of learning in the south. Students from different parts of the country went to

Conjeepuram for purposes of study. Scholars thronged there for the purpose of being recognised at the Pallava Court. Mayura-Sarma one of the early founders of the Kadamba dynasty went to the Pallava capital for the purpose of completing his education in the Sacred lore. It was there that he quarrelled with the master of the horses who was a Kshatriya Mayura Sarma, a brahmin by birth vowed that even a brahmin could handle the weapons of warfare with skill and could found a kingdom. Thus arose the Kadamba dynasty. Thus the glory of Conjeepuram—the Pallava capital must have wide spread about the 2nd century A. D. The kings of Conjeepuram as patrons of learning must have encouraged philosophical discussion among the representatives of the different religious sects,—the Hindus, Buddhists and Jains. Taking part in such religio-philosophical discussions must necessarily have a reaction on the personal faith of the kings. In the early centuries of the Christian era, proselytising was a common factor among the rival religionists. Great religious leader of different denominations went about from country to country converting kings and people. Thus we hear from Jaina History that Samantabhadraswami visited Conjeepuram and converted Siva Koti Maharaja who became Siva Koti Muni the disciple and successor of Samantabhadra. Still later towards the 8th century Akalanka visited the capital defeated the Buddhists in open philosophical contests and converted *Himaseethala* the then Buddhist king. It is not improbable therefore that the Pallava kings at Conjeepuram during the 1st century of this era were patrons of Jaina Religon or were themselves Jainas by faith.

We also know from several epigraphical records that they had Prakrit as their court language. What is known as the Mayidavolu grant is an important document for South Indian History. It is in Prakrit with the exception *of the last verse, which is the closing mangala* in Sanskrit. The body of the grant is in a prakritic dialect which comes close to the literary Pali, but shows also a number of peculiarities and divergent forms Dr. Buhler, Epi. Indica. Vol. I, p. 2. Come nearer to the usage of the Jaina and Maharashtri dialectics than to that of the Pali and older inscriptions. It is issued by the Pallava King Siva Skandavarma of Conjeepuram. Further it may be pointed out that the grant resembles in many particulars the Jains inscriptions from Mathura. The use of the word *'Siddham' in the beginning of the grant as well as in the*

Mathura inscriptions is very suggestive of Jaina origine. The most important point for us is the name of the King Sivaskanda which is merely another form of Siva Kumara. No doubt the same name occurs in the Andhra line M. J. G. Dubreinl tries to connect the two dynasties by matrimonial alliance. He suggests that the Sivaskandavarma (Yuvamaharaja) of the Pallava dynasty is the grandson of Sivaskanda Sata Karni by the daughter and received the *name of the Andhra king who was his grandfather*. Whether the name was so inherited or was independently adopted by the Pallava kings it is not quite material to decide here. It is enough to notice the fact that there was a Pallava king by name Sivaskanda or Siva Kumara Maharaja. He also figures as Yuva-maharaja in another grant. This name is also curiously identical with Kumara Maharaja. It is quite possible therefore that this Sivaskanda of Conjeepuram or one of the predecessor of the same name was the contemporary and disciple of Sri Kunda Kunda. This would well fit in with several facts known about Kunda Kunda. Kunda Kunda or Elacharya must have been in Thondimandalam. So also was Pataliputra the seat of Dravida Sangha a town in Thondimandalam

In this connection we have to reject two theories about Pallavas as unfounded and improbable. The Pallavas are generally supposed to be foreigners from Persia. They are identified with Pahlavas, Mysore and Coorg by L. Rice, page 53, which is the prakrit form of the Pârthava meaning Parthians, here especially the "Arsacidian Parthians" Rice further builds upon this theory another fantastic one that Chaulkyans who were sometimes the enemies of the Pallavas were *by origin Salenkaians V. Venkiyya adopts the same theory* though it is based upon purely etymological grounds. The Hypothesis that is based upon mere similarity of names has no great historical importance unless it is corroborated by independent evidence. This theory unfortunately lacks such a corroboration. Hence it leaves *unchallenged the other hypothesis which is perhaps more probable* that the Pallavas were a section of the Hindu race in the south.

Another hypothesis deserves notice before dismissal. It is the identification of the Pallavas with some aboriginal tribes as the Kurumbas. This again is based upon the use of the word "Kadavar" *to designate the later Pallavas.* No doubt the term "Kadavar" "means the men of the forest". But there is no other ground to show that this "Kadvars" were of the "forest tribe". In tamil literature

it refers to a *highly civilised and cultured race.* There must be some other reason therefore for the application of the name to the Pallavas. It may be merely a contraction of "Palakkadavar" a people of the Palakkada another seat of Pallava government.

Waiving these two hypothesis as improbable may we not suppose *a much closer alliance between the people of the* Thondimandalam and Andhras or the Andrabhrityas who succeeded the Mauryas. The term "Thondu" in tamil means 'Service'. 'Thondar' may simply mean 'those who serve' and may be taken as the Tamil Translation of *Andrabhrityas.* The Pallavas or the Thonders therefore may merely a section of the Andhras. Settled in the south who inherited that portion of the Andhra kingdom either by matrimony or by right. This theory that the Pallavas were an indigenous race with a very high culture and civilization men related to *Andhrabhrityas is highly probable and is* corroborated *by* other circumstantial evidence.

This digression into the history of the Pallavas we have had because such a political environment is required for our author Sri Kunda Kunda Acharya according to the available data about his life. We may therefore conclude that Sri Kunda Kunda Acharya wrote his ***Prabhrita Triya*** for one Siva Kumara Maharaja who was most probably the same as *Siva Skanda Varma of the Pallava dynasty.*

Several works are attributed to Sri Kunda Kunda Acharya.

1. Prabhrita traya (The three Prabhritas).
2. Shatpahudam.
3. Niyamasara, etc.

Of these the first three, Panchastikaya, Pravachanasara and Samayasara are the best known and most important. The work that is offered in translation here is the first of these three Panchastikaya Prabhrita which treats about the five cosmic constituents.

A PHILOSOPHICAL INTRODUCTION

TO

PANCHASTIKAYASARA.

JAINISM—ADYNAMIC REALISM.

When the European scholars first began to study Indian Philosophy and Indian Literature they were peculiarly sympathetic towards the idealistic systems of India. These scholars were brought up in the tradition of *Kant* and *Hegel*. *Kant* in constructing his critical philosophy emphasised the phenomenality of our experience in general. The external word including "the starry heavens above" was merely a fictitious creation of the human mind according to its own forms and categories.

Roused from his dogmatic slumber by *Hume*, *Kant* began to inquire as to the possibility of a true metaphysics. *Hume's* analysis of experience ended in throwing overboard the fundamental conceptions of experience The reality of the Self, the objective world and even the certain law of causation were all said to be fictitious concepts based upon psychological habits but having no rational foundation. From such a sceptical shipwreck *Kant* attempted to save metaphysics Waiving the earlier methods as dogmatic he introduced his own critical philosophy. The main characteristic of this system is the activity of the mind as opposed to the passive *tabula rasa* of the *Lockeian* system. Nature is due to the co-operation of sense materials and the activity of mind. Forms of space and time and the categories of the understandig from the *a priori* constitutive elements of experience. Knowledge is confined to such an experience which is phenomenal. This phenomenal world or the world of appearance is but an island surrounded by the unknown ocean of *noumenal* reality. This may be taken to be the foundation of modern idealism.

No doubt *Kant* strongly repudiated the suggestion that his system was idealistic It is true that he posited the existence of the thing-in-itself. But this realm of *noumenal* reality remained unknown and unknowable. It was preserved only because of *Kant's* personal prediliction ; hence it was the very first thing to be rejected by his successors.

which is the method followed in Science is hailed as the true model for philosophy. Thought is studied in its true concrete setting. In as much as it is merely an instrument to secure greater efficiency of life, its value is entirely determined by its utility. Even Scientistis like *Mach* and *Poincare* acknowledge this instrumentality of thought. Concepts are only convenient fictions to comprehend Nature.

From within Oxford University itself there has sprung up a philosophical schism which boldly qestions the pertensions of the Absolute. *Schiller* and *Rashdall*, *Strutt* and others attack the *Hegelian* stronghold. The Absolute is condemned because it neither satisfies the pholosophical curiosity nor appeals to religious consciousness.

From France and Italy we hear a similar protest from *Bergson* and *Croce*. The former repudiating the *Hegelian* Absolute builds up a theory of the Universe based upon evolutionism. He too condemns intellect as inadequate to apprehend the inner nature of reality. His antagonism to Intellectualism is carried to an uncompromising revolt against even scientific and philosophical constructions in general. He appeals to intuition as the only means of getting at Reality. Similarly *Croce* tries to separate what is living from what is dead, in *Hegel* Thus on all sides this *German Idealism is being assaulted But the most dangerous* opponent of Idealism is come in the form of New Realism

From an unexpected source there has come opposition The Science of Mathematics whose alleged weakness was the strength of *Kantian* Idealism has asserted its own right to challenge metaphysics. The *mathematical discoveries of Cantor, Peano, and Frege* have *once for* all reclaimed certain fundamental Mathematical notions such as the concepts of infinity and continuity from the unwarranted criticisms of metaphysicians As Mr. *B. Russell* clearly points out, modern Idealism must once for all relinquish its *Kantian* basis. It can no more depend upon the so called demonstration offered by *Kant* as to the impossibility of real space and time.

This wave of realism is further intensified by the fact that it is intimately associated with modern Science. The traditional *Hegelian* idealism of the West has been peculiarly adverse to the interest of Science. It may be safety asserted that a system of

metaphysics with does not take into consideration the method and achievement of modern Science is so far self-condemned. Nobody can be blind to the claim of Science to be a safe means for *revealing truth. Its claim is so wonderfully substantiated by its* achievements, that we may say that modern life and modern thought are mainly the result of modern Science So much so any system of Metaphysics which aspires to secure the open-sesame to unlock the secrets of reality must not openly conflict with modern Science. The new realism therefore is in noble company.

When we are aware of this changed attitude in modern thought we are naturally stimulated to examine similar philosophical *attitudes* in the past.

What is placed before the students of philosophy herein is due to such a sympathetic scrutiny of the past. The Jaina system of thought is so peculiarly consistent *with modern realism and* modern science, that one may be tempted to question its antiquity. Still it is a fact, that such a system flourished in India several *centuries before the Christian era.*

The author of the work who is translated in the following pages lived in the 1st century B. C. Hence it is one of the earliest treatises on Jaina Thought. But the author was not the orginator of this system The *anenkatavada* of the Jains must be certainly older than *Mahavira* who is believed to have revived Janism.

The realistic tendency in oriental philosophy is not peculiar to Jainism. *From the very early days, we find this principle of interpreting* life and the Universe running side by side with the idealistic one. During the Vedic period we find nothing but gross form of Realism. The Vedic Gods were but magnified human beings sharing all the weaknesses and foibles peculiar to mankind. When sacrifices were offered to *Indra* or *Agni* or *Vayu* or *Varuna* with chanting of hymns, there could be no trace of any suspicion as to the reality of the world around. Not only the world of Nature was taken to be real but many of its element were imaged after man. No doubt we find a unifying tendency as an undercurrent of the Vedic thought. No doubt the Vedic Devas were subordinated to the one *creative principle of the Universe—Prajapati.*

But this wonderful period of primitive culture is followed by a barren age of sheer ceremonialism. The period of the Brah-

manas is marked by sacrificial technique. Elaborate formulæ were invented for the conduct of sacrifices. Ceremonialism took the place of Poetic effusions This led to the ascendency of the priestly class. The sacrificial master or *Yajaman* has to engage his priests, paying heavy fees or *dakshanas*. Religious. devotion during this period degenerated into petty commercialism. But this state of things did not last long. While the priests were further elaborating the ceremonial formulæ the work of investigating the true nature reality was taken up by another band of thinkers. By this time the homogenious *Aryan tribe split up into different castes. Of these sects* the *Kshatriyas* or the warrior class have learned the secrets of Reality. They have introduced a new philosophical cult known as *Brhmavidya*. The *Brhmavidya* must have originally referred to certain spiritual intuitions obtained through introspection. Man discovered himself for the first time. The inner spiritual principle, the *Atman* is taken to be the Reality. It is neither the body nor the senses. It is something behind and beyond the corporeal frame. It is that which hears but is not heard. It is that which sees but is not seen. It is that which makes the operation of the senses possible while itself is beyond sense-apprehension. This spiritual principle was indifferently called *Atman* or *Brhaman*. Like the Pythogorians of Greece, the Indian thinkers kept their metaphysical cult as a secret. The *Kshatriyas* who,were the discoverers and custodians of the New Thought imparted it only to the deserving few. This *upanishadic* cult, for so was it named, soon replaced the earlier ceremonialism. The *Jñâna-kânda* superseded the *Karma-kânda* as the path to Self-realisation Even the priests, discounting their ceremonial technique, flocked to the Royal courts to be initiated into the new mysteries Thus the age was one of intense discussion, research and self-introspection. During this period again, we have the seeds of the different philosophical systems constructed in the succeeding period. No doubt *Yagnavalkya* is a towering personality of the Upanishadic age. No doubt he attempted reconciliation between the old and the new. In his hands the new wisdom appeared as distinctly monistic. But that current which is evidently the source of the later Vedantic stream was only one of the many currents of the Upanishadic wisdom. This is very well substantiated by the different systems constructed subsequent to the age. The philosophical systems in India are mainly of two classes, the orthodox and the heretic. The six

Darshanâs Pûrva mimamsa, Uttara mimamsa or Vedanta, Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaya, Viseshika—constitute the orthodox systems. The heretical systems are Buddhism, Jainism, the philosophy of the Chârvakas and Brhaspatyâs. Of course this classification does not mean anything but that it was made by Brahminical scholars 'orthox' and 'heretical' are terms mainly based upon the attitude towards the Vedas. Kapila's Sankhya is *Nirisvara* and is allied to Jainism and Buddhism in its opposition to Vedic Sacrifices. Pûrva mimamsa or Vedanta rejects the creator and creation as Vyavaharic and hence the result of *Maya*. There is a good deal of truth in the statement that it is merely Buddhism in disguise. Hence the traditional classification is justified neither by philosophical nor religious criterion.

Of these different systems which reperesent the post-upanishadic thought the Vedanta alone has become prominent. But students who study impartially the other systems will realise the importance of their contributions to Indian thought and culture.

The supremacy of Vedanta over the systems, which are to a very great extent realistic, is not a thing to congratulate ourselves. For, Realism is generally allied to science and many of the scientific theories pertaining to the constitution of the physical world are associated with these realistic schools, e.g., the atomic theory of the *Nyaya* and *Viseshika* schools Idealism even in the West either openly or covertly has been antagonistic to the interests of Science. Hence any attempt to escape from the hypnotic illusion of a powerful Idealism is to be welcomed by impartial students of Science and Philosophy.

It is not possible for us to examine in detail the several realistic schools of Indian Thought. Hence we shall confine ourselves to Jaina Philosophy which is generally neglected by many and misunderstood by the few who attempt to speak on it.

JAINA PHYSICS.

We have referred to the contribution to Indian Wisdom by the Warriors. By their plain living and high thinking they led to the emancipation of human intellect from the thraldom of barren ritualism While the priest-craft was engaged in devising sacrifice after sacrifice their minds were dominated by a passionate desire for solving the

riddle of the Universe and for understanding the nature of the Eternal One behind the world of appearance. This dominant phase of monism centres round the court of *Janaka.* But there must have been other schools of new *Kshatriya* thought. This group of thinkers could not compromise with the traditional thought of the Vedic period. They show a strong bias towards Dualism and Pluralism. They represent the liberal tendency in the new thought itself. Whenever they encountered a conflict between their ideals and the Vedas they did not hesitate to repudiate the authority of the latter. To this left wing of the pioneers of thought we owe the Systems of philosophy such as the *Sankhya,* the *Jaina* and the Buddhistic schools. It is worthy of notice here, by the way, " that the greatest intellectual performances or rather almost all the performances of significance for mankind in India have been achieved by men of the warrior caste."*

The Sankhya system presupposes two kinds of existences, Physical and Spiritual, *Prakriti* and *Purusha* — rather an infinite number of *Purushas.* Salvation according to Sankhya consists in the differentiation between the two, matter and spirit. The individual *Pursha* secures emancipation by recognising its own intrinsic qualities as being distinct from the *Prakritic* transformations which go to constitute the cosmic evolution Not only the genuine physical changes but also the pshychological facts such as will, desire and intellect are credited to *Prakriti* while the *Purushas* remain passive spectators of the whole drama, having nothing to do with moral responsibility.

Evidently following the same dualistic tendencies but differing in the last point of moral responsibility the Jainas and the Buddhists worked out their respective systems with a deep religious colour. The Buddhists seem to have overshot their mark. Equipped with the logic of *Kshanikavâda* they reduced the whole world of reality, physical and spiritual, to mere concatenation of sense-qualities having only a momentary existence—a result independently reached after several centuries by *Hume. Neither* this sensational nihilism of Sâkya Muni nor the monistic interpretation is favoured by the Jainas. They steer clear of the two extremes. They accept the *Purushas* of the *Sankhyas;* but in their hands these *Purushas* cease to be passive spectators They are active architects of their own destiny and

* "Philosophy of Ancient India" by *Richard Garbe.*

through their own effort obtain final freedom bearing all the while full moral responsibility for conduct. The *Prakriti* is also similarly elaborately reconstructed. It is made more definite It is denied many of its psychological implications. It is identified with Matter in modern scientific sense and it is also given an atomic constitution. It appears under a new name—*Pudgala*. The term *pudgala* means matter. The Physical object which has the several sense qualities and which occupies space is also called *Múrta* and *Rupa*, object In speaking about *Pudgala* or matter the Jaina thinkers clearly analyse the qualities apprehended by sense perception. The qualities of touch, taste, smell, colour, and sound are generally associated with *Pudgala*.

But the Physical bodies that are apprehended by sense perception are constituted by atoms or *Paramanús*. It is this atomic structure of the Universe that is the interesting part of Jaina Physics * The *Paramanu* or atom is defined quite in terms of modern physics. Though modern physics revolutionised the concept of Atom still it has not completely annihilated it. No doubt an atom is a cluster of electrons as complex perhaps as the solar system itself. But the discovery of *radio-activity* has not interfered with the laws of Physics and Chemistry based upon atomic conception. The only change that modern Physics has introduced is that Atom is no more simple and basic but complex and perhaps secondary. In spite of this complex nature it does maintain its individuality. No modern physicist will deny that it is the fundamental foundation of the structure of the Physical Universe. It is such an atom or *Paramanu* that is the basis of Physical structure

The *Paramanu* is neither created nor can be destroyed. It is the permanent basis of the Physical Universe. The several kinds of Physical objects are all constituted by the same class of primordial atom. The *Paramanu* cannot be an object of sense perception It is in itself transcending the sense experience and as such it is practically *Amúrta* though it is the basic constituent of all *Múrta*, objects.

This primary atom or the material point has an intrinsic attraction to similar atoms. Thus moleculor aggregates are formed by the combination of atoms. These molecular aggregates

* This doctrine of atomic structure is also prominent in the *Nyaya* and *Viseshika* Schools

are called *Shandhas.** These *skandhas* are again of infinite variety; you may have a molecule constituted by two atoms or three and so on up to infinite number of atoms. Thus every perceivable object is a *skandha* and even the whole physical universe is sometimes spoken of as *Mahaskandha* or the Great aggregate The physical objects being aggregates of atoms or *skandhas* their changes are entirely due to atomic disintegration or aggregation.

THE CONCEPTION OF MOTION.

Having accepted the reality of physical object the Jainas naturally accepted the possibility of real motion.

Motion has always been an unintelligible perplexity to the Idealist. Both in the East and the West Idealistic thinkers have fought shy of this by taking refuge in the conception of *Mâya* or appearance. It is in the western System of thought that the conception figures prominent *Zeno* trying to defend the unchangeable admantine Absolute of *ParmInides* introduced four invincible arguments against the reality of motion. These arguments were accepted as invinciable for several centuries. They figure in some from or other in Kantian antinomies and Hegelian dielectic Even *Bradley* draws upon *Zeno's* wisdom in his attempt to condemn the realities of concrete world to the limbo of appearances. As *Mr. B Russell* points out the arguments are no more irrefutable in the light of modern Mathematics. Hence Realism need not approach the problem with any misgivings. Reality of motion has thus obtained a standing ground in the field of modern philosophy.

What is more important than this is the part played by this concept in Science. For Science the world of reality is a system of energies. This dynamic conception of science has given a new dignity to the concept of motion. In spite of the unwarranted caution exhibited by Physicists like *E. Mach* and *Karl Pearson* modern Physics has once again emphasised the importance and the reality of motion in understanding the mystery of Nature. Always looked upon with suspicion by idealistic metaphysics the doctrine of Reality of motion has been welcomed by Realistic and scientific systems of thought.

But in order to accept the reality of motion of Physical objects the reality of space must be postulated. Thus motion in Jaina doctrine is intimately associated with space and two other Categories

* This term also occurs in Buddhistic philosophy but with a different meaning.

with peculiar nomenclature, of *Dharma* and *Adharma*. We shall examine the Jaina account of these three Categories.

Reality of space is also a crucial doctrine to determine whether metaphysics is indealistic or realistic. Curiously the non-Jaina Indian systems of thought do not pay any prominent attention to the problem of space. In fact the more influential Indian system of Philosopdy, the Vedanta uses the term *Ākâsa* indifferently to denote space and ether. It is the latter meaning that is more prominent. It is to the credit of the ancient Jaina thinkers that they took a bold attempt to attack the problem and that with very great success. This fact is perhaps due to their special interest in Mathematics. An adequate solution of the problem of space and time is intimately connected with Mathematical Philosophy. It is modern Mathematics that has successfully reclaimed once again space and time from the destructive dialectic of the idealistic metaphysics. Space is indispensable to Science and Realistic metaphysics. The wonders of modern science are all associated with the reality of Space and what is contained therein. Hence to "the Indian Realism" space cannot but be real. *Ākâsa* is infinite extension. It accommodates all other real existences. On account of this accommodating function it has a portion which is filled with the other real objects. This portion is called *Lokâkâsa* the world-space because it is co-extensive with the world or *Lokä*. Beyond that there is the infinite empty space which is *Suddha Ananta Ākâsa*.

The interesting fact about this conception of space is the doctrine that space also is constituted by simple elements known as *Akâsânu* or spacial point. This *Akâsânu* is to space what *Pudgala Paramânu*. is to matter. And each *Akâsânu* is related to each *Pudgalanü*. To borrow a convenient modern expression the class of space points and the class of material points are "similar having one to one relation."

The Jaina thinkers elaborately describe the nature of space carefully distinguishing it from matter. It is devoid of the several Physical qualities and as such it is mere extension. It should not be confounded with extended objects.

Matter and space do not exhaust the Physical conception. The Jaina thinker pertinently asks the question why the atoms should be kept together constituting the world of *Maha Skandha*? Why should they not get dissipated throughtout *Anantâkâsa* or infinite space? Then

there would be no world. The very fact that the structure of the world is permanent, that the world is a cosmos and not a chaos implies the existence of another principle which guarantees the permanency of the world's structure and the world form This principle has the function of binding the flying atoms to the world's centre. Its function then is distinctly inhibitive to arrest the flying atom. This Physical principle is called *Adharma* or rest. But if *Adharma* alone were to function in the Universe, there would be absolute rest and universal cosmic paralysis; hence the necessity of a counteracting force called *Dharma*. The function of this is to guarantee free movement for the objects that move of their own accord or otherwise. This principle of *Dharma* or motion then is merely to relieve the universal inhibition that would otherwise result.

These two principle, *Dharma* and *Adharma*, of motion and rest are described in terms that are applicable to the modern conception of *ether*. Both *Dharma* and *Adharma* pervade through space up to the world limit. They are absolutely non-Physical in nature and non-atomic and non-discrete in structure. The qualities of *Pudgala* are not found therein. Nor have they the structure of space which is constituted by space points. These two Physical principle are perfectly simple. Therefore they may be spoken of as one or as many. There are spacial, and yet are non-spacial. They are *Amurta* and *Arupa*. They are neither light nor heavy. They are not objects of sense perception. Their existence is inferred only through their function. Such are the characteristics of these two principles which are distinctly peculiar to Jaina Physics.

The movement of Physical objects and of organic beings is due entirely to other causal agency. Organic beings are capable of spontaneous movement and Physical objects move because of impact received from other Physical moving objects. Movement of these things should not be causally traced to the agency of *Dharma*. Similary when the moving objects come to rest. rest should not be interpreted as the result of the agency of *Adharma*. *Dharma* and *Adharma* are devoid of any kind of direct causal potency. Their function is purely external and indirect. Their neutrality is so much emphasised by the Jaina thinkers that there conld be no mistake about their meaning. These are in short the necessary Physical postulates without posting which the structure and form of Physical Universe will be quite unintelligible.

JAINA METAPHYSICS.

There are two important concepts in Jaina Metaphysics which are preplexing to students of Jainism, the *Astikâyas* and the *Dravyas*. The term *Astikâya* is a compound name made up of *Asti* and *Kâya* which respectively mean existing and extensive magnitude. *Astikâya* therefore means a real that has extensive magnitude. The other term *Dravya* means the real that is fluent or changing. We shall try to explain these two concept in detail.

The *Astikâya* are five in number, *Jîva* (soul) *pudgala* (matter), *dharma* (principle of motion), *adharma* (principle of rest) and *âkâsa* (space). These five build up the Cosmos. Space and matter are distinctly extended reals. *Dharma* and *Adharma* are indirectly related to space. Their operation is in space and is limited by *Lokâkâsa*. Thus they may also be considered as related to space. Lastly Life is generally associated with body, the organic body constituted by *Pudgala* or matter. Jiva is operative in and conditioned by such a physical medium. In a way therefore Jiva also is related to space. These five existences which have spatiality either directly or indirectly are the five *Astikâyas* These are the constituent elements of the universe or the world.

KÂLA.

Kâla or time though not an element of the physical universe may be mentioned here. Since change and motion are admitted to be real, time also must be considered real. The real are absolute time as contrasted with the relative time is constituted by simple elements known as *Kalânûs* or instants. Instants, points and atoms are the characteristic conceptions of Jaina thought and in this respect it has a wonderful corroboration from the field of modern mathematics.

The Jaina thinkers in distinguishing time from the five *Astikâyas* made use of an important idea. *Astikâya* is spatiality or extensive magnitude. This extensive magnitude is denoted by a technical name—*Tiryak Prachaya* or horizontal extension.

When the simple elements, say, the points are so arranged in a series where each term is an item also in another series we must have the two demensional series which will correspond to surface or extension. Wherever there is such a *Tiryak Prachaya* we have *stikâya*. But time or *Kâla* has only *Urdha Prachaya*. The

elements are in a forward direction. The series is *mono-dimensional* or linear order. Therefore *Kâla* has no extension either directly or indirectly. Hence it is not an *Astikâya.* Though it is not an *Astikâya* it is distinctly a real entity which accounts for changes in other things.

Such are the characteristics of real time. This should not be confounded with *Vyavâhara Kâla* or relative time which is measured by some conventional units of either long or short duration. These conventional distinctions would have no meaning if they are not co-ordinated in a single real time series.

THE SIX DRAVYAS.

The term Dravya denotes any existence which has the important characteristic of persistence through change. Jaina conception of reality excludes both a permenent and unchanging real of the *Permenidion* type and also the mere eternal flux of *Haraclites.* An unchanging permanent and mere change without substratum are unreal dan impossible abstractions. Jaina system admits only the dynamic reality or *Dravya.* *Dravya* then is that which has a permanent substantiality which manifests through change of appearing and disappearing. *Utpâta*—Origin, *Vyaya*—decay and *Dhrouvya*—permanency form the triple nature of the Real. To emphasise the underlying identity alone would end vedantic conception of this Realas *Brahman.* To emphasise the change alone would result in the *Kshainka Vâda* of the Buddhist. The reality as a stream of discrete and momentary elements. The Concept of *Dravya* reconciles both these aspects and combines them into an organic unity. It is an identity expressing through difference, a permanency continuing through change. It corresponds to the modern conception of organic development rather in its Hegelian aspect. It has duration; it is movement; *it is the Elan Vital.* The five *Astikâyas* and *Kâla* or time are the six *Dravyas* or the real existences.

DRAVYA GUNA AND PARYAYA

or

SUBSTANCE, QUALITIES AND MODES.

Having introduced tho Jaina conception of the real let us examine the distinctions in the realem of the reals. The dynamic

substance or *Dravya* is always associated with certain intrinsic and inalienable qualities called *Gunas*. Thus the yellow colour, malleability, etc., will be the qualities or *Guna* of the *Dravya* gold. The *Dravyas* with its inalienable qualities must exist in some state or form. This is its mode of existence or *Paryaya*. This mode or *Paryaya* is subject to change. It may be destroyed and a new mode may appear. But this creation and destruction are relevent only to *Paryayás* or modes and not to *Dravyas* the constitutive substance. That can neither be destroyed nor created. That is eternal.

The approximate parallel conceptions in the western thought will be *Spinoza's* substance, qualities and modes. Of course for *Spinoza* there was only one substance wherens here we have six distinct substances or *Dravys*. The term 'attribute' is used in a technical sense by *Spinoza* whereas it means merely the qualities in Jaina Metaphysics. Each *Dravya* or the real has its own appropriate attributes. Matter has the sense qualities of touch, taste, etc., soul has *Chetana* consciousness, and so with the other *Dravyas*. What is the relation between *Dravya* and *Guna*? The reals and their qualities? This is an important problem even in modern metaphysics. There have been two distinct answers proposed by philosophers One answer always emphasises the permanent basis as the real and the other the changing qualities. The former condemns change as mere appearance or *Maya*, whereas the latter condemns the permanent substance as a mere figment of imagination. The former school generally ends in agnoticism and maintains that the real is unknown and unknowable. The latter generally ends in scepticism and sweeps away in a flood of doubt the fundamental concepts of life and world, of morality and religion. In India we have *Advaita Vendanta* as an example of the former and Bhuddism of the latter. In the West the philosophers, like *Locke* and *Kant* may be mentioned as representatives of the former school and *Hume* may be taken as a type of the latter.

The problem is once again taken by *Bradley* who after an acute analysis codemns it to be insolube. Hence according to his own dialectic the thing with its qualities is self-contradictory and therefore an appearance. This is a conclusion which goes clean against science and common sense. Thing-hood is not after all a self-

contradictory notion. For the Jains it is a fundamental concept. The thing or *Dravya* as it is a dynamic entity is always flowing. It has no existence apart from its qualities which in their turn are not really distinct from the *Dravya*. The thing-in-itself apart from all the qualities is merely an empty abstraction The qualities themselves are not merely momentary fleeting sensations The thing exists in and through its qualities and the qualities related and organised constitute the thing. The difference between the two is only a difference of reference and not difference of existence; in the technical language of Jaina metaphysics, the *anyatva* between *dravya* and *guṇa* is only *vyapadesamātra*. They donot have *pradesapraduktva*. Hence they are one in reality though having distinct nomenclature and reference

Paryāya is another technical term demanding careful understanding *Paryāya* means mode of existence. This again is viewed from two different aspects, *arthaparyāya* and *vyanjana-prayāya*. We have already mentioned that *dravya* is but an entity that is continually changing This triple nature of reality that is permanency through births and deaths, through creation and destruction gives to *dravya* a characteristic mode of existence every moment. This continuous flow of the real is parallel to the continuous flow of the duration of time. This intrinsic change of *dravya* is known as *arthaparyāya*. All the six *dravyas* have this *arthaparyaya*. What is *vyanjanaparyāya* ? It is not merely the cross section in the continuous flow of *dravya*. *Vyanjanaparyāya* has a pretty fixed duration of existence. Besides the molecular aggregation and disintegration that take place every moment in a physical object, the object may have a particular mode of existence as a pot, for example *for a certain duration of time. This paryāya of pot is vyanjanaparyāya* of *pudgala*. Similarly for jiva. The continuous change that takes place in consciousness is Jiva's *arthaparyāya*. Its *existence as a particular organism as a man or a deva with determinate* age is the *vyanjanaparyāya* of Jiva's. Thus *Jiva. and pudgala* have both the kinds of *paryayās* whereas the other four *dravyas*, have got only *arthaparyāya* alone. The reals are thus exhausted by the six *dravyas* with their respective *gunas* and *paryāyas*.

Since these *Dravyas* are reals they have *satta* or *astitva* or existence as there common characteristic. From this point of view

of *satta* all the *Dravyas* may be brought under one class. Though from the class point of view all the *dravyas* are one, still the *satta*, their common characteristic should not be abstracted and postulated as the unitary substance of which the other *Dravyas* may be taken as *paryayas*. This *ekanta* view is condemned as unwarranted and erroneous. The six *Dravyas*, in spite of their common characteristic of *satta* are fundamental and irreducible one to another.

One more point and we may leave this topic. A thing in concrete world is therefore a *paryâya* of anyone of the *Dravyas*. It is also otherwise called *artha*. An *artha* or a thing is a corporate unity of an infinite number of qualities, just as the Cosmos is a system of infinite number of *arthâs*. The one is extensive and the other is intensive; but both are infinite wholes. According to Jaina Philosophy therefore, we require an infinite thought to apprehend them completely. He who cannot know a thing completely cannot know the world completely and conversely he who cannot know the world completely cannot know even a single thing really and completely. This particular attitude of the Jaina thinkers reminds us of Tennyson's lines in, "*A flower in the crannied wall*" "If I could know thee root and all I could know what God and man is."

Having spoken of the *Dravyas* in general, let us try to explain *Jiva-dravya* a little more in detail.

JAINA BIOLOGY.

Perhaps it is inaccurate to speak of biology in the system before us. The science of biology as such is peculiar to modern age; hence we are not quite justified in expecting such a scientific conception in a work of pre-christian era and which is perhaps of the same age as of Plato and Aristotle. Naturally therefore, the ideas about the organic world are curiously intermixed with various mythic and fantastic conception relating to being of Hell and *Svarga*. Eliminating all these as irrelevent we still have considerable material to enable us to have an insight into the ancient ideas about life and living beings.

One important conception that would strike the reader in the very beginning is the organic unity of the plant and the animal world. Vegetable kingdom is distinctly organic. Its nature was accurately observed and carefully described. The whole plant world is included in the class of organisms having one sense, i. e. the senses of contact. Then the world of animals and insects is classified according to the

same principle of sense organs. The animal world beginning with such insects as earthworm and ending with man is brought under four main groups, organisms, with two, three, four, and five senses.

PRANAS.

Associated with organisms there is the Conception of *Prânas* or the essential characteristics of living beings. These are mainly four. *Balaprâna, Indriyaprâna, Ayuh Prâna*, and *Uchhvâsa—nischhvasa Prâna*. Every organism implies certain capacity of spontaneous activity. This capacity for action is *Balaprâna* or life potency. Every organisms must possess some kind of sense awareness. This implies the possession of a sense organ and the capacity to apprehend the environment through that sense. The number of sense organs is different according to stages of organic development. Next is *Ayuh Prâna* or duration of life. Every living organism has a limited duration of life. This organic capacity to persist through a certain duration is *Ayuh Prâna* And lastly respiration. There is no organism without this *Prâna* of *Uchhvasa—nichhvasa*. These four main *Prânas* are the essential attributes of organic beings.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF BIRTHS.

One other interesting point is the enumeration of the different means of birth of organisms. Young ones may be produced from *Garbha*. These are *Garbhajâs* young ones produced from the womb. Then the *Andajâs*, the young one produced from eggs. Thirdly *Sammurchana* or spontaneous generation. This refers to minute organisms. And lastly they speak of *Upapadikas* in the case of *Devas and Narakas* The last one of course we may treat as beyond scientific pale The recognition of spontaneous generation is a point deserving special emphasis.

MICROSCOPIC BEINGS.

Another fact deserving notice is the early recognition of the existence of microscopic organisms. These are called *Sukshma Ekendriya Jivas* or microscopic organisms having only one sense. These are said to fill the earth, air, water and fire. The possibility of microscopic organisms in fire seems a little too fantastic.* But in the case of the other three we need have no hesitation as they are fully established by modern Science.

In this connection it is necessary to point out that H. Jacobi's conjecture that Jainisms is very ancient though historically true rests on an

*For the verification of this, one must look to the result of further scientific investigation.

of *Samsari Jiva* or living beings in our ordinary sense. Conduct or behaviour is also assumed to be the natural manifestation of life. *Châritra* or conduct is also associated with all *Samsari Jivas*. Thus from the point of view of modern Psychology consciousness has a threefold function and this is also assummed in Jaina system.

This tripartite division of consciousness is expressed in another way also. In describing the characteristics of *Jiva* its *Chetana* character is said to mainfest not only in *Jñâna, Darsana*-understanding and perception but also in *Karma Chetanâ* and *Karmaphala Chetanâ* awareness of action awareness of pleasure pain The recognition of the threefold aspect of consciousness may be illustrated even from the conception of a perfect being. The characteristics of a perfect being are *Anantajñâna, Anantadarsana, Anantavirya,* and *Anata sûkha*—infinite Knowledge, Infinite perception Infinite power and Infinite Bliss. The other characteristics are irrelevent to our purpose The first two of the enumerated qualities Infinite knowledge and infinite perception are distinctly cognitive. Infinite power implies activity or conation and infinite bliss the hedonic experience. Thus throughout the Jaina account of life the three aspects of consciousness are assumed.

SOUL AND BODY.

Every organism or a *Samsari Jiva* is an organic unity of two distinct entities, *Jiva* and *Pudgala*, soul and body. Naturally therefore there crops up the problem of the relation between the two. Soul is *Chetana* (consciousness) *Amûrta* (non corporeal) *Arûpa* (non-sentient) whereas body has the opposite qualities in each case. One may be said to be the contradiction of other. The Dualism is so emphatically expressed here as in *Cartesianism*.

The term body implies two different things. The gross body that we actually perceive through our senses. This is constituted and nourished by matter taken in the form of food, etc This body is every moment changing and will be given up by the soul after a certain period. Besides this gross body there is for every *Jiva* a subtle body known as *Karmâna Sarira* This body is constituted by subtle material molecules known as *Karma Pudgala*. This subtle body may also be changing. But still it is a necessary and inalienable appendage of *Samsari Jiva*. This is transcended only in the perfect state. In discussing the relation between the states of this *Karma Sarira*

and the states of *Jiva*, Jainism makes an important distinction between *Upâdâna Karta* and *Nimitta Karta*, substantial cause and external cause. Mental states are the modifications of the mind and Physical states are the modifications of matter. Mind is the *Upâdana Karta* of psychical states and matter is the *Upâdana Karta* of physical changes and yet physical states and psychical states may be mutually external conditions. The causal activity contemplated here is a bit obscure. One Psychical State is due to the immediately antecedent psychical state and similarly one physical state is the result of its own antecedent. Thus mental series in a way is independent of physical series. But still a mental change may be externally determined by a physical change and the physical conversely by the mental change. The relation between the physical and the mental is purely external. In the technical language of the system one is the *Nimita Karta* of the other. So far as we are able to make out, the meaning seems to be this ; a mental change is due to two condition one an *Upâdana Karta* a mental antecedent and another *Nimita Karta* a physical antecedent. The mental change is the result of both these antecedent conditions physical and mental. Similarly a change in the body is to be traced to two conditions : an *Upâdana* condition a physical antecedent in this case and a *Nimitta* condition a mental antecetdent. The system emphasises the causal interrelation between mind and matter even though the interrelation is one of external condition The reason given for accepting this interrelation is the reality ofmoral responsibility. If there is no causal interrelation between mind and matter why should a person be taken responsible for his conduct. If moral responsibility is real, if moral evaluation of conduct is genuine then conduct must be the intimate expression of the personality.

Though the discussion is between *Jiva* and its *Karmana Sarira* the discussion and its conclusion may very well be taken as relevant to our problem of the relation between soul and body. The whole discussion may be taken as expressing the views in regard to the wider problem. Soul and body are capable of causal interrelation and a change in one always involves two antecedents, one physical and the other psychical. If causal interrelation is not admitted certainly ethical value will remain unexplained and unintelligible.

SENSATIONS AND SENSE ORGANS.

The sense organs recognised in the system are the usual five. But sometimes *Manas* or mind is also spoken of as an *Indriya.*

Indriyas in general are of two kinds. *Dravya Indriya* or the physical sense organ and *Bhāva Indriya* the psychical counterpart. Sensary awareness is the result of the contact between *Dravya Indriya* and the physical object sensed. It is assumed of course that only physical objects or *Pudgala* that can be apprehended by sensation. This contact may be direct or indirect. In the case of sight the contact is indirect. The object perceived by vision is not brought in contact with the eyes. The objects in space are revealed to us by light or *Jyoti*. It is through being illuminated they are apprehended by vision. The exact operation of light on the eyes is not further explained. In the case of the other senses we have direct contact. But the direct contact may be *Sthula* or *Sukshma* gross or subtle. In the case of contact and taste we have the direct contact with the gross object. But in the case of smell we have contact with minute particles of the object smelt. In the case of sound also we have *Sukshma* contact. But in this case what the ears come in contact with is merely a kind of motion. Unlike the other Indian system of thought which associate sound with *Ākāsa* Jaina system explains the sound as due to the violent contact of one physical object with the other. It is said to be generated by one *Skandha* knocking against another *Skandha*. Sound is the agitation set up by this knock. It is on account of this theory of sound the system speaks of an atom or *Paramanu* as unsounding by itself. Thus in all these cases the environmental stimulus is either directly or indirectly a physical object. Sense perception is the result of the contact between two physical things *Dravyendriya* on the one hand and the stimulus from the object on the other hand.

ANALYSIS OF SENSATIONS.

The next interesting point is the analysis of the different sensations obtained through different sense organs. Through the eyes we have the apprehension of five colours. Visual sensations consist of the five elements or *Pancha Varna*. But we have to note here that sensation of white is also included as one of the colours. In this respect the term *Varna* or colour is used in its popular sense and not in the scientific sense. Similarly taste is of five kinds, pungent, bitter, sweet, sour and saline. These five tastes are obtained through the tongue which is *Rasanendriya*. Skin is *Sparsanendriya* and through it the following eight kinds of cutaneous sensations are obtained: light and heavy, soft and hard, rough and smooth, and

cold and hot sensations, four pairs of opposite senses. These cutaneous sensations include sensations of temperature, contact, pressure and muscular or *kinæsthetic sensations. Sensation of smell* is only of two kinds, *Sugandha* and *Durgandha*. Sound sensations are of infinite variety. The different kinds of sounds natural and artificial, purposive and non-purposive, articulate and inarticulate, musical and non-musical are spoken of.

SENSE PERCEPTION.

What we directly apprehend through a sense organ is not merely particular sensation but the object. Sense perception is known as *Darsana*. *Darsana* is the perception of a physical object. *Darsana* may be *Chakshu Darsana* and *Achakshu Dasana*. *Chakshu Darsana* means perception of an object through visual sensation. *Achakshu Darsana* means perception through the other senses. *Darsana* or sense perception not only implies the passive receptivity of the mind but also the active interpretation of the received stimulus, i. e. *Darsana* means the complication between the datum and mental construction. This is implied in the description given of "knowledge by acquaintance" or *mati Avagraha*, *Eha*, *Avaya* are different stages of sense perception. *Avagraha* refers to roughly the datum. But the datum does not mean anything. It is merely the ununderstood patch of colour, e. g in the case of visual sensation. At the presentation of this visual patch there is the questioning attitude of mind which is represented by the term *Eha*. As a result of this examination we may interpret the object. This interpretation is *Avaya*. In the case of visual perception these three different stages may not be clearly distinguishable. But in the case of auditory perception we may clearly recognise the different stages. *Darsana* then includes all these three stages, then only is the thing known to us.

[These three stages together with *Darsana* or recollection constitute the different forms of *Mati Jñāna* But recollection is connected with memory and need not be brought under sense perception.]

In this connection we have to notice one important point. The term *Darsana* is not confined to sense perception. It is a general term including the sense perception as well as the supernormal perception of other kinds. Two kinds of supernormal perception are generally mentioned by Jaina thinkers, (1) *Avadhi Darsana* (2)

Kevala Darsana. Avadhi Darsana refers to the peculiar kind of clairvoyant capacity which is able to perceive things and events in distant places and also in distant times either past or future Objects and events not evident to the normal sense perception are obvious to *Avadhi Darsana.* But the objects of *Avadhi* perception appear as if they are perceived normally close at hand. It is said that *Avadhi Darsana* is concerned with only *Rupa Dravyas* or perceptual objects. The other *Darsana* known as *Kevala Darsana* is perception *par excellence.* It is associated with perfect consciousness This faculty is acquired only after complete emancipation from *karmic* bondage. To this perfect perception the whole reality is obvious. In short it refers to the all-perceiving faculty of *Paramâtma.* What we are justified in speaking of in connection with Jaina psychology are the normal sense perception (*Chakshu Darsana* and *Achakshu Darsana* and the supernormal clairvoyant perception (or *Avadhi Darsana*).

JÑÂNA OR KNOWLEDGE

Jaina account of cognition is also interesting. Jñâna or understanding is said to be of different kinds according to means employed in cognition. (1) *Mati Jñâna,* is knowledge obtained through the normal means of sense perception and memory based upon the same. This is the common inheritance of all persons. (2) *Sruta Jñâna* is knowledge obtained through testimony of books. This corresponds to knowledge by description. It is acquired by study. Therefore it is possessed by only the learned men. Besides these two means of knowledge there are three other supernormal means of understanding. These are :- *Avala Jñâna, Mana Paryaya Jñâna,* and *Kevala Jñâna. Avadhi Jñâna* is the understanding of the nature of the objects obvious to *Avadhi Darsana. Mana Paryaya Jñâna* refers to a peculiar kind of telepathic knowledge acquired by persons of certain stage of spiritual development. It is a means by which knowledge of alien minds is obtained. The last one of course refers to the perfect understanding or the omniscience of the Perfect Being or *Purushottama.* Treating this as the metaphysical ideal we have to recognise the other four kinds of cognition as relevant to our psychological interest.

AFFECTION.

Affective conseiousaness plays a very important part in Jaina metaphysics. The whole religious discipline is directly secured by

a stoic freedom from the affective influence of environmental objects. Experience of pleasure, pain, is assumed to be the specific characteristic of organised beings or *Samsâri Jivas*. In one of the descriptions given of Jiva it is mentioned that Jiva has the tendency to continue beneficial activity from which pleasure results and to discontinue the harmful activity from which pain results. This is so very analogous to biological description of the instinct of self-preservation. Jiva equipped with this quality naturally desires pleasant things and avoids unpleasant things.

Since the psychological analysis is subordinate to the metaphysical system several facts of psychological interest are thrown into the background of the philosophical scheme. Nevertheless there is no mistake about the striking psychological analysis exhibited by Jaina thinkers Experience of pleasure and pain, is generally referred to as *Karmaphala Chethana* or consciousness of the fruits of action. Pleasure and pain are always viewed in relation to action.

Bhâva or affective consciousness is of three kinds, *Sûbha Bhâva, Asubha Bhâva*, and *Suddha Bhâva* Feeling of pleasant nature, feeling of an unpleasant nature, and feeling of pure nature. The last one refers to the enjoyment of Self by Self. As such it may be taken to mean the spiritual experience of the pure Self. The other two kinds of the feeling are relevant to the point. These are corresponding to the normal feelings generally recognised by students of psychology. These feelings are generally related to certain objects in the environment to which there may be attraction or aversion in the Jiva. Thus on the one hand feelings manifest as the result of *Karma* or action and on the other hands they are determined by objects in the environment.

A very interesting classification of emotions is given in connection with the conditions of *Kârmic* bondage. These emotions are generally divided into two main classes *Sakashâya*, and *Akashâya* those that have the tendency to colour or stain the purity of the soul and these that have not that tendency. The *Sakashâya* ones are *Krodha*, or anger, *Mâna* or pride, *Mâya* or deceitfulness or dissembling and *Lobha* or greed. The *Akashaya* emotions are

Hâsya—laughter.

Rati—feeling of attraction.

Arati—feeling of repulsion.

Soka—sorrow.

Bhaya—fear.

Jugupsâ—feeling of disgust which may manifest in hiding ones own weaknesses

Striveda—peculiar sex feeling of women.

Pumsaveda—peculiar sex feeling of men.

Napumsaka Veda—The corrupt sex feeling of eunuchs.

Again certain instinctive tendencies are also referred to as *Samjnâs*. These are *Ahâra*, *Bhaya*, *Maithuna*, and *Parigraha*—hunger, fear, sexual appetite and acquisitive instincts. There are corresponding feelings to these instinctive appetites which may colour the consciousness of a Jiva

The feeling aspect of sensations is implied in the very classification of the sense elements The feeling aspect is predominent in the case of smell and test whereas it is indirectly associated with auditory and visual sensations. The rest of the references to feeling of pleasure pain are purely metaphysical and therefore they are more of religious interest than of scientific interest.

CONATION OR THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF ACTION.

Âtma is not only *Jñâni* and *Bhoktâ*, the knower and the enjoyer but is also a *Kartâ* or the agent. This may be considered as the centeral idea of Jaina system. Soul by its own activity is able to make or mar its own destiny. The Theory of Karma is intimately associated with the causal agency of *Âtma*. As the result of this metapysical assumption we have several facts of psychological importance mentioned in the System. Even in the lowest organism there is the tendency to continue pleasurable activity and to discontinue painful activity. This primitive tendency of life or *Jiva* is just the conative activity which develops into conscious choice of an end or purpose which is the characteristic of volitional activity. In human beings this conative tendency is naturally associated with *râga* and *dvesha*, desire and aversion

Conative activity in general is denoted by the term *Karmachetana*. This *Karma chatana* or consciousness of activity is to be associated with the Zoological Kingdom—*Trasa Jivâs*. The plant world or the world of *Ekandriya Sthavara Jivâs* is devoid of this *Karma Chetana*. They have *Karma Phal*[illegible] alone wher[illegible] the other *Jivâs* have

both and also *Jñâna Chetana* to boot. The importance of volitional activity is clearly testified by the part it plays in the Jaina System of ethics. The psychology of *will* is also connected with another doctrine of psychological importance. *Mohaniya Karma* which is considered to be the root of all evil has two aspects cognitive and conative. What is known as *Drasana Mohaniya* interferes with the faculty of perception and belief *Charitra Mohaniya* is a sort of corruption of the will ; it misleads the will and thus leads the *Jiva* towards evil : We shall consider the relation between *Karma* and *Atma* when we go to consider the ethical aspect of Jaina system. In the meanwhile let us see what Jaina logic is.

JAINA LOGIC.

UNDER this head we have to consider the following three points:—

1. *Pramâna*
2. *Naya*
3. *Saptabangi*

Pramâna and *Naya* refer to understanding. (*Pramânanayairadhigamaha*) Knowledge is through *Pramâna* and *Naya* *Pramâna* refers to the apprehension of reality or valid knowledge. *Naya* refers to the different aspects of considering things. These are the two means of enriching knowledge. *Saptabangi* refers to the theory of predication which is peculiar to Jaina System.

Pramâna is of two kinds, *Pratyaksha Pramâna* and *Paroksha-Pramâna*,—Immediate Apprehension of reality and Mediate Apprehension of reality. Ordinarily the term *Pratyaksha* refers to sense perception. This ordinary meaning of the word is considered secondary and subordinate by Jaina thinkers. They call it *Vyavahârika Pratyaksha*. The real *Pratyaksha* is known as *paramârthika pratyaksha* or that which is apprehended by *Âtma* immediately and directly. According to this view sense perception is indirect and mediate, for the sensory object is apprehended by *Âtma* only through the medium of sense organs.

Pramânâs in general are five, — *Mati, Śruti, Avadhi, Manahparyayâ,* and *Kevalâ*. These five are already explained in connection with cognition. Of these *Mati* and *Śruti* are considered *Paroksha Pramânâs*. The other three are cosidered to be *Pratyaksha Pramânâs*.

There is one interesting fact about these *Pramáṇás* The standard of reality is distinctly experienced in its normal and super-normal aspects. The normal experience would be *Mati Jñána*; the super-normal experience would include *Avadhi*, *Manahparyaya* and *Kevala*. These four would constitute direct knowledge by the Self, but our experience is also enriched by the testimony of others. Therefore the testimony of others transmitted through literature is also cosidered as one of the *Pramáṇás*. This is *Śruta Jñána*. This is not given the supereminent place which it has in the other Hindu systems of thought. The *Vedás* form the ultimate *Pramáṇa* for the *Brahmanical* systems. Every other principle of knowledge is subordinated to the *Vedic* revelation which itself must be implicitly accepted. But the Jainas recognise *Sruta Jñána* as only one of the *Pramáṇás* and even then it is only subordinate. Direct and Immediate Apprehension is the ultimate standard of truth. The *Pramáṇás* are all distinctly human and they are not considered to be eternal. It is this humanistic element in the system that is specially interesting. Three of these five *Pramáṇás* have the possibility of being corrupted by adverse psychological conditions. Thus they will become misleadignor corrupt *Pramáṇás* or *Pramanabhasas*. Thus *Mati Jñána* may become *Kúmati*. This evidently refers to illusory and hallucinatory perceptions aud erroneous inferences. *Śruti* may become *Kúśruti*. This would be feeding ones intellect with fictitious philosophy and unreliable literature. False and misleading clairvoyance is the corrupt form of *Avadhi* which is technically called *Vibhanga Jñána*; hence right *pramáṇás* would exclude these three corrupt forms of *Kúmati Kúśruti*, and *Vibhanga*. But in the case of the other two *Pramáṇas* there is no such psssibility of falsification. *Manahparyaya* is the supernormal faculty acquired after great spiritual development and *Kevala* is the Ideal reached after complete emancipation. Hence in these two cases there is no chance of extraneous interference. The right forms of the former together with the latter two constitute the *Pramáṇas*

From the short enumeration of the *Pramáṇas* given above it is clear that the Jaina doctrine of *Pramáṇas* is slightly different from that of the Hindu Systems in general. The *Pramáṇas* such as *Pratyaksha*, *Anumána*, *Upamana*, Sabda, etc. which are variously stated by the various systems of Hindu Philosophy are all

comprehended by *Mati Jñāna* and *Śruta Jñāna*. Even in these two cases objective corroboration seems to be the most important criterion of the true *Pramanas*. In addition to these two normal sources of Knowledge they recognise the other three supernormal sources. Thus they recognised not merely the intellect but also the higher intuition which *Bergson* emphasises. *Bergson* is no doubt right in placing intuition over intellect. Intellect is the analytic process of understanding things. Hence it shares the artificial nature of the process of analysis. It is no doubt incapable of accounting for the vision of artist or the poet. The *Daemon* of *Socrates* and the *Christ* of *St. Paul* are quite beyond the pale of intellectual analysis. The Reality like the *Proteus* of ancient myth slips out from the grip of intellect but is quite evident to the supernormal intuition. The existence of such a supernormal faculty in man we have an inkling of, through the lifting of the veil by recent psychic research. The normal personality is but a fraction of the total personality which is more of the subconscious nature. It is the sub conscious self that seems to be the storehouse of spiritual power and wisdom. One who has learnt to tap the resources of this hidden self, becomes a genious in the field of art or morality. To him is given the open *seasame* to unlock the secrets of the universe. A philosophy of knowledge, therefore, must necessarily take cognisance of such a supernormal intuition.

But to recognise this is not to deprecate the intellect altogether. According to *Bergson* what is revealed by the intellect is quite untrustworthy. Such a summary condemnation of the intellect would be an unwarranted impeachment of modern Science. Intuiton apotheosised at such a cost would be no more than a philosophical fetish. A more reasonable attitude would be to recognise both the intellect and intuition as adequate means of apprehending the nature of reality so long as they have corroboration by objective evidence. Rationalism which could not accomodate any suppernormal faculty and mysticism which could not stand the glare of Reason, both are inadequate representation of the full nature of human personality whose powers are inexhaustible and whose depths are unfathomable. The Jaina doctrine of *Pramânas* is able to accommodate both from the olwest to the highest in the order of gradation.

Jñâna and *Jñeya*

KNOWLEDGE AND THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE.

The recognition of the distinction between the *Pramânas* and *Pramânâbhasâs* implies an important philosophical principle—The existence of an objective reality which is beyond and beside knowledge. Knowledge is not the only form of reality. If that be the case Jaina philosophy would not be different from *Advaita*. Its whole philosophical claim as an independent system of thought rests on the admission of the independent existence of the objective universe besides consciousness. The world of objective reality is apprehended by perception or *darśana* and understood by intellect or *Jñâna* which two are but the manifestations of *chetana* the intrinsic nature of the soul Nowhere in the Jaina system is it even casually implied that the object of Knowledge is in any way modified or interfered with by the process of Knowing. In order that *Darsâna* may reveal the form and *Jñâna* may discover the nature there must be an object postulated, an object which is logically prior to the intellectual process. This postulating of an independent object of Knowledge should not be interpreted to imply the passivity of the intellect. The continuous activity of the *Jiva* or soul is the central doctrine of Jaina thought. Hence the intellect is an active manifestation of consciousness but this activity has the power of revealing its own nature as well as *non chetana* objects beyond. Thus the term *Jñeya* or the object of Knowledge includes both the self and the non-self, mental facts as well as physical facts. The example of a light is very often brought in to illustrate the nature of Knowledge Just as light reveals itself as well as other objects which are illuminated so also *Jñâna* reveals the *tattvas* both *Jiva* and *Ajiva*. Hence it would be quite inconsistent to interpret the relation between *Jñâna* and *Jñeya* Knowledge and its object in any other way that would make both inseparable elements of any higher unity No doubt as far as *Jiva* or soul is concened the relation between *Jñâna* and *Jñeya* is very intimate. The soul is *Jñâni* the possesser of *Jñâna* or knowledge. There can be no *Jiva* without *Jñâna* for without it he would be *achetana* and indistinguishable from other *ajiva dravyas*; and there could be no knowledge without *Jiva* for being foundationless and off its moorings from life It will cease to have connection even with consciousness

Thus *Jñāna* and *Jñāni*, knowledge and self are absolutely inseparable though distinguishable by name. But this very name *Jñāni* may also become *Jñeya-padārtha* the object of knowledge to his own *Jñāna* The, *Jñāni*, *Jñāna* and *Jñeya*, the self, knowledge, and the self as object of knowledge all become different aspects of a single concrete unity.

But Knowledge or *Jñāna* is also related to *ajiva padārthas* that is, physical objects can also be *Jñeya padārthas*,—When physical *objects are the objects of Knowledge the relation of Knowledge to its* object is not the same as in the previous case that between Knowledge and self as object of Knowledge. *Jñāna* is distinctly alien to *ajiva padārthas* though these become as *Jñeya* related to *Jñāna* or *Knowledge The function of Jñāna or knowledge here is to reveal* the *ajiva padārthas* in their true nature as *achetana* or physical. How could *chetana* reveal the nature of *achetana* things ? This question is rejected as unreasonable for the simple reason that it is unanswerable for the question means why *Jñāna* should have its *Jñāna* nature. That *Jñāna* though alien to the nature of physical object—these latter being *achetana* can still be related to them and reveal their nature to *Jñāni* or the knowing self—is taken as the fundamental postulate of *Jaina Epistemology*.

Thus the close study of the philosophical foundation of *Jaina Epistemology* reveals the following two facts.

(1) The relation between knowledge and its objects, *Jñāna* and *Jñeya* as far as *ajiva padārthas* are concerned is purely one of external relation.

(2) As a corollary of the first we have the independent existence of *Jñeya padārthas* or objects of knowledge, of course with the exception of self, which has an internal relation to *Jñāna* or Knowledge.

The distinction between internal relation and external relation requires explanation. The *Russell-Bradley* controversy as to the nature of relations is an interesting though an intricate topic of modern philosophy. But here we cannot deal with it in detail It is enough to indicate what the terms mean. *Bradley-Bosanquet* school of modern idealism following the traditions of *Hegal* assume that all relations are grounded in the nature of the terms related. That is, the terms apart from the relations and the relation apart fr

the terms will not be the same. A and B having a relation R cannot be the same A and B if they cease to have that relation R Change or cessation of a particular relation will lead to change or the nullification of the terms so related. A blind faith in this metaphysical doctrine has constrained the *Hegelian* Idealist to subscribe to many an absurd doctrine. The terms related to one another since their nature is tyrannically controlled by this relation are to be interpreted as members or elements of a higher organic unity. The members of a family therefore are the elements of the unity of family. Society itself is an organic unity like plant or an animal body having as its elements the different human personalities who constitute the society. Nay, even the whole universe is conceived as an organic unity or system having as its members both things and persons. The logical result of this doctrine is the complete subordination of human personality, to this fetish of a higher unity beside which there is nothing real Every thing is degraded to the level of appearance and unreality. The political and moral consequences of such a metaphysical doctrine need not be portrayed in detail. It is enough to say that the catastrophe which destroyed the European civilisation is the necessary consequence of the culture and social organisation inspired by the philosophy of the Absolute.

But we have a healthy change introduced into modern thought by the invaluable contributions from *B. Russell.* He the upholder of the opposite doctrine of external relations sufficiently exposed the inadequacy and the falsity of the rival doctrine. According to him two terms A and B may have a relation R and yet the nature of the terms may not be affected by the change of the relations. To exhibit the truth of the controversy we may cite the following illustration which is very useful to the reader though crude. You may have for example a chair by the side of a table. The two are in a certain spatial relation: say the chair is to the south of the table. If the relation is changed, (*i e*) if the chair is placed to the north of the table then according to the doctrine of internal relations both the terms the chair and the table must undergo change in their nature because of a change in the relations. This seems absurd to the unsophisticated observer. In this case he knows fully well that there is no change in the things themselves except the change of position. To persist in the belief that the things do change in consequence of the change of position is merely to surrender one's

own reason to the false gods of philosophy. *Russell* holding the doctrine of external relations maintains that the things do not change their nature inspite of the change of postion. This has an important and refreshing consequence. You may have a society of human beings without degrading the personalities to fractions of a unity or to appearance of a reality. And the one consequence that is relevent to us in this connection is that the relation of Knowledge to its object need not amount to the postulating of a higher unity of which these two are aspects. If that were the case this alleged higher unity must have as its members both persons and things *chetana* and *achetana dravyás*. The fundamental doctrine of Jainism like that of the *Sankhya* is the distinction and the alienability between *Jiva* and *ajiva*.

This short digression into modern European thought we had for the following reason The authors of an " Epitome of Jainism " in trying to expound the doctrine of *Syadváda* attempt to make out that Jainism is a bold Idealistic interpretation of the universe as a set-off against the Realistic method. We are not going to quarrel about a name. Jainism may be characterised idealistic or realistic according to one's own tastes so long as the terms are clearly defined. But what we are concerned with is just the exposition of the doctrine of *Syadváda* Speaking of the ordinary way of thinking of *ajivas*, the authors say,

" They are continually betraying the phenomenal changes when brought into relation with other existences around them. How, then, can we think of them as individual things in spite of the changes ? The answer often unhesitatingly forwarded by philosophers is that we can combine diversity with unity in our conception of things by thinking them as individual entities each endowed with manifold qualites. *They are substances according to philosophers, which* possess various properties such as extension, solidity, weight, colour etc. Or they are substances or subjects to whom belong the capacities of sensation, feeling and perception etc., But a careful observation will show that such a device obviously *fails to give us any real* apprehension of existence—even though it may be the simplest individual existence ; *because in trying to give unity to a member of unconnected determinations* by ascribing them to a common substance what we *really do is to add to these determinations another determination,*

the terms will not be the same. A and B having a relation R cannot be the same A and B if they cease to have that relation R Change or cessation of a particular relation will lead to change or the nullification of the terms so related. A blind faith in this metaphysical doctrine has constrained the *Hegelian* Idealist to subscribe to many an absurd doctrine. The terms related to one another since their nature is tyrannically controlled by this relation are to be interpreted as members or elements of a higher organic unity. The members of a family therefore are the elements of the unity of family. Society itself is an organic unity like plant or an animal body having *as its elements the different human personalities who constitute the* society. Nay, even the whole universe is conceived as an organic unity or system having as its members both things and persons. The logical result of this doctrine is the complete subordination of human personality, to this fetish of a higher unity beside which there is nothing real Every thing is degraded to the level of appearance and unreality. The political and moral consequences of such a metaphysical doctrine need not be portrayed in detail. It is enough to say that the catastrophe which destroyed the European civilisation is the necessary consequence of the culture and social organisation inspired by the philosophy of the Absolute.

But we have a healthy change introduced into modern thought by the invaluable contributions from *B. Russell.* He the-upholder of the opposite doctrine of external relations sufficiently exposed the inadequacy and the falsity of the rival doctrine. According to him two terms A and B may have a relation R and yet the nature of the terms may not be affected by the change of the relations. To exhibit the truth of the controversy we may cite the following illustration which is very useful to the reader though crude. You may have for example a chair by the side of a table. The two are in a certain spatial relation: say the chair is to the south of the table. If the relation is changed, (*i e.*) if the chair is placed to the *north of the table then according to the doctrine of* internal relations both the terms the chair and the table must undergo change in their nature because of a change in the relations. This seems absurd to the unsophisticated observer. In this case he knows fully well that there is no change in the things themselves except the change of position. To persist in the belief that the things do change in consequence of the change of position is merely to surrender one's

own reason to the false gods of philosophy. *Russell* holding the doctrine of external relations maintains that the things do not change their nature inspite of the change of postion. This has an important and refreshing consequence. *You may have a society of human* beings without degrading the personalities to fractions of a unity or to appearance of a reality. And the one consequence that is relevent to us in this connection is that the relation of Knowledge to its object need not amount to the postulating of a higher unity of which these two are aspects . If that were the case this alleged higher unity must have as its members both persons and things *chetana* and *achetana dravyas.* The fundamental doctrine of Jainism like that of the *Sankhya* is the distinction and the alienability between *Jiva* and *ajiva.*

This short digression into modern European thought we had for the following reason. The authors of an " Epitome of Jainism " in *trying to expound the doctrine of Syadváda* attempt to make out that Jainism is a bold Idealistic interpretation of the universe as a set-off against the Realistic method. We are not going to quarrel about a name. Jainism may be characterised idealistic or realistic according to one's own tastes so long as the terms are clearly defined But what we are concerned with is just the exposition of the doctrine of *Syadváda.* Speaking of the ordinary way of thinking of *ajivas*, the authors say,

" They are continually betraying the phenomenal changes when brought into relation with other existences around them. How, then, can we think of them as individual things in spite of the changes ? *The answer often unhesitatingly forwarded by philosophers is that* we can combine diversity with unity in our conception of things by thinking them as individual entities each endowed with manifold qualites. *They* are substances according *to* philosophers, which possess various properties such as extension, solidity, weight, colour etc. Or they are substances or subjects to whom belong the capacities of sensation, feeling and perception etc., But a careful observation will show that such a device obviously fails to give us any *real* apprehension of existence—even though it may be the simplest individual existence ; because in trying to give unity to a member of unconnected determinations by ascribing them to a common substance what we really do is to add to these determinations another determination,

equally isolated and unconnected with the rest. Take away the other determinations, what will *be left of your substance?* It is impossible to explain the known by the unknown. So to apprehend the real unity of different qualities or to put in other words, to think them as one, what mind demands is, that we should think or have a rational notion of the relation of each to each and that we should discern how the existence of any *one involves the existence* of all the rest and how all are so connected with this particular quality would not exist except in and through the whole to which it belongs. To catch hold of such substance and not *substratum* as *Locke* had meant we must discern the principle from which this manifoldness of parts and properties necessarily arises and which has its very existence and being in them and linking together in thought differences which spring out of it. Such unity of substance is really a *unity in difference* which manifests itself and realises in these differences.

" In the realm of mind or in the spiritual life of conscious beings also, there are undoubtedly infinite multiplicity and diversity, but we must not overlook the fact that it is a multiplicity or diversity which is no longer of parts *divided from* each other but each of which exists and can be conceived of by itself in isolation or segregation from the rest or in purely exterenal relations to them. Here on the contrary, the multiplicity or diversity is that of parts or elements each of which exists in and through the rest and has its individual being and *significance only in its relation to the rest or each of which* can be known only when it is seen in a sense to be the rest. We cannot, for example, take the combination of two external independent things in space and employ it as a representation of the relation of mind and its objects, for though thought be distinguishable from the object, it is not divisible from it. *The thinker and the object thought of are nothing apart from each other. They are twain and yet one. The object is only object for the subject, the subject for the object. They have no meaning or existence taken individually and in their union they are not two separate things stuck together but two that have lost or dissolved their duality in a higher unity.*" ("*An Epitome of Jainism*" *pages 106-109.*)

The subject and the object merging into a higher unity sounds *more like idealstic rhetoric than philosophical logic. Here we have* an echo of *Bradley* and *Bosanquet.* The authors have drunk deep

of *Hegel* but they have not discerned what is living and which is dead in *Hegel*. No doubt the Jaina Conception of *Dravya* is closely allied to the *Hegelian* dialectic but the Jaina metaphysics does not contemplate the *Hegelian* absolute. The Authors who do not spare, the Indian Absolutist, *Sankara*, for his misunderstanding of *Syadvâda* do not hesitate to make obeisance to his western counterpart. This inconsistency is quite glaring and the misrepresentation of Jaina doctrine is all the more surprising as it apparently proceeds from Jaina writer, a more *careful* study of their own system and a little less of that hypnotic illusion by and the blind adoration to the German Idealism would have enabled our authors to see that the System they expound is a bold and masterly refutation of the philosophical Absolutism of ancient India.

JAINA LOGIC.

NAYAS.

The next topic relating to Jaina Logic is about "Nayas." *This is* the second means of understanding things, the first being "*Pramāṇas*". All concrete things are extremely complex; they have innumerable qualities and relations. The Reals being such complex entities, they may be examined from different aspects. This apprehension of a thing from a particular point of view is known as *naya*—an opinion or an assertion from some one aspect Every aspect of a thing in its own way reveals the nature of that thing. Hence *Naya* is a means of insight into the nature of Reality. Theoretically the possible *Nayas* are infinite in number since the Reals have infinite qualities and relations. *But writers on Jaina Logic generally speak of* seven (7) different *Nayas*. These are *Naigama*, *Samgraha*, *Vyavahāra* *Rjusūtra*, *Sabda*, *Samabhirudha* and *Evambhūta* Let us try to *explain these in order.*

NAIGAMA NAYA.

This *Naya* seems to be somewhat obscure and is therefore differently interpreted by the Scholars. *Pujyapāda* in his commentary *on Sūtra 33 of Bk. 1 Tattvārtha Sūtra, explains the Naya thus: Naigama* is that which relates to the purpose or end of a course of activity. The illustrations given are:—

(1) You see a person carrying water, firewood and other necessaries for cooking meals and ask him "what are you doing?" "I am cooking meals" he replies. This answer refers to the purpose *or end of a series of activity. The person is not actually in the act* of cooking at the time of the answer.

(2) The Second illustration refers to a person who goes with an axe *When he is asked what he is about, he replies* "I am to bring a wooden measure (*Prastha*)" He is to cut a piece of bamboo perhaps and make a *prastha* out of it. Here again this measure is *only the purpose or end to be realised.*

(3) In each of the two examples "*Odana*" and "*Prastha*" "food" and "measure" there is a central purpose which gives meaning to a course *of conduct of some duration*. The course of conduct is represented by different modes of activity at different stages. In

spite of this difference, the whole series and also every individual item tend towards the ideal aimed at. So far therefore the general purpose or aim 'may be said to be present in all the different stages of the course of conduct. It is the general purpose that gives meaning to the different items of the series and connects them into a whole This emphasis on the teleological element which is immanent in a course of purposive activity seems to be *Naigama naya* point of view.

The same interpretation, with the same two illustrations of 'cooking' and making a 'measure' is adopted by *SrutaSâgara*, the authors of a *Vritti* on " *Tattvârtha* " called after him *Srutasagareyam*. The same illustrations are again found in *Prameya Kamala Mârtanda* a treatise on Logic.

This *Naigama Naya* is further sub-divided into three according to the true relations of the teleological and interpreting idea. The two illustrations refer to some present course; hence they come under—

(1) *Vartamana Naigama.* But there may be looking back to a past event. On the morning of *Deepavali* day, you may say " To-day is the *Parinirvâna Kâla* of Lord Mahavira.". But Lord Mahavira does not attain *Nirvâna* on that day which you are actually speaking about. The event took place several centuries ago. Yet it was on a corresponding day of that year. Because of this correspondence an event true of the day centuries ago is also associated with all such corresponding days of the subsequent years. Thus we speak of the King's birth-day, the *Darbar* day every year. The assertion has meaning only because of a past event. This characteristic attribute of the present—the genuinely belonging to the past, yet transferred to the present, because of an identical relation, between the two is pertaining to

(2) *Bhûta Naigama.* (Past *Naigama*.) Instead of looking back to the past you may look forward to a remote future. Instead of detecting in the concrete present some element which *was* once associated with it, you may discover in it something which is *yet to be.* At the sight of a prince you may hail " Here comes His Royal Highness,". The Prince is but Lion of the Royal family. He is not yet King, but is going to be one. Similarly you may speak of every *Bhavyâ Jîva* a good soul as *Siddha Jîva*, a perfect soul. For somehow in

the far off future Perfection will be the goal of all; for every one is *God* in the germ.

Such an assertion is true according to *Bhâva Naigama*—future *Naigama.*

The other way of interpreting this *Naigama Naya* is associated with *Siddhasena* who is quoted by Hermann Jacobi under his translation of the *Sûtra* 33 (referred to above) of *Umasvâti's Tattvârtha. Sri Deva Suri* who is quoted by *Mallishena* in his *Syadvada Manjari* also adopts this second' view. But curiously, this is not so very prominent in *Umasvâtis* own *Bhâshya,* any how this method of interpreting the *Naya* starts with the examination of the relation between the universal and the particular, *Sâmânya* and *Vishesha.* For this *Nyaya and Vaiseshika* systems are referred to as adopting this *Naigama Naya* in an *ekânta* manner (i e). *These two system adopt this Naya* so far as they go, but push it to an unwarranted length *Sankhya* and *Vedânta* deny altogether *Viseshas*—particulars. Buddhism denies—*Sâmanya* universal outright. Against these two extremes the above systems recognise the importance of both. The universal by itself or the particular by self will not be able to account for a concrete thing. These will be empty abstractions. Again one cannot be derivative from and secondary to the other. The thing is an organic unity of both *Sâmânya* and *Visesha,* universal and particular. There can be no (*Sâmânya*) universal apart from the particular and no particular (*Visesha*) apart from the universal and there can be no *real thing apart from either. This seems* to be the fundamental Jaina view of the Real.

The very same view, is said to be adopted by the *Nayyayikâs* and the *Veseshikds.* Therefore both the Jainas and the others adopt the *Naigama* point of view. But wherein the Jainas differ from the others? It is here. No doubt *Nayyayikds* and *Veseshikas* adopt the *Naigama* view by maintaining that the concrete thing is the complex made up of the unversal and the particular (*Sâmânyas* and *Visheshâs*). No doubt they maintain that these two are different and therefore distinguishable. No doubt they believe each is in itself primary and not derivative. So far they agree with the Jainas. But while the Jainas believe that the distinction between *Sâmânya*—universal and *Visesha*—particular, is true only in a relative way the *Naiyayikâs* and the *Viseshikds* maintain that it is absolutely true.

Sâmânya is quite different and distinct from *Visesha.* It is because of this absolute difference between the two that in their hands this *Naya* becomes *Naigamabhâsa.* They are *kathanchit bhinnah* and not *atyanta bhinnah.*

After explaining thus the *Naigama Naya, Sri Deva Suri* enumerates three species of this *Naigama* distinction.

1.—Differentiating two qualities one from the other. e. g. existence and thought are in soul *Sat chaitanyam atmâni."* Here Thought is differentiated from existence.

2.—Differentiating two substances, e. g. Dravya is that which manifests through things and their modes,

" *Vastu paryayayah Dravyam."*

3.—Differentiating a thing from its atiribute., e g. a sensual person has only a momentary pleasure. " *Kshavarnekam Subhi Vishayasaktajiva."*

Thus (1) existence is spoken to be separate from Thought, (2) a thing from its mode and (3) a person as different from his pleasure. Contrast in all these cases is true only in a relative way. As we saw above the very same illustrations are reproduced by H. Jacobi in his translation.

But when we attend to *Mallishena,* we find evidently both the interpretations given in his *Syadvada Manjari.* He begins by explaining *Naigama Naya* in the same way as *Deva Suri* or *Siddhasena* does. He refers the readers to an earlier portion of his book. When there is a discussion of the relation between *Sâmânya* and *Visesha.* Hence he does not want to add anything further under this *Naya* and ends the passage by mentioning two well-known examples given in *Pravachana* the Divine word. What are the two examples ? He just mentions two names; and they appear to be cryptic. But this need not be altogether helpless. His words are *Pravachana Prasiddha Nilayana Prastha dristantadvya,* etc., *Nilayana* and *Prastha*—are the words here In *Pujyapâda* we have *Odana* and *Prastha.* Instead of *food* and a *measure* we have *a house* and *a measure.* The rest is quite clear. The illustrations leave us in no doubt as to the meaning of the *Naya.* House-building or making a measure refers to the purpose or the ideal. It relates to "*Samkalpă mâtra*" as *Pujyapâda* says.

The next question we have to face is "How does *Mallishena* manage to give one explanation and to bring in the illustrations *pertaining to the other interpretation?* *Here we must confess we* are driven to conjecture. We do not know wherefrom he is quoting the examples. It may refer to an another from whom both *Pujyapáda* and *Mallishena* draw their inspiration. What justification is there for *Mallishena's* attempt to bring the two views together? The teleological element or purpose may be taken to be the common basis *for both the views. In the case of house*-building or measure-constructing the thing which *is to be the Goal* is indicated by the purpose of the individual. This purpose embodies the ideal nature of the thing which is the concrete realisation of the same. Similary the distinction between the universal and particular is purely teleological. What is particular from one point of view may be universal from another. In fact the particular is drawn out of the universal. *It is through the medium of the particular that the universal expresses its nature. If you* remember this point then it is clear to us that the distinction entirely depends upon the purpose in view. It is this purposive nature that brings the two views together. What are apparently divergent have this common foundation. Perhaps *Mallishena* had this in his mind when he interpreted the *Naigama* one way and illustrated it in the other way This compromise is offered as a provisional *suggestion.*

(ii.) Samgraha Naya: The next Naya is the class point of view. The nature of things as understood by the Jaina System is such that there is a similarity and identity among a number of individuals.

These individuals naturally fall into appropriate classes. When we consider them as individuals belonging to a class, our attention is *directed to the underlying* similarity to the exclusion of their individual and proper *characteristics. From this underlying principle of* classification we may consider the individuals as a *whole and* a Unity. Here again the unity is only *relatively* true. The unity here rests on the underlying similarity among the number of individuals brought under the same class But there is a great danger in forgetting the elementary fact of this class point of view The individuals forming the class though spoken of as a whole and unitary class are really distinct from one another and may be really

differentiated by not only their intrinsic natures but also by intervals of Space and Time. To emphasise the unity at the cost of the plurality and difference would be a distinct metaphysical error. It is this erroneous application of *Samgraha Naya* that accounts for the system of *Advaita Vedânta*. Too much emphasis on the unity and the complete ignoring of the diversity is the characteristic of this system. A similar mistake is found in its western counterpart of *Hegelian* Idealism. Both agree in condemning the *differences* as appearances and *Naya* and in accepting the ultimate absolute as the one reality.

But Jaina thinkers noticed very early both the utility as well as *the danger of this Samgraha Naya*. This class point of view is quite useful and rational in its own way. It contributes to economy of thought by enabling us to deal with a number of things as one.

This is not merely justified by practical convenience but also by the philosophical principle of the common nature. The common nature by itself is but an abstraction. Hence to set it up as the *reality* and the *only reality* is doubly erroneous. So long as its relative nature is remembered the Naya has its own uses. But in the hands of the *Samkhyas* and *mimansikâs* it becomes absolute and thus a *Nayabhâsa*.

This *Samgraha Naya* is of two kinds *Para Samgraha* or the ultimate class-view and *Apara Samgraha* or the inferior class-view. Every existing thing partakes of the nature of Reality. Hence we may spea kof all things as one in the Ultimate Reality or Existence. But the different classes of things living and non-living included in this ultimate Reality may themselves be spoken of as different classes. This is *Apara Samgraha* or the inferior class view.

(iii) *VYAVAHÂRA : Vyavahâra Naya* means the popular and conventional point of view, which rests on sense-perception of the concrete present. This is the basis of the ancient materialistic systems of the *Chârvâkâs* and *Brahaspatyâs*. The whole Criterion of Reality is the Concrete present. The forgotten past and the far off future are unwarranted myths not justified by the only *pramana* of sense-perception. Looking back into the past through memory and keeping into the future through ideal forecast are

philosophical uncertainties. The same applies to the categories obtained by Intellectual analysis such as *Samânya* and *Visesha* Universal and particular.

Sense-perception reveals to us a tree or a stone or a pot or a cloth. These are the real things supported by the *Pramânás* and sanctioned by *Vyavahâra* or convention. Whoever has perceived at any time either *Sâmânya* or *Visesha* ? Why should philosophers trouble themselves about these metaphysical abstractions. The concrete reality of things is sufficient for our practical life and what is justified by this pragmatic criterion is so far theoritically true.

Here again the Jaina thinker recognises the partial truth of the principle. The tree in the compound, the stone on the path way, the pot with water and the cloth you wear are all real things. They are not appearances or illusions of *Naya*. Their reality is corroborated by our concrete experience. To say this much is certainly acceptable and true. But to go beyond to condemn everything that is not included in the concrete present to deny the past and the future and to reject the philosophical categories *in toto* is to surrender reason to sense-perception is the apotheosis of convention. Hence Jaina thought rightly rejects the unwarranted exaggeration of this *Vyavahâra Naya* though it recognises in it the soul of goodness, and an element of partial truth.

(iv) RIJU SUTRA. This *Riju Sûtra* is the extreme opposite of the *Samgraha-Naya*. The latter denies all difference whereas *Riju Sûtra* denies all *continuity* and identity. Reality is concentrated to mathematical present. It is purely momentary. In this respect it is still narrower than the *vyavahâric* present. At least for *vyavahâra* view there is a tolerable duration; for, the present and the conventional things are real so far. But according to this *Riju Sûtra Naya* a thing is what it is in the present mathematical moment. To speak of duration of a thing is rejected by this view as an unwarranted assumption. What we are absolutely sure of is just the present moment. The past moment is no more and the next moment is not yet. Hence a thing as being in the no more or in the not yet is sheer contradiction. If it is real at all it must be in the present moment. We at once recognise the identity between this *Riju Sûtra* view and *Buddhistic* metaphysics. Its aim is as that of Buddhism to expose the pretensions of an unchanging

mataphysical substratum of things As a corrective to such a conception of changeless substratum Buddhist metaphysics adopts *Riju Sûtra* view and brings the centre of gravity to the present moment. Thus it enables to secure the balance between change and permanence. Change partakes of the nature of time duration It shares with it the ephemerality. There is some truth in maintaining the reality of change and in concentrating it to one moment To over emphasise the neglected element of change as a set off against *Vedânta* and to secure a habitation for it in the camp of Reality is certainly a commendable metaphysical venture But to identify reality with mathematical moment, to emphasise change as the only real and to make it live in a metaphysical void is to overshoot one's mark It is this erroneous and uncalled for accent on change to the detriment of the relating and the unifying principle of Reality without which, change will have no meaning It is this *Riju Sûtrabhâsha* that the Jaina system asks us to beware of. If this principle is the sole criterion of Reality, then reality would end itself by committing suicide to employ a suggestive phrase of *Bradley's*

(v) *Sabda-Naya* or the implication of Terms or names. The name has the function of calling to our mind, the particular object which is referred to or implied by the name Of course the implication need not necessarily be an individual object. An attribute, a relation and action may be referred to by appropriat words in the language Thus the grammatical distinction of terms into parts of speech has an underlying logical foundation. The particular kind of meaning is associated with a particular part of speech. Thus the difference in meaning corresponds to the differenee among the terms. Thus a sort of intimate relation exists between a term and its meaning Variation in the term may introduce a corresponding variation in the meaning. Thus not only the difference of the parts of speech implies a broad difference among the meanings but also the inflexional variations in the same part of speech may be said to have corresponding variations, however, slight they be This principle of correspondence between the terms and their meanings is the foundation of the science of grammar. We have already mentioned that there is a relation to logic implicitly present in this grammatical principle. Indian grammarians in their discussion of verbal implications very often pass beyond their legitimate sphere and enter into logical and quasi-metaphysical discussions. Such

aspect is contemplated by the root of a term and it is this contemplated aspect that is the legitimate meaning of the term in its current usage. The very same thing in a different attitude must be designated by a different term altogether. Thus for example, the term '*gau*' implies an animal in motion. That which moves is a '*gau*' or 'cow.' The same term therefore should not be applied when the animal is at rest or lying down. Movement is fundamentally different from lying down and therefore the same term 'cow' should not be applied to an animal at two such fundamentally different attitudes. Fundamental difference in the logical implication must necessarily be indicated by literal difference on the terms. This is the contention of *evambhuta naya*. The term must just designate the particular aspect or attitude in the object referred to. If the term goes beyond that it will be a source of confusion and ambiguity. Language instead of revealing things as they are would only conceal them.

This grammatico-logical contention may be conceeded partially. In a perfect vocabulary this ought to be the principle but the language that we use is not so evolved under the guidance of such a rigorous logical principle. Hence it would be an egregious blunder to identify, what actually exists, with what ought to be, logically. Therefore this *evambhuta naya* interpreted without reference to concrete usage and conventional meaning would only end in meaningless verbiage.

These are the *Seven nayas* referred to in Jaina logic The first four are called *artha nayas* inasmuch as they deal with objects of knowledge, whereas the other three are called *Sabda nayas* inasmuch as they pertain to terms and their meanings The same seven are sometimes otherwise grouped. The first three come under *Dravya naya* whereas the other four come under *paryaya naya*. The former means the substantive aspect whereas the latter means the aspect of change or manifestation.

These *nayas* have an important place in the *Anekânta Vâda* of the *Jaina* system. All human descriptions and predications are relative and circumscribed inasmuch as they issue forth from the limited and partial nature of the intellect. Not only in our every day speech but also in the language of the metaphysical statements have their own context and relation universalising their meaning apart from their setting in the background would result in practical inconvenience and philosophical confusion. Jaina thinkers recognising the extreme

complexity of reality are never wearied of emphasising the *anekānta* aspect. Multifaced reality may lead to "multitude of descriptions." Every one of them may be partially true but not one of them is really true. Philosophy is but the fable of the seven blind men and the elephant. Each one perceives a certain aspect of the real and congratulates himself that that is the only reality. When reality would not fit in with his own petty framework then there is the ruthless pruning and chopping to make it convenient. Then there is the denial of certain inconvenient things as appearance and illusion. System building in philosophy has always been the process of providing reality with a procrustean bed. But one who knows, smiles at the simplicity of human philosophising. The critical caution that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy was sounded several centuries before the Christian era by the *Anekāntavādins*

Our account of the *nayas* will be incomplete without a mention of the six *nayas* which are generally employed in the examination of the nature of souls. According to Jaina Metaphysics *Jīva* or soul has the nature of consciousness or *chetana*. When it is viewed in its pure state unlimited by extraneous conditions, it has its thought characteristics fully and perfectly developed. This state of its existence represents the Ideal of Perfection or *Siddhahood*. But even in this ideal state, the nature of the self does not lose its complexity. Even in its infinite radiance, the self does not lose its *Dravya* nature or dynamic constitution. It is not distinct and separable from its own infinite qualities. It is the richness of content that marks the Jaina conception of Perfection as against the nihilistic attitude of *Vedānta* which speaks of quality-less existence as the ultimate Reality. Existence apart from qualities would be an empty abstraction and is therefore all the more unfit to stand for the ultimate reality. It is this unalienable unity that exists between the Real and its qualities that may be said to be the central doctrine of the Jaina metaphysics.

This pure and perfect state of the self is a thing to be achieved. Ordinarily the existence of the self is *somewhat different*. Its infinitude is limited, its glory abated and radiance dimmed by alien conditions and limitations. By its own general weakness and disposition it weaves round itself material sheaths some subtle and some gross. These material sheaths form the encumbrances and limitations which make the cycle of births and deaths possible for the *Jīvās*.

view. There is no distinction between *Dravya* and its *guṇas*. The self is looked at as a whole with all the wealth of its attributes. The latter represents the partial point of view. The complex nature of the self is analysed into its diverse qualities and our attention may be directed to any particular attribute with which the self may be identified at the moment. Further the former *Nischaya Naya* is divided into *Sûddha Nischaya* and *Asûddha Nischya Naya*. *Sûddha Nischaya Naya* holds the self in its pure and unconditioned *Nirupâdhi* state. Disentangled from all its material evironment and limitation the self radiates in its pristine glory through all its wealth of infinite qualities. This aspect where the self is in its qualities and its qualities are pure and unalloyed expression of the nature of this self is the topic of *Sûddha Nischaya Naya*. The second *Asûddha Nischaya Naya* contemplatas the self as caught in the meshes of the material evironment the *Sopâdhi* state. The presence of *Upâdhi* makes it impure or *Asûddha*. Its intrinsic glory is dimmed but still it is viewed as a whole with its complete nature as expressed in its attributes though somewhat warped by alien influences. This is the self according to *Asûdha*. *Nischaya Naya*.

Similarly the *vyavahâra* point of view is divided into two main heads-*Satbhûta Vyavahâra* and *Asatbhûta Vyavahara*. The term *Satbhûta* implies the intrinsic nature of the thing. Here the question is not about the purity or the impurity of the thing. The term *Vyavahâra* as already explained implies the analysis and differentiation of attributes from the underlying *Dravya*. *Jñâna* or thought is certainly an attribute of the self. To speak of *Jñâna* as identical with self is to adopt *Satbhûta Vyavahâra Naya*. The term *Asatbhûta* implies the importation of alien qualities into the self. Some of the organic instincts and emotions are distinctly due to the physical constitution. Nevertheless such instincts and emotions are associated with the self from the point of view of *Asatbhûta Vyavahâra Naya*. Similarly the *kârmic* constituents which are intrinsically physical may be said to belong to the self and modify its manifestations.

Each of these two again is divided into two other minor kinds *Upachârita* and *Anupachârita*. *Upachârita* is usage sanctified by convention but having no other intrinsic justification. It is a sort of metaphorical application; whereas *Anupachârita* is just the opposite of the above It stands on its own intrinsic merit and

has no metaphorical and transferred import. Thus finally we have 4 kinds of *Vyavahâra Naya* 1 *Anupachârita Satbhûta Vyavahâra Naya* 2. *Upachârita Satbhûta Vyavahâra Naya* 3. *Anupachârita Asatbhûta Vyavahâra Naya* 4. *Upachârita Asatbhûta Vyavahâra Naya.*

Now the first is mainly *Vyavahâra* inasmuch as it analyses the attributes from the thing is *Satbhûta* inasmuch as it emphasises the genuine and intrinsic attributes and is *Anupachârita* inasmuch as it is free from figurative and transferred implication. The illustration of this is the self is of the nature of *Jñâna* or knowledge. The second *Naya* is *Vyavahâra* for the reason stated above and *Satbhûta* for the same and *Upachârita* because the epithet is figurative and transferred. When we speak of *Jñâna* or knowledge as *Pramâna* or the criterion of truth we are thinking of the objects of knowledge or *Artha*. *Artha* itself may be spoken of as a manifestation of knowledge or *Jñâna Vikalpa.* To speak of *artha* or the object as a modification of knowledge is only figuratively true in the case of external objects. These being physical in nature are *achetanâ* and yet as object of knowledge may be spoken of as modification of *Jñâna.* What intrinsically belongs to the self is transferred to its object because of the relation brought about by the process of knowledge. The third *Naya* is *Anupachârita Asatbhûta Vyavahâra.* The only term that demands explanation is *Asatbhûta* here. It refers to the identification of the Self with some alien properties. For example to consider one's own body as oneself which is generally done in ordinary life is *Asatbhûta Vyavahâra.* This is not merely figurative as the statement is sanctioned by the intimate interrelation that exists between the soul and the body. Hence 'this body is mine,' or 'I am this,' pointing to the body is a statement which is justified according to *Anupachârita Asatbhûta Vyavahâra Naya.* The last *Naya* is the *Upachârita* form of the same. Here the alien quality or the thing with which the self is identified lack that intimate relation that exists between the soul and its own body. To call the ornaments as one's own, to claim certain individuals as one's relating to possess certain things as one's own property in short to identify one's personality with alien things and persons is possible only in a figurative sense. Each personality is distinct from and alien to

the others though all by co-existing together may partake of common *environment and enter into definite relations. Still from the metaphysical point of view one's destiny is in one's own hands* Therefore *the popular identification of the self with the other things said to be* owned by it is a figurative and transferred predication or *Upachârita Asatbhûta Vyavahâra Naya.* These four kinds of *Vyavahâra Naya* together with the two *Nischaya Nayas* constitute the six *Nayas* which are specially employed to fathom the depth of human personality.

The object of these Nayas generally of the former seven and specially of the latter six is to reveal the intrinsic nature of personality *in its comic environment. It is not merely* a matter of theoretical interest that underlies these *Nayas.* Apprehension and understanding of the nature of reality must be a useful means in the hands of the self to reach the safe haven of Beatitude from which there is no return But besides this practical aspect there is another aspect to the question. The truth that is apprehended by the *Pramânas* and the *Nayas* must be available for the general public. Ever growing under the weight of sorrow and yearning to have that *Bliss* which they know only by faith and hope. Hence is the necessity for expressing the truth through Scripture. This Revealation of the truth through language is the WORD or *Syadvâda.* This pertains to the principle of conditional predication which is *sevenfold.* This seven-fold predication is known as *Saptabhangi*

SAPTABHANGI.

SAPTABHANGI OR THE SEVEN MODES OF PREDICATIONS.

The Dialectic of *Syadvâda* is no less puzzling to Indian students of philosophy both old and new, than the *Hegelian* dialectic is to the European philosophers. *Syadvâda* and its counterpart appear at first sight self-conflicting and unwarratned But they have an important principle,—nay the fundamental principle of reality as their substratum and justification. Closer examination reveals in them a clear grasp of truth. Every other theory of knowledge is fading into insignificance before the principle of conditional predication.

Everything existing from the bespangled heavens above to the inmost core of human personality is in a process of change and modification. If we trust ourselves to the imagination of the astronomer which enables him to look back through eons of the past cosmic history or to have a glimpse of the far off future we see the universe as a motion picture on the screen of existence What is a twinkling star at present was once upon a time gigantic nebulous mass of several million miles diameter. Then by process of aggregation and condensing there is the formation of a denser nucleus which becomes larger and larger by the same process which in its turn leads to the evolution of an enormous quantity of heat. This leads to the formation of the fiery orb which by the same laws of motion gives birth to a number of incandescent masses. These held to the parent by the laws of gravitation form the planetary system. Thus our Sun itself is but a star among the starry systems.

Side by side with this evolution of a sun with its planetary system we have the converse drama enacted. Either due to a mysterious explosion or due to a clash of star with star there bursts into existence a new mass of nebula. The telescope reveals to human view not only the nursery of distant solar systems, but also the decay and dissolution of the decrepit and defunct starry systems. The starry heavens are but the cosmic alphabet which spell the three sublime words birth, growth and decay.

Turn now to our own earth which is but a tiny speck in space when compared to the Sun and the Stars. Here also the same process.

The formation of the crust of the earth is after terrible volcanic convultions which had taken place in the early history of the earth. The geological changes are followed by the appearance of life on the surface; then the wonderful evolution of the plant and animal kingdoms are all indelibly written on the different strata of the earth. This also repeats the same story. Then life itself is a mysterious though subtle process of combined building up and breaking up. Turn where you will you see the same thing. Reality is a complex process of change and everything in it is partaking of the same process.

Nothing is merely permanent; nothing is merely changing. The acorn grows to the oak; the seed is in the plant and the tree and yet it is not there as the seed. Everything lives by the process of death. *The very loss leads to gain. This message of the organic reality is an* important contribution to philosophy.

Hegel founded his metaphysics on Logic—nay *identified both.* But his Logic *is not the mere scholastic logic on which his predecessor Kant* built his system. *Hegel's* logic came as a disturber of peace to the then philosophic thought; but it ultimately led to the emancipation of thought from scholastic thraldom. He proclaimed boldly to the world that affirmation and negation are ultimately reconciled by a higher unity 'is' and 'is not' are really identical and same, for they are *but the aspects of the same reality. To one who is familiar with this* dialectical process of thesis and antithesis reconciling in a higher synthesis, the following presentation of *saptabhangi* will lose its paradoxical nature and discover the underlying truth.

Long ago the Jainas recognised this complexity of existence. Any particular object which as the topic of assertion can very well take in two assertions—affirmative and negative. How can there be two apparently contradictory statements both true of a single fact? The nature of the fact is such is the answer. *Every concrete assertion* presupposes a *question as* to the exact nature of the object. This interrogation again rests on the desire to determine the thing from a particular point of view. Since the thing has several aspects and relations there may be several determinations. Hence is the possibility of apparently conflicting attributes inhering in the same and exhibited by the process of predication. Is that statue of marble or of plaster of Paris? If it is one, it is not the other. Is that the same gold bangle which you had last year? No, it is newly made though the

same gold is used Was Socretes a Greek or Roman ? He was Greek and not Roman. What is the *Kaiser* now ? He is and yet is not the *Kaiser* These are familiar questions and answers. All these exhibit the possibility of predicating affirmation and negation of the same thing. *Is* and *is not*, can significantly refer to the same subject The only thing we have to remember is that the point of view is different in each case There is nothing mysterious, nothing incredible. When the same subject can have two such predicates no one predicate can monopolise *the subject to itself. There will always be* some aspect of the subject left out by this predicate ; and this left-out aspect can very well be *expressed by the rival predicate. This* implies that under no circumstances can we have a predication which is the only true predica*tion about the subject. There can be no judgment absolutely true* and excluding every other judgment about the same topic. Hence we have *recourse to qualified assertions as the only available ones under the* circumstances. These qualified or conditional assertions are *primarily* two affirmation and negation.

(1) Perhaps X is.

(2) Perhaps X *is not.*

These two aspects are inherent in the same thing ; hence we can say.

(3) Perhaps X *is* and *is not* ; here we are contemplating the whole thing in its two aspects which are kept apart and attended to severally. But these two aspects are inherent in and expressive of one single identity. *Hence they may be considered together jointly* as expressing the single identity. In that case there is no chance of *asserting two conjointly by a single predicate*, for the simple reason that there can be no such predicate. Therefore we have to confess our inability to and proclaim the bankruptcy of vocabulary for having such an assertion. This fact becomes the fourth mode of predication.

(4) Perhaps X is indescribable.

Remembering this helpless nature of our tongue, we may still qualify this by each of the first three predicates. Thus we have the last three modes of predications.

Which are (5) Perhaps X is though indescribable.

(6) Perhaps X and *is not* though indescribable.

(7) Perhaps X *is* and *is not* though indescribable.

In their traditional form these are :—

(1) *Syâdasti*

(2) *Syânnâsti*

(3) *Syâdastinâsticha*

(4) *Syâdavaktavyah*

(5) *Syâdasti avaktavyah*

(6) *Syâdnâsti avaktavyah.*

(7) *Syâdasti nâsti avaktavyah.*

These seven modes of predication are usually illustrated wit reference to some object such as a *Jar* or *Ghata*. Whether it is to have an affirmative predicate or negative one depends respectively on four aspects : its own form, matter, place and time leading to affirmation and alien form, matter, place and time bringing in negation to the jar. A jar is real, or is affirmed with reference to *Svarûpa, Svadravya Svakshetra, Svakâla* and is unreal or is denied from the point of view of *pararûpa, paradravya, parakshetra* and *parakala*. When we have affirmation and negation for their reasons, the subsidiary modes are derived from these two

1. Then what is the *Svarûpa* or intrinsic form of a Jar? And what is its *pararûpa*? When we hear the word *jar* uttered, the term invariably implies a certain definite group of attributes through which a particular object is designated by the term These essential attributes connoted by the term *Jar* will be its *Svarûpa* The attributes of any other object implied by any other term will be its *pararûpa*—will be alien to the *Jar* Existence rests on *Svarûpa* and non-existence on *pararûpa*. If existence is predicated of the *Jar* both from its own form as well as that of an alien thing like cloth (*pata*) then the *jar* will lose its distinctive character and become one with cloth. If on the other hand non-existence is predicated from its own form as from alien nature then there will be no jar at all. Neither of these results stand to reason

Again confining ourselves to the class of vessels we still find that a *jar* is different from a kettle. Is that vessel a *jar* or kettle? The *jar-form* is its *svarûpa* and the kettle form is its *pararûpa*. From the former the *jar* is, from the latter, it is not.

Again we may be concerned with jars alone. One individual *jar* has its individuality as *Svarûpa*, and every other *jar* will be *pararûpa*

Jar A exists on account of *svarûpa* and does not on account of *pararûpa.* If non-existence is associated with *svarûpa* then there will be no *jar* at all; if existence follows from *pararûpa* then all *jars* will become one without distinction and there will be no separate individual ones.

Then *Ghata-jar is made by the potter. The mass of clay on the* potter's wheel is not yet a *jar.* It is only the finished product that is a *jar. This finished form is its svarûpa; any other stage in its form*ation is its *pararûpa.* The former leads to affirmation the latter leads *to negation.*

2. What is its own matter? Clay is *Svadravya,* and gold is *paradravya. The Jara is of clay and is not of gold. Svadravyena asti, paradravyena nâsti.*

3. What is its own place or *Svakshetra?* The ground where the *Jar* is, is its *Svakshetra* and every other place is its *Parakshetra.* The *Taj* is in Agra (*Svakshetra*) and is not in Delhi (*Parakshetra*). If the *Jar* exists in *Parakshetra* also then there will be no place without a *Jar. In the case of the Taj every place will have a Taj Mahal.* If the thing is not even in its own place then there will be *no Jar anywhere in the world. Either result will be unsatisfactory.*

4. What is its own time or *Svakâla?* The *Jar's Svakâla* is the *duration of the present in which it is intact. Its past* when it was a mass of clay on the potter's wheel and its future when it will be *a heap of broken shells will be its Parakâla Its existence in its* own time and non-existence in other times will be quite evident. So also with every other object. *Socrates* existed at a particular age of Athenean History and is not existing now. If a thing exists. in *Parakâla* also as in *Svakâla* then it will be eternal; if it does not exist in *Svakâla,* as in *parakâla* then it will be nothing; for existence implies a relation to its time or duration.

Thus a thing is affirmed in its four-fold self-relation, form, matter, place and time; and is denied in its four-fold alien relation.

Now the *Svarûpa,* etc, are determined with reference to the four-fold other-relation of *Pararûpa,* etc. The self-relation apart from the other relation has no meaning. But how are we to determine the four kinds of relation:—*Pararûpa, Paradravya,* etc. These must depend on their environmental relations and these latter again on others Thus we pass on from our environment to others still wider without having

any clear grasp of the self-relation. The distinction between a thing and its other rests on the sandy foundation of a vicious indefinite regress. Hence the affirmation and negation also fall to the ground.

This objection rests on misapprehension. The distinction between the fourfold self-relation and other-relation does not rest on an indefinite regress The essential nature of a thing not only implies its *Svarūpa* but differentiates itself from *Pararūpa*. In experience we not only perceive a thing, but perceive it as distinct from other things. A *Jar* is seen not merely as a *Jar* but as a thing distinct from cloth by its side. Without this distinction there can be no perception of the *Jar* at all. The very process of self-assertion implies differentiation from non self. Hence the change of indefinite regress is quite unwarranted

Now, according to this theory *asti* and *nāsti* (is and *is not*) may be predicated of *Prameya* the objective aspect of knowledge or the process of apprehending an object. This dual predication must rest on *Svarūpa* and *Pararūpa* of *Prameya*. What is its *Svarūpa* and what is its *Pararūpa*: *Pararūpa* of *Prameya* means non-*Prameya* anything other than *Prameya* we have no means of knowing. Hence the theory must fail in this case

No, says the Logician. The state of being apprehended by knowledge-*Prameyatva* is the *Svarūpa of Prameya* This implies in general the *relation* of object to the knower anything besides this *relation*; even the object will be distinct from *Prameyatva* and hence will be the *Pararūpa* in this context. Now this theory must be applicable to the ultimate existence or *Mahāsatta*. If *is* and *is not* are to be predicated of this *Summum Genus* what are its *Svarūpa* and *Pararūpa*? For the latter cannot be, as there can be no other form or matter or place or time not included in this. The *pararūpa* of *Mahāsatta* need not imply the existence of other things besides itself; that would be self-contradictory. But still we can speak of its *Pararūpa* when we contemplate something which falls short of the all-comprehensive universal. Any of its parts will be so far the negation of whole—its *Pararūpa*.

Now *asti*, affirmation depends on self; *nāsti*, negation, on other things. *Asti* which is conditioned by self can very well belong to a thing. But if *nāsti* which is conditioned by other than the *Jar*

e. g. is also predicated of the *Jar*. Then it would imply that the *Jar* participates in the nature of its other—say cloth. This will lead to mere confusion.

This objection also is based on a misapprehension. Affirmation no doubt rests on the nature of the self the *Jar*. The negation resting on another thing—*Pata* (cloth) does not mean that the *Jar* also has the nature of a cloth. That would be absurd. The clear cut boundary between things will vanish and with it all knowledge. *Asti*—implies self assertion, *nâsti* implies alien-exclusion. A thing not only asserts its own individuality, but also repulses anything alien to it. It is this element of repulsion that everything must have, in order to be real that entitles it to have the negative predicate. Instead of leading to a confusion this element of differentiation is the only basis for self-assertion of a thing. *Asti* and *nâsti*-assertion and exclusion are inalienably present in the same thing. Wherever there is *astî*, there is *nâsti* and wherever there is *nâsti*, there is *astî* also.

Now this association of this two *astî* and *nâsti*—in the same thing appears quite unwarranted. For on the one hand when we perceive a *Jar* we see mere *asti* without *nâsti* and on the other hand in the case of certain impossible and unreal concepts such as asse's horns, sky-flower there is mere *nâsti* without *asti*.

This is not quite correct. In the case of any perceived object *nâsti* does not mean that the thing should not exist as such and yet be perceived. That would be meaningless. *Nâsti* means nothing more than that element of repulsion and differentiation which isolates a thing from its background and gives it a determinate and positive nature. In this sense *nâsti* is inseparable from *asti* and it is the sense in which it is used. As to the other case of impossible and unreal concepts where is the positive foundation. If sky-flower is quite real; nay if it has a slight positive basis it will cease to mean an unreal and an impossible thing. Its nature seems to be pure negation and nothing less than that. This cannot be, answers our Logician. How can there be any negation without any significance. A significant negation must have some positive basis; otherwise it will be mere nonsense. The elements constituting the concept are by themselves real and are justified by the canons of experience. We have seen horns in a cow;

we have seen an ass or a horse. These are existing and real. But the fanciful combination of an ass with horns or a flower with sky is unreal. But for the experience of horns on the head of a cow or flower in a tree there can be no talk of an ass with horns or a flower in the sky. Without this positive basis of experience there will no elements to make up even a fanciful complex. Thus even the fanciful ideas of *unicorn* and centaur must have some foundation in our experience. Again in the proposition "*Syādasti Jiva*" the terms *asti* and *Jiva* (life) must mean identically the same thing or different things. If the meanings are of the same nature then one cannot be predicated of the other as a pot cannot be the predicate of a Jar both being co-ordinate. Further *asti* or existence is predicable of everything real. If *asti* is identical with *Jiva* then *Jiva* also must be predicated of everything. But if Jiva is different from *asti* then there is no chance of predicating *asti* of *Jiva* for they are entirely different from each other. Further *Jiva* being different from *asti* and *asti* being the predicate of everything, *Jiva* cannot be ralated to anything real; (i e.) Jiva would become unreal. You cannot maintain that *Jiva* though different from *asti* can be said to have the predicate by a process of combination with it; for combination is impossible in the case of repelling elements.

The horns of this dilemma are blunted by *syadváda*. These results need not frighten the Logician to whom *asti* and *Jiva* are identical from the *dravyartha* view and different from *paryartha* view. They are different and yet identical. But for this dual nature there can be no predication at all *

The primary modes of predication are three—*Syādasti*, *syannasti* *syadavaktavyah* The other four are obtained by combining these three. Now according to *sankhya* philosophy everything is real and therefore exists. According to *Buddhism* everything is momentary and unreal. Both these views are rejected by the *Jainas* as extremes. The former is true according to the principle of *Dravyarthika* point of view; the latter is true according to *paryayarthika* point of view. Hence each is true in its own way and is not true absolutely. Again reality is indescribable according to the *Vedāntins* who emphasise the *nirvachaniva* aspect of reality. Even this is only partially true.

* [This discussion from *Saptabhangitarangini* reminds us of *Bradley's* discussion of the theory of Predication—In appearance and Reality.]

say, it is impossible that contradictory attributes such as being and non-being should at the same time belong to one and the same thing; just as observation teaches us that a thing cannot be hot and cold the same moment. The seven categories asserted by you must either be so many and such or not be so many and such; the third alternative expressed in the words 'they either are such are not such' results in a cognition of indefinite nature which is no more a source of true knowledge than doubt is. If you should plead that the cognition that a thing is of more than one nature is definite and therefore a source of true knowledge, we deny this. For the unlimited assertion that all things are of a non-exclusive nature is itself something, falls as such under the alternative predications 'somehow it is' 'somehow it is not' and so ceases to be a definite assertion. The same happens to the person making the assertion and to the result of the assertion, partly they are, partly they are not. As thus the means of knowledge, the object of knowledge, the knowing subject, and the act of knowledge are all alike indefinite, how can the *Tirthankara* (*Jina*) teach with any claim to authority and how can his followers act on a doctrine the matter of which is altogether indeterminate? Observation shows that only when a course of action is known to have a definite result people set about it without hesitation. Hence a man who proclaims a doctrine of altogether indefinite contents does not deserve to be listened to any more than a drunken man or a madman. Again, if we apply the *Jaina* reasoning to their doctrine of the five categories, we have to say that on one view of the matter they are five and on another view they are not five; from which latter point of view it follows that they are either fewer or more than five. Nor is it logical to declare the categories to be indescribable. For if they are so, they cannot be described; but, as a matter of fact they are described so that to call them indescribable involves a contradiction. And if you go on to say that the categories on being described are ascertained to be such and such, and at the same time are not ascertained to be such and such, and that the result of their being ascertained is perfect knowledge or is not perfect knowledge, and that imperfect knowledge is the opposite of perfect knowledge or is not the opposite; you certainly talk more like a drunken or insane man than like a sober, trustworthy person. If you further maintain that the heavenly world and final release exist or do not exist and are

eternal or non eternal the absence of all determinate knowledge which is employed in such statement will result in nobody's acting for the purpose of gaining the heavenly world and final release. And moreover it follows from your doctrine that soul, non-soul and so on, whose nature you claim to have ascertained and which you describe as having existed from all eternity relapse all at once into the condition of absolute indetermination. As therefore the two contradictory attributes of being and non being cannot belong to any of the categories—being excluding non being and vice versa non being excluding being—the doctrine of the *Arhat* must be rejected.

RAMANUJA AND SAPTABHANGI

Thibaut's Translation—With the help of this they prove that all things—which they declare to consist of substance (dravya), and *paryaya* to be existing one and permanent in so far as they are substances and the opposite is so far as they are *paryayas*. By *paryaya* they understand the particular states of substances and as those are of the nature of *Being* as well as *Non being*, they manage to prove existence, non existence and so on. With regard to this the *sutra* remarks that no such proof is possible 'Not so on account of the impossibility in one' i e because contradictory attributes such as *existence* and non existence cannot at the same time belong to one thing not any more than light and darkness. As a substance and particular states qualifying it—and (by the Jainas) called *paryaya*—are different things (*padartha*) one substance cannot be connected with opposite attributes. It is thus not possible that a substance qualified by the particular state such as existence, should at the same time be qualified by the opposite state, i e non existence. The non permanency further of a substance consists in its being the abode of those particular states which are called origination and destruction, how then should permanency, which is of an opposite nature, reside in the substance at the same time? Difference (*bhinnatva*) again consists in things being the abodes of contradictory attributes non difference which is the opposite of this, cannot hence possibly reside in the same things which are the abode of difference, not any more than the generic character of a horse and that of a buffalo can belong to one animal. But (the *Jaina* may here be supposed to ask) *the intellectual* how can you maintain that Brahman

although one only; yet at the same time is the self of all?" Because we reply, the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings *constitutes the body of the supreme person, omniscient, omnipotent* and so on. And that the body and the Person embodied and their respective attribute, are of totally *different* nature (so that *Brahmana* is not touched by the defects of this body), we have explained likewise." Moreover, as your six substances, soul and so on are not one substance and one *paryaya*, their being one substance and so on, cannot be used to prove their being one and also not one and so on. And if it should be said that those six substances are such (viz. one and several, and so on), each owing to its own *paryaya* and its own nature, we remark that then you cannot avoid contradicting your own theory of everything being an ambiguous nature. Things which stand to each *other in the relation of mutual non-existence cannot alter all be* identical. Hence the theory of the Jainas is not reasonable"

These two passages are quoted from the two great Hindu Commentators of *Vedarta Sûtras, Sankara* and *Ramanuja*. The Sûtra that is commented on is "नैकस्मीन्नसंभवात्" (CH I. PADA 2 SU. 33.)

The author of the *Vedanta Sûtras* as well as the commentators reject the *Saptabhangi* naya on the ground of the impossibility of contradictory attributes inhering in the same thing.

All that is said above by way of exposition and discussion would vindicate the claim of *Saptabhangi* against the charges brought against it by these scholars. Our account would be incomplete if these charges are not examined in this connection

Now the author of the Sutras does not give any detailed reasons besides the one contained in the Sûtra itself—that a thing cannot have self-contradictory attributes. *Asti* and *nasti* being and non-being, or affirmation and negation being contradictory epithets cannot be referred to the same thing. Hence the doctrine of such a predication is futile This reasoning though short is interesting and suggestive. We have already pointed out the philosophical attitude adopted by the Jainas. A thing being of complex nature, having '*dravya*' and *paryaya* must be an identity in difference. Instead of rejecting the doctrine of reality for the reason given they seem to claim that the real is real only because of such a capacity to comprehend and reconcile the differences in itself. Here we are reminded of *Bradley's*

may itself be a species in relation to its own higher genus. We need not multiply instances It would be quite idle to maintain the impossiblity of incompatible attributes in one and the same-thing. It is a matter of surprise to us modern readers how such an acute thinker like *Sankara* should go without observing the particular aspect from which the rival presents his case.

After appealing to experience to substantiate his point *Sankara* brings in the charge of indefiniteness against the doctrine of *Saptabhangi*. On a previous occasion we replied to this charge of indefiniteness. It is enough here to show that if by definiteness *Sankara* means unconditional and absolute assertion indefinitness instead of being a defect would be certainly a meritorious point to the credit of *sayadvâda*. In the course of the discussion the critic indulges in certain epithets which we should now call "unparliamentary." We may pass it without notice partly because of its irrelevency to the main argument and partly because of the fact that in his days such an intermixture of Logic and Rhetoric was perhaps accepted as a justifiable weapon of debate.

As to his second point the practical futility of the doctrine we have to say a word. His argument comes to this. Every theoretical doctrine has a practical bearing This is all the more so in the case of Indian thinkers All Indian philosophers in spite of their doctrinal differences accept this as the fundamental truth of philosophy that metaphysical research is the handmaid of ethico-religious ideal of securing the *summum bonum* of life Hence any doctrine that is indefinite and ambiguous *in its message is condemned by this* pragmatic test. Since we have not accepted the theorical charge of ambiguity we need not tarry long at this practical consequence.

Next let us go to the application of *Saptabhangi* to the other Jaina doctrines Such as the five categories and the final release with the consequent heavenly bliss. *Sankara* points out that according to this *logic the five astikâyas may be five* and may not be five. This result will not certainly non-pluss the Jaina logician. If they are severally referred to they are five. If they are referred to as an aggregate and a class they are *one*. *If they are classified* according to a different principle they may be two, living and non-living. Hence there is no fixed numerical characterisation of these categories. Variation in the number that may be used *to designate*

these categories instead of implying self-contradiction indicates only a variation in the point of view from which they are examined. As the climax of his criticism *Sankara* asks his rival to say, what would become of the heavenly world if it both exists and does not, both eternal and non eternal. His rival will only answer as the author of *Saptabhangi Tarangini* does—in the following manner. If as you say it must be one of those and not both you have the following difficulty. If the final release and heavenly bliss is eternal and existing where is the chance for *Samsâra* and the attempt to obtain *moksha*. It the other alternative is the only truth, what is the purpose of preaching such an ideal which is altogether impossible " Man partly is and wholly hopes to be " is not mere poetry. It is genuine philosphy. Inasmuch as the final release is the goal towards which the whole creation moves it is true and real and inasmuch as it is *the goal* and is not yet an actualised fact it is not real and true. Why should this doctrine be so vehemetly attacked passes our understanding.

When we go to *Ramanuja* we have got a different method of argument altogether. He seems to accept the rival doctrine all the while protesting. He clearly sees the distinction between *dravya* and *paryaya*. Substance and mode. He also perceives that *paryaya* means change and *dravya* permanency. He also correctly points out that the doctrine of *syadvâda* is based upon these two different aspects *Dravya* and *Parayaya*. The proper course for the critic having gone so far would be to accept the doctrine. Or if he wants to reject he must show that things do not have both these aspects *dravya* and *paryaya*. Instead of doing either *Ramanuja* attempts to defend the *Sûtra* on a principle which is quite indefensible and unwarranted What he proves is that *asti* and *nasti* cannot be predicated of a thing from the *dravya* point alone. According to him the same substance cannot have both predicates. Certainly, it cannot have. Jaina Logic too proclaims the same thing. But if you take the thing in both its aspects—and it must be so taken to avoid empty abstractions—then it can and must have both the predicates

Attempting to reject this doctrine of identity in difference *Ramanuja* has the insight to perceive how his own doctrine of *Vedânta* is affected In one sense the *vedântic* metaphysics is the doctrine

of the one and the many. If reality could be one and the many at the same time *Vedântism* would be sufficient argument in favour of *Sayadvâda*. But unlike *Sankara* who dismisses the Many as *Maya* Ramanuja as constrained by his metaphysical attitude accepts the reality of the many also. Then what becomes of the one in the many. He proposes the *purva paksha* for the Jains, " But how can you maintain that *Brahmaa* although one only yet at the same time is the self of all," He answers the *purva paksha* thus—" The whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of the Supreme Person and that the body and the person are of totally different nature." This is extremely dubious victory. If the body constituted by finite things and persons is really the manifestation or *parinama* of the *Brahmana* and this what *Ramanuja* believes, then his refuge is quite unsafe. For, his rival would be justified in asking whether the *parinama* or the body is real or illusory. If the latter, his commentary becomes an unnecessary reduplication of *Sankara's* and if the former he is bound to admit the *Sayadvâda* point of view that the real is one from the point of view of the Person and many from the point of view of *parinâma* or his body.

For a fuller discussion of the same we refer the reader to the excellent work *Saptabhangitarangini* from which we have freely drawn in this essay.

One other point and we may take leave of this topic. *Bertrand Russell* in his American lectures " On Logical atomism" develops *Menrong's* Theory of objective fact in a very suggestive way. According to *Menrong* every proposition either true or false has an objective fact as the basis. For in order that there may be an intelligent assertion apart from its truth value their must be some objective basis. This doctrine implies two sets of objective facts one for true propositions and other for false ones. Both being objective, what is the destine mark of each so that one stands for truth and the other for error? Thus the question of truth is pushed further withont being answered and we have to admit objective facts which are false and erroneous. In order to avoid this result *Russell* proposes a modification in the doctrine.

He distinguishes between the meaning of a name and the fact implied by a proposition. Any individual object may be designated

by a name. The name is a symbol refering to some particular object. This is a bare fact. There is no meaning in calling this true, or false. It simply is. Truth *or falsity refers to a proposition*, a *proposition* becomes true or false because of an *objective fact*. The term *objective fact* is used in the sense of that which is other than the proposition that makes *for its truth or falsity. Every objective fact may have two* propositions of which one is true because it corresponds to the fact and the other is false because it has no corresponding fact. This theory *of correspondence works well in the case of a true affirmative proposi*tion (i e.) of the pair of propositions based on each fact if the true one is affirmative, it is so because there is a corresponding fact. The negative proposition which is not corresponding to that fact is so far falsified by the fact. But take the following pair. *Socrates* is living and *Socrates* is not living. Here it is the negative proposition that is true and affirmatiue one is false. According to *Russel's* theory the negative proposition which is true must have a corresponding fact; otherwise it cannot be true. But what is the objective fact that is corresponding to this proposition——*'socrates is not living.'* There seems to be none and yet there must be one. Therefore *Russell* brings in the theory of *"negative fact."* This suggestion raised a lot of discussion among the audience. But *Russel* himself leaves it undeveloped. He emphasses the fact that negative facts must be accepted as a fundamental postulate if the correspondence theory is to work.

Now what have we in the above doctrine of *Saptabhangi?* Each thing is capable of having seven modes of predication and primarily two affirmative and negative The affirmative proposition is determined by self form, matter, place and time. The negative proposition rests on non-self relation of the same four form, matter, place and time. In this case both the propositions are true. A negative proposition in the case of self-relation and affirmative proposition in the case of non-self-relation would both be false. The proposition relating *Socrates* to his own time is true; the one relating him to any other time is false To say that he is living now is such a false proposition. We are entitled to say only this that he is not living now.

Thus we have something like thus. A thing in its *Svarúpa* (self-form), *svadravya,* (matter), *svakshetra* (place) *svakála* (time) is the positive fact enabling the truth of an affirmative proposition. The thing in its *pararúpa* (non-self-form), *par-dravya, parakshetra,*

parakâla will constitute the negative fact. This will justify the negative proposition. This is offered only by way of suggestion for a possible explanation of what *Russell* calls "negative fact." Neither do we propose to develope *Russell's* theory nor do we want to imply that he was anticipated by Indian logicians of old. Any how the comparison is interesting and suggestive.

This *Saptabhangi* is a powerful organon in the hands of *Syadvâdins* who avoided the Nihilism of the *Buddhists* as well as the absolute Monism of the *Vedantists*, who steered clear of the shallow realism of the *Charvakas* and the ludicrous idealism of the *Nayavâdins*.

by a name. The name is a symbol refering to some particular object. This is a bare fact. There is no meaning in calling this true or false. *It simply is. Truth or falsity refers to a proposition, a proposition* becomes true or false because of an *objective fact.* The term *objective fact* is used in the sense of that which is other than the proposition that makes for its truth or falsity. Every objective fact may have two propositions of which one is true because it corresponds to the fact and the other is false because it has no corresponding fact. This theory of correspondence works well in the case of a true affirmative proposition (i e.) of the pair of propositions based on each fact if the true one is affirmative, it is so because there is a corresponding fact. The negative proposition which is not corresponding to that fact is so far *falsified by the fact.* But *take the following pair. Socrates is living* and *Socrates* is not living. Here it is the negative proposition that is true and affirmatiue one is false. According to *Russel's* theory the negative proposition which is true must have a corresponding fact; otherwise it cannot be true. But what is the objective fact that is corresponding to this proposition——' *socrates is not living.*' There seems to be none and yet there must be one. Therefore *Russell* brings in the theory of *"negative fact."* This suggestion raised a lot of discussion among the audience. But *Russel* himself leaves it undeveloped. He emphasses the fact that negative facts must be accepted as a *fundamental postulate if the correspondence theory is to work.*

Now what have we in the above doctrine of *Saptabhangi?* Each thing is capable of having seven modes of predication and primarily two affirmative and negative The affirmative proposition is determined by self form, matter, place and time. The negative proposition rests on non-self relation of the same four form, matter, place and time. In this case both the propositions are true. A negative proposition in the case of self-relation and affirmative proposition in the case of non-self-relation would both be false. The proposition relating *Socrates* to his own time is true; the one relating him to any other *time is false* To say that he is living now is such a false proposition. We are entitled to say only this that he is not living now.

Thus we have something like thus. A thing in its *Svarūpa* (self-form), *svadravya,* (matter), *svakshetra* (place) *svakāla* (time) is the positive fact enabling the truth of an affirmative proposition. The thing in its *pararūpa* (non-self-form), *par-dravya, parakshetra,*

श्रीपञ्चास्तिकायसमयसारः।

Pañchâstikâya Samayasâra.

इंदसदवंदियाणं तिहुअणहिदमधुरविसदवक्काणं ।
अंतातीदगुणाणं णमो जिणाणं जिदभवाणं ॥ १ ॥*

1. Obeisance to Jinas, possessed of attributes infinite, the conquerors who are beyond the influences of transmigration, worshipped by the hundred Indras; revealers of the clear, sweet, and three-world-beneficial Word.

COMMENTARY.

The three Lokas are Ûrdhva (upper), Madhyama (middle), and Adhah (lower). The Word is called beneficial, because it enables the people of the three worlds to realise their pure and perfect self. It is sweet because it draws towards itself the hearts of the faithful and the wise. It is called clear because it is free from defects such as, doubt, or self-contradiction etc.

The hundred Indras are, —

40 of the Bhavana Devas.

32 of the Vyantara Devas.

24 of the Kalpa Vâsis.

2 of the Jyotiska Devas, Sun and Moon.

1 of the Human beings

1 of the Animals.

One who is worshipped by such Indras in *Samosarana* is certainly deserving of worship by the ordinary mortals. The reference shows the glory of Jina.

2.

Next, salutation to the Jinâgama.

---

*Sanskrit rendering :

इन्द्रशतवन्दितेभ्यस्त्रिभुवनहितमधुरविशदवाक्येभ्यः ।
अन्तातीतगुणेभ्यो नमो जिनेभ्यो जितभवेभ्यः ॥ १ ॥

The following works are due to Sri Kundakunda Âcharya.

Prâbhrita-traya or Nâtaka-traya, i e, the trilogy of

Pañchâstikâyasâra,

Pravachanasâra, and

Sammayasâra or Sammayasâra Prâbhrita.

Also Niyamasara;

Satâ Prâbhrita; or Satapâhûda; consisting of Darśana Pahûda, Sutta, Charitta, Bodha, Bhâva, and Moksha Pâhûdas. Rayana Sârá; Bâraha Anubekkhâ;

(All these books have been printed.)

He is said to have written 84 Pâhûdas. Some names are given below:—*They are not as yet found in any library*

Jonisâra, Kriyasâra, Ârahanasâra, Ksapanasâra, Vamdhasâra, Tattvasâra; Amgasâra, Dabbasâra, Karma Pâhûda, Paya Pâhûda, Vidya Pâhûda, Ughâta Pâhûda, Dristi Pâhûda, Siddhânta Pâhûda, Samavâya Pâhûda, Naya Pâhûda, Prâkriti Pâhûda, Chûrnî Pâhûda, Pamchabagga Pâhûda, Karma Vipâka Pâhûda, Vastû Pâhûda, Payadhara Pâhdûa, Utpâda Pâhûda, Dibba Pâhûda, Sikkhâ Pahuda, Jiba Pâhûda, Achara Pâhûda, Sthâva Pâhûda, Alâpa Pâhûda, Chûti Pâhûda, Sata Darśana Pâhûda, Nakamma Pâhûda, Samthana Pâhûda, Nitaya Pâhûda, Eyamta Pâhûda, Vihâya Pâhûda, Sâlami Pâhûda.

All the works of *Sri Kundakunda* are in Prakrit verse. But it is easy and beautiful. His *nataka traya* or Trilogy has been commented upon in Sanskrit by *Śri Amrita Chandra Achârya* and also by *Sri Jayasena Achârya.* There is also a commentary on *Niyamsara* by *Sri Padma Prabha Maha Dhari Deva.* There is an excellent printed Hindi edition of this work by Jaina Dharma Bhûsana Brahmchâri Sital Prasadji.

श्रीपञ्चास्तिकायसमयसारः।

Pañchâstikâya Samayasâra.

इंदसदवंदियाणं तिहुअणहिदमधुरविसदवक्काणं ।
अंतातीदगुणाणं णमो जिणाणं जिदभवाणं ॥ १ ॥*

1. Obeisance to Jinas, possessed of attributes infinite, the conquerors who are beyond the influences of transmigration, worshipped by the hundred Indras; revealers of the clear, sweet, and three-world-beneficial Word.

COMMENTARY.

The three Lokas are Ûrdhva (upper), Madhyama (middle), and Adhah (lower). The Word is called beneficial, because it enables the people of the three worlds to realise their pure and perfect self. It is sweet because it draws towards itself the hearts of the faithful and the wise. It is called clear because it is free from defects such as, doubt, or self-contradiction etc.

The hundred Indras are —

40 of the Bhavana Devas

32 of the Vyantara Devas.

24 of the Kalpa Vâsis.

2 of the Jyotiska Devas, Sun and Moon.

1 of the Human beings

1 of the Animals.

One who is worshipped by such Indras in *Samosarana* is certainly deserving of worship by the ordinary mortals. The reference shows the glory of Jina.

2.

Next, salutation to the Jinâgama.

**Sanskrit rendering:*

इन्द्रशतवन्दितेभ्यस्त्रिभुवनहितमधुरविशदवाक्येभ्यः ।
अन्तातीतगुणेभ्यो नमो जिनेभ्यो जितभवेभ्यः ॥ १ ॥

समणमुहुग्गदमट्ठं चदुग्गदिणिवारणं सणिव्वाणं ।
एसो पणमिय सिरसा समयमियं सुणह वोच्छामि ॥२॥*

2 I bow to the Śāstra that is revealed by Jinas is the means of liberation from the four "Gatis and leads to Nirvana Listen! I describe that same truth in this work

COMMENTARY

Samaya means system It is of three kinds —

(1) *Śabda Samaya the system of philosophy or scripture*
(2) Arthasamaya the system of reality
(3) Jñanasamaya the system of knowledge

Saluting the Sabdasamaya or the scripture the author goes to describe Arthasamaya the facts of reality in order to attain true knowledge of the Jñânasamaya

The four Gatis are —

1 Naraka the Hell
2 Tiryak the plant and the animal world
3 Manusya Man
4 Deva the Gods

These four *Gatis* constitute Samsara

The Âgama is saluted because of two great reasons Its origin and its fruit *It* is the word of *God* *It is revealed by* Sarvanja Its fruit is that it saves the soul from the four Gatis of *Samsara and leads it to Nirvana the unconditioned state of perfection* where the self is completely realised

3

Then he mentions the three Samayâs Sabda Artha Jñana in the first half of the Gâthâ *and the distinction between the* Loka (the world) and the Aloka (the beyond) in the second half of the Gâthâ

**Sanskrit rendering*

श्रमणमुखोद्गतार्थं चतुर्गतिनिवारणं सनिर्वाणं ।
एष प्रणम्य शिरसा समयमिमं शृणुत वक्ष्यामि ॥ २ ॥

समवाओ पंचण्हं समउत्ति जिणुत्तमेहिं पण्णत्तं ।
सो चेव हवदि लोओ तत्तो अमिओ अलोओ खं ॥३॥*

3. It is said by Jina that the group of five categories *constitutes the system of reality; the same is the world.* And beyond that, is the immeasurable and infinite space (called Aloka.)

Arthasamaya or the system of reality is two-fold. Loka and Aloka. Loka is constituted by the five Astikâyas, or existences. Beyond that is the great and the infinite Aloka which is co-extensive with pure Space or Anantâkaśa.

4.

Here the author enumerates the five existences He describes the number of each and the general and special characteristics of the different Astikâyas.

जीवा पुग्गलकाया धम्माधम्मा तहेव आयासं ।
अत्थित्तह्मि य णियदा अणण्णमइया अणुमहंता ॥४॥†

4. Jivas or souls, Pudgalas or non-souls, Dharma and Adharma, *the principles of rest and motion, and finally Space*—these are the Astikâyas. They are eternal, uncreated and of huge magnitude.

COMMENTARY.

Since the atom or the material point is the unit of space the spatial point is also called *Anu* or Atom. *Since the five entities, such* as Jivas, etc., mentioned above are capable of occupying space, they are called Kâyas (corporeals); the term Kâya implies relation to many spatial points. Existences that can be so related to space are called by the Jainas, Astikâyas. It is evident that material objects consti-

---

**Sanskrit rendering.*

समवायो संज्ञानां समय इति जिनोत्तमैः प्रज्ञप्तं ।
स एव च भवति लोकस्ततोऽमितलोकः खं ॥ ३ ॥

†*Sanskrit rendering.*

जीवाः पुद्गलकाया धर्माधर्मौ तथैव आकाशम् ।
अस्तित्वे च नियता अनन्यमया अणुमहान्तः ॥ ४ ॥

tuted by physical molecules have such space quality. Jîva or soul is also considered to be an Astikâya because of its organic nature. Jîva exists as an organism and as such it is related to body and hence the spatial quality. Dharma and Adharma are the peculiar principles recognised by Jainas as corporeal. These are also Astikâyas. One is the principle of motion; the other is the principle of rest. They are pervading space and as such are Astikâyas. It is not necessary to point out that space is a multidimensional existence. Jains have recognised the reality of space They do not think that it is possible to reduce space to a "form of the mind" as the Idealists of Europe and India have done.

Since Time has neither potentially nor really the possibility of such space relations it is denied the name Astikâya. It is purely an entity of monodimensional series. Though it is not an Astikâya it does not cease to be a real entity. Here also the Jains differ from the Idealistic thinkers of the world in their attitude towards Time. Time is a reality and not a form of experience. Their views are more or less akin to the ideas of the Realism which is associated in England with thinkers like B. Russell.

5.

Then the Astikâyas are described

जेसिं अत्थिसहाओ गुणेहिं सह पज्जएहिं विविहेहिं।
जे हुंति अत्थिकाया णिप्पण्णं जेहिं तेल्लो क्कं ॥५॥*

5. Whatever things have the essential nature of manifesting themselves severally through their numerous qualities and modes are the Astikâyas. These fill the three worlds—they being the constituent parts of the world

COMMENTARY.

Since these are real, they are called Asti. Since they constitute the world or Loka they have the space quality, hence they are Kâyas. Astikâya then implies existential nature as well as space quality.

6.

Next the description of the six Dravyas. The above five Astikâyas together with the Time (Kâla) form the six Dravyas

*Sanskrit rendering.
येषामस्तिस्वभावः गुणैः सह पर्यायैर्विविधैः।
ते भवन्त्यस्तिकायाः निष्पन्नं यैस्त्रैलोक्यम् ॥ ५ ॥

ते चेव अत्थिकाया तेक्कालियभावपरिणदा णिच्चा ।
गच्छंति दवियभावं परियट्टणलिंगसंजुत्ता ॥ ६ ॥*

6. These five Astikâyas which though manifesting themselves diversely, maintain their permanency, constitute together with Kâla or time which has the quality of permanence in change, the Dravyas.

COMMENTARY.

These five entities are being and becoming. They undergo change and yet maintain their identity.

Thus they have the three characteristics of coming into existence, ceasing to exist, and also remaining permanent in spite of both. Creation, destruction, and yet continuity,—these are the main qualities of Dravya Kâla or time also has these three qualities, hence the Dravyas are six in number.

Dravya is fundamentally an organic unity. This view takes reality not merely in its aspect of change nor of permanency. It is permanency in change. Hegel is responsible for introducing such a conception of reality in modern thought. Jainas in their conception of Dravya have anticipated such a modern idea, several centuries in advance. Of course the concept was not fully worked out because of other limitations peculiar to their age

7

These six Dravyas can move in the same place. They can also occupy the same space because of their mutual accommodating nature. Though they get thus interpenetrated still each preserves its own proper nature.

अण्णोण्णं पविसंता दिंता ओगासमण्णमण्णस्स ।
मेलंता वि य णिच्चं सगं सभावं ण विजहंति ॥ ७ ॥†

7. These six Dravyas though mutually interpenetrating, and accommodating one another, and though getting mixed up

---

**Sanskrit rendering :*
तेचैवास्तिकायाः त्रैकालिकभावपरिणता नित्याः ।
गच्छन्ति द्रव्यभावं परिवर्त्तनलिङ्गसंयुक्ताः ॥ ६ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering :
अन्योऽन्यं प्रविशन्ति ददन्त्यवकाशमन्योऽन्यस्य ।
मिलन्त्यपि च नित्यं स्वकं स्वभावं न विजहन्ति ॥ ७ ॥

in view of occupying the same space, yet they always maintain their identical nature without losing their respective qualities, general as well as special.

COMMENTARY.

The six Dravyas are classified into three kinds:—(1) Sakriya (2) Sakriyaniṣkriya, (3) Niṣkriya. Sakriya Dravyas are those that can be efficient causes. They can move about from place to place They have the capacity of Âgamana or motion. Such are Pudgala, or matter and Jiva or soul. Sakriyaniṣkriya Dravyas are those that condition movements, without themselves undergoing change or motion. These have merely Avagahana. The physical principles of Dharma and Adharma correspond to this description. Lastly Niṣkriya Dravya is one which is capable of being neither the direct nor the indirect condition of change. Such is Space which has pure Avasthâna.

8.

After describing the general nature of Astikâyas in Gâthâ No. 5, "Jesim Atthisahâo etc," the author proceeds to describe their distinctive characteristics and examines them from different points or Nayas.

सत्ता सव्वपयत्था सविस्सरूवा अणंतपज्जाया ।
भंगुप्पादधुवत्ता सप्पडिवक्खा हवदि एक्का ॥ ८ ॥*

8 Substance is one (as a class). It is the inherent essence of all things It manifests itself through diverse forms. It undergoes infinite modifications. It has the triple characteristics of creation, destruction and permanence. It also has the antithetical qualities that is, it may be described by the opposites.

COMMENTARY.

The antithesis referred to is due to the fact that the substance may be described in each case by the opposite attribute. It is described as one from the class point. It may be described as many from the individual point. So with every adjective; Sarvapadastha

Sanskrit rendering:

सत्ता सर्वपदार्थस्था सविश्वरूपा अनन्तपर्याया ।
भङ्गोत्पादध्रौव्यात्मिका सप्रतिपक्षा भवत्येका ॥ ८ ॥

may have the antithesis *Ekapadastha, Viswarûpa against Ekarûpa*, Anantaparyâya, against Ekaparyâya, etc. Such a description of the same thing by opposite attributes may be incompatible with the false position taken up by Ekanta philosophy, that is, the philosophical attitude which insists on a single point of view with reference to the extremely complex facts of reality. But such complex facts can be *described by opposites without involving violent self-contradiction* according to the Anekânta philosophy—philosophy of manifold aspects. Complex reality naturally claims complex attitude of the understanding. Any attempt to provide life and its problems with a simple ready-made framework must certainly end in failure; for conceptual analysis always implies selection and abstraction. The *reality which is described by a concept will certainly be richer in* content than the content of the idea. Hence is the possibility of describing the same fact of Life by distinct and sometimes diverse conceptual symbols. This means that life is always greater than Logic. It is this aspect that is expressed in the Jaina attitude of Anekânta. The *prima facie* contradiction suggested by the term Anekânta is in no way different from the Hegelian dialectic which could embrace contradictions. When the Jaina philosopher speaks of describing the same thing by opposite attributes his view need not be assumed to be more violently shocking to the common sense attitude than Hegel's assertion that affirmation and negation are *identical. Both the views in short are apparently inconsistent*, but both emphasize an important aspect of reality

9

While describing the nature of *Dravya the author goes to mention the qualified identity between* Sattâ and Dravya. These are the same from one aspect

दवियदि गच्छदि ताइं ताइं सब्भाव पज्जयाइं जं ।
दवियं तं भण्णंति अण्णण्णभूदं तु सत्तादो ॥ ९ ॥*

9. What flows, or maintains its identity through its several qualities and modifications, and what is not different from Sattâ or Substance, that is called Dravya by the All knowing.

**Sanskrit rendering:*

द्रवति गच्छति तांस्तान् सद्भावपर्यायान् यत् ।
द्रव्यं तत् भणन्ति अनन्यभूतं तु सत्तातः ॥ ९ ॥

COMMENTARY.

Here Sattâ or substance is distinguished from Dravya. Dravya means that which flows or changes. While changing through its different qualities and modifications its essential nature persists. This kind of progressive development is associated with Dravya. But such development is also the characteristic of substance. Hence according to Jaina attitude Dravya is not entirely different from Sattâ or substance. Therefore the opposite qualities mentioned above with reference to Sattâ or substance are also applicable to Dravya which is not different in meaning.

According to this view there is no unchanging substance or Sattâ in Jaina system. Such adamantine existence cannot be identified with Dravya which is extremely volatile. Here also the similarity between Hegelian concept of "*thing*" and the Jaina concept of Dravya is worth noticing. Sattâ is not "a thing in itself" behind Dravya Sattâ and Dravya are one and the same as Hegel mentioned. Thing in itself and experience are not absolutely distinct. Dravya refers to facts of experience. Sattâ refers to existence or reality. One may be abstracted from the other but it is not different from the other as a fact.

10

Then he speaks of the other characteristices of Dravya.

दव्वं सल्लक्खणियं उप्पादव्वयधुवत्तसंजुत्तं ।
गुणपज्जयासयं वा जं तं भण्णंति सव्वण्हू ॥ १० ॥*

10. Whatever has substantiality, has the dialectical triad of birth, death, and permanence, and is the substratum of qualities and modes, is Dravya. So say the All-knowing.

COMMENTARY.

Here the three characteristics of Dravya are described: First Dravya has the quality of 'Sat' or existence Secondly it has the quality of permanence through birth and death Thirdly it is the

*Sanskrit rendering:
द्रव्यं सल्लक्षणकं उत्पादव्ययध्रुवत्वसंयुक्तं ।
गुणपर्यायाश्रयं वा यत्तद्भणन्ति सर्वज्ञाः ॥ १० ॥

substratum of attributes and conditions. The quality of 'Sat' emphasises the substantial reality of Dravya. It is not merely the form of the intellect. It has an existence in *Rerum Natura*. The triple quality of dialectical change is the second attribute. Utpâda is appearence, *i.e.*, assuming new modification This does not mean creation out of nothing. Creation by the fiat of a Will is not recognised by the Jainas. Utpâda therefore means that phase of the process of the development when a new form is assumed. Vyaya is losing the previous form. Here also it is different from absolute disappearance. It only means that phase in the process of development where the earlier form is replaced by the succeeding one. Dhruva refers to the persistence of the essential nature of Dravya which undergoes development and which makes both Utpâda and Vyaya simultaneously possible. In fact the process of development includes all the three phases. This fact is not only recognised by the scientists like Darwin and Spencer, but by the great French philosopher, Bergson, who raised it to an important philosophical principle. Lastly Dravya is the substratum of qualities and modes. Attributes and modifications will have no basis if they do not rest on something real. This does not mean that Dravya is merely a prop, supporting an alien fact, the attribute. The attribute is the thing and the thing has the attribute; but still the Jainas do not admit that the attributes alone are sufficient to constitute a reality. For them *esse* is not *percipii*. Attributes in order to be objective and not merely psychical do require an objective basis. Such a basis Dravya is Finally it is to be noted that these three characteristics are inseparable from one another. Sattâ pre-supposes Utpâda, Vyaya, Dhruvattva, and also is the substratum Similarly process of development implies Sattâ, which again cannot be existing apart from qualities and modes. Neither of the three can exist apart from the other two. In short the three characteristics express the same essential nature of Dravya in three different ways.

11.

Then Dravya is examined from two points of view :—

(1) Dravyârthika Naya, the aspect of substance, and (2) Paryâyârthika Naya, the aspect of change or development.

उप्पत्तीव विणासो दव्वस्स य णत्थि अत्थि सब्भावो ।
वय* उप्पादंधुवत्तं करंति तस्सेव पज्जाया: ॥ ११ ॥†

11. Dravya in its reality can neither be created nor destroyed; it has only permanent substantiality. But through *its modes, it secures the triple qualities of permanence, appearance and disappearance.*

COMMENTARY.

According to Dravyârthika Naya, Dravya, e g , gold can neither be created nor destroyed. It exists and that is all. But the ornaments and other things made of gold are the Paryâyas or modes. These may change; one ornament may be melted and a new one be made. The disappearance of the previous ornament is Vyaya and the appearance of the new ornament is Utpâda, and yet all the while there is the same gold Dhruva. Dravya then has both the qualities, permanence and change, it is permanent as Dravya and changing as Paryâya.

12.

Then it is pointed out *that there is* no fundamental difference between Dravya and Paryâya, substance and its mode.

पज्जयविजुदं दव्वं दव्वविजुत्ता य पज्जया नत्थि ।
दोण्हं अणण्णभूदं भावं समणा परूविंति ॥ १२ ॥‡

12. There is neither substance without mode nor mode without substance. *The one cannot be without the* other, so say the Śramanas.

COMMENTARY.

Though there is a difference between substance and its mode from the points of significance, quality and utility, yet the one cannot exist apart from the other as the difference is not fundamental. For

*There is another reading of it in the printed edition of this work in *Raichandra Jain Granthamala* as विगमुप्पाद

†*Sanskrit rendering.*

उत्पत्तिर्वा विनाशो द्रव्यस्य च नास्त्यस्ति सद्भावः ।
व्यय उत्पादध्रुवत्वं कुर्वन्ति तस्यैव पर्यायाः ॥ ११ ॥

‡*Sanskrit rendering.*

पर्यायवियुतं द्रव्यं द्रव्यवियुक्ताश्च पर्याया न सन्ति ।
द्वयोरनन्यभूतं भावं श्रमणा प्ररूपयन्ति ॥ १२ ॥

example, an ornament which is the Paryâya of gold is different from gold in Samjñâ or significance, in Lakṣana or attribute, and in Prayojana or utility. But still there can be no ornament apart from gold and gold apart from some form or mode of it. The relation between Dravya and Paryâya is the same as the relation between matter and form. No matter without form and no form without matter.

13.

Next he establishes the identity of substance and qualities

दव्वेण विणा ण गुणा गुणेहिं दव्वं विणा ण संभवदि ।
अव्वदिरित्तो भावो दव्वगुणाणं हवदि तह्मा ॥ १३ ॥*

13. There is neither quality without substance nor substance without quality; hence these two are not incompatible in their nature.

COMMENTARY

Though the quality and the qualified are different in appellation, they are not really different in nature, as both refer to the same real fact.

14

Then he describes the Pramâna Sapta—Bhangi The seven forms of Predication about Reality.

सिय अत्थि णत्थि उहयं अव्वत्तव्वं पुणो य तत्तिदयं ।
दव्वं खु सत्तभंगं आदेसवसेण संभवदि ॥ १४ ॥†

14. According as Dravya is viewed from different aspects of reasoning it may be described by the following propositions:—(1), Perhaps it is. (2), Perhaps it is not. (3), Perhaps it is both (is and is not) (4), Perhaps it is indefinable (5), Perhaps it is and is indefinable (6), Perhaps it is not and is indefinable and (7) Perhaps it is and is not and is indefinable.

*Sanskrit rendering.
द्रव्येन विना न गुणा गुणैर्द्रव्यं विना न सम्भवति।
अव्यतिरिक्तो भावो द्रव्यगुणानां भवति तस्मात् ॥ १३ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering:
स्यादस्ति नास्त्युभयमवक्तव्यं पुनश्च तत्त्रितयं ।
द्रव्यं खलु सप्तभङ्गमादेशवशेन सम्भवति ॥ १४ ॥

COMMENTARY.

Sapta—Bhaṅgi or the seven-aspected logical predication is an important doctrine of Jaina logic. The same object may be described by seven distinct propositions. These are the seven possible ways of *a priori* description. We cannot have another proposition about an object which cannot be brought under any one of the seven propositions. The complex nature of a real object or Dravya is amenable to description by the above seven and only seven propositions. To have a complete description then, the thing must be taken *in all the seven ways. In each case it is the same fact that is the* subject of the propositions which are certainly diverse in nature. That only means that different and apparently conflicting ideas may be predicated of the same subject. This is possible only in Anekânta philosophy.

The different *propositions are all beginning with the term* "*Syât*" which means *perhaps* The proposition aims, at the most only at probable truth. Jaina logicians were evidently extremely *cautious. With the consciousness of seven possible predications they* would never assert anything categorically about anything. Absolute categorical assertion may be justified in Ekânta philosophy. But the Jaina thinker in his dread of such absolutist attitude never hesitated to emphasize his relativistic philosophy even at the cost of verbal redundency.

The prefix Syât therefore saves the proposition from becoming an absolute assertion. The quality predicated is probably or perhaps *true.* The predication is accepted provisionally with the full recognition that the same may be denied and that other ideas may be affirmed of the subject.

1. The proposition *Syâdasti Dravya* means *that existence is* affirmed of a thing from the point of view of its own Dravya or essence. Essential characteristic may be safely affirmed of a thing. The affirmation has meaning with reference to its own *kṣetra* or place; *i e.*, you can say that "*a thing is*" *when you refer to its* place *of* existence. Similarly the proposition is significant with reference to its own *Kâla.* You can affirm the existence of a being during its lifetime. Again affirmation is significant if reference is to its *Bhâva* or quality. The quality of a thing can be safely predicated of the thing. Hence the proposition Syâdasti Dravya is an affirmation about the Dravya with reference to its own Dravya, (substance), Kṣetra (place), Kâla (time) and Bhâva (quality).

2. *Syânnâsti Dravya*, (perhaps the thing is not.) This proposition is a negation about a thing from the point of view of Para-Dravya (alien substance), Para-Kṣetra (alien place), Para-Kâla (alien time) and Para-Bhâva (alien quality), *i.e*, you can have a negative proposition of a thing in the following manner:—

1. X is not Y (Para Dravya).
2. X is not in Y (Para Kṣetra).
3. X is not now (Para Kâla), *i.e.*, it ceased to exist or it is not yet born.
4. X has not the quality Y, *i.e*, (Para Bhâva.)

3. *Syâdastinâsti Dravya* (perhaps the thing is and is not.) Both the conflicting predicates may be applied to the same subject, provided the following condition is satisfied. The affirmed predicate must refer to Sva Dravya (its own substance), Sva-Kṣetra (its own place), Sva Kâla (its own time) and Sva-Bhâva (its own quality.) And the predicate denied must refer to Para Dravya (other substance), Para Kṣetra) (other place), Para Kâla (other time) and Para Bhâva (other quality.)

4. *Syâdavaktavyam Dravya* (perhaps the thing is beyond description) There is no word which would bring out the implication of both the affirmation and negation of a thing at the same time Avaktavya should not be interpreted to be absolutely indescribable for then '*Avaktavya*' itself would become meaningless It only refers, to the impossibility of finding an idea which would include both the thesis and the antithesis at the same time.

5. *Syâtastiavaktavya* (perhaps the thing is and is beyond description). When reference is made to Sva Dravya, Sva Kṣetra etc., the thing exists and hence the affirmation, and when reference is made at the same time to Sva Para Dravya, Sva Para Kṣetra etc, the thing becomes beyond description and when attention is directed to both the abovementioned aspects, affirmation and indefinability will be the fifth *Bhaṅga*, namely:—perhaps a thing is and is beyond description.

6 *Syânnâstiavaktavya* (perhaps a thing is not and is indefinable.) Here the first reference is negation from the point of Para Dravya, Para Kṣetra, etc. Secondly the reference is to the indescribability and when both these characteristics, denial and indefinability are associated with the thing at the same time then the proposition "perhaps that it is not and is beyond description" becomes significant.

7. *Syad-asti-nasti-avaktavya Dravya,* (perhaps the thing is, is not and is indefinable.) Affirmation is with reference to Sva Dravya etc. Negation is *with reference to Para Dravya. Indefinability* when these two are taken at the same time. When all the three above characteristics are attended to together then the thing may be said to exist, and yet not to exist, and to be beyond description.

The seven principles are divided in the following manner.

1. *Pratyeka Bhangas,* single principles.

(*a*) Syâdasti.

(*b*) Syânnasti.

(*c*) Syâdavaktavya.

2. *Dvisamyoga Bhangas,* dual principle.

(*a*) SyAdastinâsti.

(*b*) Syâdastiavaktavya.

(*c*) Syannâstiavaktavya.

3. *Trisamyoga Bhanga* (triple principle).

(*a*) Syâdastinâstiavaktavya.

It is already mentioned that the Jainas accept only seven principles. Hence the following statement of Kumârila Bhatta is condemned to be absurd.

सप्तभंगी प्रसादेन शतभंग्यपि जायते ।

"When seven principles are admitted then there may also be hundred." Jainas believe that the true nature of reality will be understood when it is viewed according to Sapta—Bhangi.

15.

There can be neither destruction of existing Dravyas nor creation of non-existing ones. Concepts of creation and destruction are applicable to substance only because of its qualities and modes. In this Gâthâ Dravya is shown to be permanent from Dravyârthika Naya and changing from Paryâyârthika Naya.

भावस्स णत्थि णासो णत्थि अभावस्स चेव उप्पादो ।

गुणपज्जयेसु भावा उप्पादवए पकुव्वंति ॥ १५ ॥*

15. There can be no destruction of things that do exist, nor can there be creation of things out of nothing. Coming into existence and ceasing to exist, things do have because of their attributes and modes.

**Sanskrit rendering.*

भावस्य नास्ति नाशो नास्ति अभावस्य चैव उत्पादः ।
गुणपर्यायेषु भावा उत्पादव्ययान् प्रकुर्वन्ति ॥ १५ ॥

COMMENTARY.

For example the atoms of gold that constitute the substance gold are subject to neither creation nor destruction. But there may be appearance and disappearance in the different forms and modifications of gold; the original form may be lost; and a new form may be assumed. One ornament may be destroyed and another created. What is true of inorganic things is also true of other Dravyas such as Jiva. Jiva as such is neither created nor can be destroyed. Its essence is eternal, but it may lose its original state of existence and come into a new state of life. Life then is continuity of existence through births and deaths. Thus Dravya as such is permanent and unchanging. But its forms and modes are perpetually changing. Hence Dravya may be described by both the attributes permanent and changing according to the respective aspects or Naya.

16.

Then Dravyas are further distinguished from their qualities and modes.

भावा जीवादीया जीवगुणा चेदणा य उवओगो ।
सुरणरणारयतिरिया जीवस्स य पज्जया बहुगा ॥१६॥*

16. Jiva and other Dravyas are reals. The qualities of Jiva are consciousness and upayoga, (perception and knowledge), which are manifold. The soul manifests in the following forms as Deva, as man, as a member of the Hell or as a plant or an animal.

COMMENTARY

The term Upayoga is used to denote Darśana and Jñâna. Darśana is perception and Jñâna is knowledge. Besides Upayoga there is the quality of consciousness or thought or Chetanâ. Chetanâ and Upayoga constitute the main qualities of Jiva. But according to Jaina thought, Jiva may be pure and perfect or impure and imperfect—Suddha Jiva and Karma Jiva. Karma Jiva is not a distinct kind. It is the same Suddha Jiva soiled by the Karma.

Chetanâ or thought when associated with Suddha Jiva would mean perfect thought to which there can be nothing opaque.

*Sanskrit rendering:
भावा जीवाद्या जीवगुणाश्चेतना चोपयोगः ।
सुरनरनारकतिर्यञ्चो जीवस्य च पर्यायाः बहवः ॥ १६ ॥

Upayoga also will be Śuddha Darśana and Śuddha Jñâna—perfect perception and perfect knowledge. The whole of reality forms an object of perception to Śuddha Darśana and at the same time the *whole reality is known to Suddha Jñâna. Śuddha Chetanâ and* Śuddha Upayoga, consciousness, perfection, and understanding all perfect and pure, constitute the Svabhâva Guṇa—the intrinsic qualities of Jîva. These Sabhâva Guṇas are potentially present in all Jîvas and explicitly manifest in Siddha Jîva or the Realised Self.

The very same *Svabhâva-Guṇas get corrupt because of the* interference of Karma. Then they become Vibhâva Guṇas of Jîva or the extrinsic qualities of Jîva. Chetanâ and Upayoga become Aśuddha. The imperfect and the impure consciousness of man and other Samsâra states of Jîva is Aśuddha Chetanâ. It is the Vibhâva Guṇa which must be got rid off before the self attains purity and regains its intrinsic Śuddha Chetanâ. Similarly Śuddha Darśana and Śuddha Jñâna become Aśuddha in Samsâri Jîvas. Sense, perception or Indriya Darśana and knowing or Aśuddha Jñâna are the forms of Upayoga which is corrupt. This again in the Vibhâva Jñâna of Jîva. The Vibhâva Guṇas accordingly are present in all Samsâra Jîvas, whereas the Svabhâva Guṇas are in the germ.

In a similar way Jîva has two main Paryâyas, Sabhâva or Śuddha Paryâya, Vibhâva or Aśuddha Paryâya. The Siddha state, the state of purity and perfection is the Svabhâva *Paryâya*, whereas all Samsâra states are Vibhâva Paryâyas.

The distinction between qualities and modifications or states of existence may also be illustrated with reference to other Dravyas.

17.

Next it is pointed out again that though things have origin and decay from the point of forms or modes they have no change in essence.

मणुसत्तणेण णट्ठो देही देवो हवेदि इदरो वा ।
उभयत्त जीवभावो ण णस्सदि ण जायदे अण्णो ॥ १७ ॥*

17. If a soul departs from the human state it becomes either a *Deva or some other living being. In either* case (during death or birth), it does not lose its intrinsic nature.

**Sanskrit rendering:*

मनुष्यत्वेन नष्टो देही देवो भवतीतरो वा ।
उभयत्र जीवभावो न नश्यति न जायतेऽन्यो ॥ १७ ॥

COMMENTARY.

When the original form is lost, the soul does not lose its own nature with the passing form and when it puts on a new form it *does not get a new nature with its coming form. In spite of origin* and decay of forms the soul maintains its nature and identity.

This view of soul rejects the two false views, Kṣanika Ekânta and Nitya Ekânta The former maintains that there is a different self at every moment as the Buddhist believes. The Jaina view rejects this as untenable because it recognises the change with Paryâya or Guna and not with Dravya. Nitya Ekânta view maintains that the self is absolutely permanent and unchanging, and that all changes are illusory. This view also is rejected by the Jainas For them Jiva maintains its identity through the changes of Guna and Paryâya.

18

The same fact is again explained from the point of Nayas or principles of understanding

सो चेव जादि मरणं जादि ण णट्ठो ण चेव उप्पण्णो ।
उप्पण्णो य विणट्ठो देवो मणुसुत्तिपज्जाओ ॥ १८ ॥*

18. Though the soul experiences both birth and death, yet it is neither really destroyed nor created. Origin and decay refer respectively to the disappearing Deva state or the appearing human state and these are only its Paryâyas or modes.

COMMENTARY.

From the Dravyârthika principle there is neither birth nor death for the Jiva has an indestructible essence which cannot be annihilated even by the hand of Time Origin and decay are applied to Jiva only from the point of Paryâyârthika Naya.

19.

Then the different states of existence and their time limits are described.

**Sanskrit rendering*.

स एव याति मरणं याति न नष्टो न चैवोत्पन्नः ।
उत्पन्नश्च विनष्टो देवो मनुष्य इति पर्य्यायः ॥ १८ ॥

एवं सदो विणासो असदो जीवस्स णत्थि उप्पादो ।
तावदिओ जीवाणं देवो मणुसोत्ति गदिणामो ॥ १९ ॥*

19 Thus neither an existing thing is liable to death or destruction, nor a non-existing one can come into being. The Jiva has the Deva state or human state as the effect of the Gatinâma Karma and the duration of each state is conditioned by its own Nâma-karma.

COMMENTARY.

The Âtmâ in itself has neither beginning nor end, and yet it will take infinite forms. Each form of existence will be of a particular Gati. Gati is a general class of beings. Four such classes are recognised by the Jainas, Manusya, Deva, Naraka, and Tiryak Gatis. The birth of Âtmâ into any one of these forms is entirely conditioned by a particular kind of Karma. This Karma which leads the soul to take forms according to the different Gatis is called Gatinâma Karma. The form and the duration of life are dependent upon the quality and the strength of this Nâma-karma

When the particular Nâma-karma exhausts its efficiency, the particular form of life brought about by that Karma ceases to exist, and the soul puts on another form, that is, enters into another Gati, as determined by the new Nâma-karma acquired during the previous life. Thus Âtmâ is like an actor who takes several parts on the stage. Forms are put off and put on while the actor is one and the same Through all the changing forms the soul maintains its identity and nature for which there is neither birth nor death. And finally when the Âtmâ gets liberated from the Karmas it still maintains its everlasting nature, of course, pure and perfect.

20

It is pointed out that the soul which by liberation from Karma attains Mokṣa is not absolutely distinct from the soul which was in Saṃsâra.

For a gem purified is not fundamentally different from its own state before purification. The gem is the same though free from dirt.

*Sanskrit rendering :

पर्वं सतो विनाशोऽसतो जीवस्य नास्त्युत्पादः ।
तावज्जीवानां देवो मनुष्य इति गतिनाम ॥ १९ ॥

णाणावरणादीया भावा जीवेण सुट्ठुअणुवद्धा ।
तेसिमभावं किच्चा अभूदपुव्वो हवदि सिद्धो ॥ २० ॥*

20. Jiva on account of his Bhâva Karma or an impure emotional state may get utterly bound by the Karmas such as Jñânâvarniya (the knowledge-clouding Karma). (Then he becomes a Samsâri Jiva). But he may (through the realisation of his own nature) completely liberate himself from that bondage and then attains a state unknown to him before the state of perfection.

COMMENTARY

Though gold, may be different from brass, yet it is mixed with it. In the same way Jîva pure in itself gets bound by Karmas. The initial condition is its own impure heart called "Bhâva Karma". On account of this psychological state, the Dravya Karmas, or the different kinds of Karmic matter are attracted and get deposited on the Jîva, thereby shrouding its light and glory.

When the Jîva is so bound by Karmas it undergoes a series of manifestations. But finally by realising its true nature it may liberate itself from Karmic shackles and get Nirvâna. When once this stage is reached there is no fear of coming back to Samsâra. Jainas do not assume the doctrine of the *fall of man*. Every Jîva to begin with is a Karma Jîva and Nirvâna is a unique state to be acquired anew and for the first time. The state of nature is not a state of freedom. It is a state of bondage. Jîva finds itself in chains; and by its own exertion secures freedom.

21

Then it is stated that the Âtmâ with the manifestation of Guna and Paryâya (attributes and modes) will lose its existing nature and assume a new state of existence according to the Paryâyârthika Naya.

Sanskrit rendering:

ज्ञानावरणाद्या भावा जीवेन सुष्ठु अनुबद्धाः ।
तेषामभावं कृत्वाऽभूतपूर्वो भवति सिद्धः ॥ २० ॥

एवं भावमभावं भावाभावं अभावभावं च ।
गुणपज्जयेहिं सहिदो संसरमाणो कुणदि जीवो ॥ २१ ॥*

21. Thus the Jiva with its attributes and modes, roaming in Samsâra, may lose its particular form and assume a new one. Again this form may be lost and the original regained.

COMMENTARY.

Dravya or substance has the quality of identity and difference It is permanent while changing. Jiva Dravya is capable of taking different forms or Paryâyas This process of Paryâyic change is Samsâra. In the series of Samsâra with reference to a particular Jiva there is the passing away of old forms and the coming in of new ones. These changes of forms do not pre-suppose the loss of identity of the Jiva. The very same Jiva as an individual survives after each change thus maintaining its self identity. Samsâra for the Jaina is not the manifestation of a single self as the Vedântin would have it. Infinite number of Jivas each having its own Paryâyas constitute the total of Samsâra. At any particular moment the simultaneous and co-existing forms of different Jivas will make up the Samsâra of that moment which means the organic world the mankind and the Devas and the Nârakas and animals and plants of that moment.

22.

After describing the Dravyas in general by way of introduction the author is going to speak about Kâla or time which is indispensably related to the five Astikâyas. Before going to the description of time, the author re-capitulates the five existences or Astikâyas in relation to which only time has relevency and meaning.

जीवा पुग्गलकाया आयासं अत्थिकाइया सेसा ।
अमया अत्थित्तमया कारणभूदा हि लोगस्स ॥ २२ ॥†

22. The souls, the material bodies, space, together with the remaining two, Dharma and Adharma, are the uncreated existences that constitute the world. These are the Astikâyas.

*Sanskrit rendering.
एवं भावमभावं भावाभावमभावभावं च ।
गुणपर्ययैः सहितः संसरन् करोति जीवः ॥ २१ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering.
जीवाः पुद्गलकायाः आकाशमस्तिकायौ शेषौ ।
अमया अस्तित्वमयाः कारणभूता हि लोकस्य ॥ २२ ॥

COMMENTARY.

The infinite number of souls, the infinite number of physical bodies, space and the two physical principles of (Dharma and Adharma) of motion and rest :—these are the constitutive elements of the world. *These are uncreated and eternal. Jainas recognise the* reality of space. To complete the world they also pre-suppose the two principles of motion and rest called by them Dharma and Adharma.

23.

Then Time is described It is the instrument of change in the above five Astikâyas. This is real Time or absolute Time. From these changes we have the perception of duration and intervals which corresponds to relative or Vyavahârika Time. Real Time is also a matter of inference from the changes in the above Astikâyas.

सब्भावसभावाणं जीवाणं तह य पोग्गलाणं च ।
परियट्टणसंभूदो कालो णियमेण पण्णत्तो ॥ २३ ॥*

23. That on account of which these existences the Jivas, material bodies, the Dharma and Adharma undergo changes is called real time or Kâla-Dravya.

COMMENTARY.

Time is of two kinds, real and relative Birth, growth and decay of things are possible only because of the former absolute time. The relative Time is made up of conventional periods measured by unit based upon those changes. This is merely an aspect of real time which is constituted by Instants This is unconditional and absolute.

First of all the distinction between absolute and relative time reminds one of Newton's distinction The idealist for whom the world of concrete experience is illusory may speak of time as a *form of* experience. But one who accepts the reality of the concrete world and its changes, must also admit the reality of Time. Jainas being realists do recognise the reality of time. *If change is real, again,* Time must also be real It is the instrument of creative evolution as Bergson would say. And lastly the absolute or real time is constituted by *instants* which *correspond to the points* of space and

**Sanskrit rendering* ·

सद्भावस्वभावानां जीवानां तथैव पुद्गलानां च ।
परिवर्त्तनसम्भूतः कालो नियमेन प्रज्ञप्तः ॥ २३ ॥

particles of matter. In fact, these three classes of elements, points, instants, and particles have important function in the Jaina system of Philosophy. It is also worth noticing that modern realist led by the Mathematical Philosophers admits the doctrine that *space is real and is made up of points, Time is real and is made up of* Instants or moments, and the physical world is real and is made of particles. And these doctrines *form the fundamental concepts* of the Jaina view of the world.

24.

Next the account of real time of which the conventional time is a *form or mode.*

ववगदपणवण्णरसो ववगददोगंधअट्ठफासो य ।
अगुरुलहुगो अमुत्तो वट्टणलक्खो य कालोत्ति ॥ २४ ॥*

(24) What is without the five colours, and the five tastes, without the two smells, and eight contacts; what is neither *heavy nor light* and has the character *of introducing changes* in other things is Time.

COMMENTARY.

Time has meaning for and existence in the world. It is made up of Instants or Kâlânus. The Instants have neither colour, taste, nor touch. The qualities associated with physical objects cannot be *applied to it. These constitute a "continuous compact series."* The time series formed by Instants is one dimensional in the language of the Mathematicians; that is why Time is denied Kayatva by the Jaina Philosopher. Time which is so constituted by Instants is called Mukhyakâla *or absolute time. It is also described by the following* terms:—Paramârthakâla, the great unconditioned time. Nischayakâla, true time. Dravyakâla, real time. It is one of the six Dravyas or the Reals.

25

Then the account of relative Time which is measured by changes in the physical object or in the Jîvas. This conventional *Time is merely a Paryâya of real time and is conditioned by the above* changes.

**Sanskrit rendering.*

व्यपगतपञ्चवर्णरसो व्यपगतद्विगन्धाष्टस्पर्शश्च।
अगुरुलघुको अमूर्तो वर्त्तनलक्षणश्च काल इति ॥ २४॥

समओ णिमिसो कट्ठा कला य णाली तदो दिवारत्ती।
मासोदुअयणसंवच्छरोत्ति कालो परायत्तो ॥ २५ ॥*

25. Samaya, Nimiṣa, Kâṣtha, Kalâ, Nâli, then (Muhurta), day, month, season, Ayana, and, Ŝamvatsara and other periods of Time are all Vyavahâra or conventional time These are determined by other objects.

Samaya or moment (which is the manifestation of infinite number of ultimate distants).

Nimiṣa which is made up of innumerable such moments.

Kâṣtha which is equal to fifteen *Nimisas*

Kalâ which is equal to thirty *Kâsthâs.*

Nâli which is a little over twenty *Kâlas.*

Muhurta which is equal to two *Nâlis.*

Day and Night, equal to thirty *Muhurtas.*

Month which is equal to thirty days.

Season which is equal to two months

Ayana Half year equal to three seasons.

Samvatsara year which is equal to two Ayanas.

COMMENTARY.

The different periods enumerated in this Gâthâ are the conventional periods measured by different units These are artificial distinctions introduced into the continuous time series of real time. The units which determine the conventional distinctions are generally the changes in the objects of the physical world or of the organic world Winking of the eyelid, the diurnal motion of the sun across the heavens (which is only apparent according to modern Astronomy) and the motion of the moon round the earth are some of the important changes of physical objects which have been traditionally associated with conventional period of measurements Because of these conventional distinctions, relative Time is said to be *Parâyatta* "dependent on other things," but still since it is merely a form of real time which is an unconditioned Dravya. Vyavahâra Kâla is said to be conditioned *in a way.* It is called *Kathanchit Parâyatta,* somewhat conditioned.

26

Then is explained what is meant by somewhat conditioned in the case of relative Time.

**Sanskrit rendering :*

समयो निमिषः काष्ठा कला च नाली ततो दिवारात्रं।
मासर्त्वयनसंवत्सरमिति कालः परायत्तः ॥ २५ ॥

(6) *Is the enjoyer* of the eternal and infinite bliss begotten of the complete realisation of self.

(7) *Is the approximate size of* the body possessed by him last

(8) *And yet is without form*, being spiritual and being free from all Karmas or physical qualities.

(9) And is *Karma—nirmukta* is absolutely free from the bondage of Karma.

Thus the author in a single *gáthá* describes the two kinds of Jîvas, each with the nine qualities.

28.

कम्ममलविप्पमुक्को उढ्ढं लोगस्स अंतमधिगंता ।
सो सव्वणाणदरसी लहदि सुहमणिंदियमणंतं ॥ २८ ॥*

28. Âtmâ which is free from the defect of Karma gets to the highest point of the universe, knows all and perceives all, and obtains the transcendental bliss everlasting.

COMMENTARY.

Of the nine attributes the attribute of lordship is taken first for explanation. It is known by experience and by the study of scriptures that Soul is the lord of his own attributes and states of existence Impurity of the heart or false faith may lead him into Samsâra The Lordship should not therefore be interpreted only with the reference to the fall from a high estate. Even when he is *in the right path*, the path that takes him to the never-before-experienced bliss, everlasting, he is the Lord of his own destiny He is not *to be imagined merely as a drift wood carried up and down by the* waves in the Ocean of Samsâra. That would make him helpless in the hands of extrinsic *Karmic* forces. No. *He* is the Creator, the Karmas themselves owe their existence to his will Hence he is his own Lord whether he walks the path of righteousness or choses the other one. Âtmâ is his own maker and Lord.

Jaina philosophy is peculiarly associated with its own cosmogony. Heavens and hells are arranged in an order. The soul that gets liberation quits the place, rises up to the summit of Loka where he retains his abode This Dogma is referred to in the Gâthâ As the

*Sanskrit rendering:
कर्ममलविप्रमुक्त ऊर्ध्वं लोकस्यान्तमधिगम्य ।
स सर्वज्ञानदर्शी लभते सुखमनिन्द्रियमनन्तम् ॥ २८ ॥

natural and inevitable result of self-realisation the true Lordship of the soul consists in inheriting the abode of bliss at the summit of the world.

29.

Then it is mentioned that this everlasting heavenly bliss is secured by Âtmâ by his own efforts without any extraneous help.

जादो सयं स चेदा सवण्हू सव्वलोगदरसी य ।
पप्पोदि सुहमणन्तं अव्वावाधं सगममुत्तं ॥ २९ ॥*

29. Thus Âtmâ becoming omniscient and all perceiving through its own effort obtains the infinite bliss which transcends sense experience which is free from any imperfection, which is spiritual and self-determined.

COMMENTARY.

This Gâthâ goes with the previous one and states that infinite bliss is an acquisition of the self through its own exertions. This brings out the quality of Prabhutva or lordship, over one's own destiny.

30

After the description of the attribute Prabhutva we have an account of Jivâtva or Life characteristic. Here the author adopts the Vyavahârika point of view and describes the characteristics of organic beings in Samsârâ

पाणेहिं चदुहिं जीवदि जीवस्सदि जो हु जीविदो पुव्वं ।
सो जीवो पाणा पुण वलमिंदियमाउ उस्सासो ॥ ३० ॥†

30. Whatever thing manifesting through four Prânas (or principles of organism) is living at present, will continue to live in the future, and was living in the past, that same is Jiva. Again the Prânas are Bala, or strength, Indriya or the senses, Âyuḥ, or the age and Vchchhvâsa or respiration

*Sanskrit rendering :
जातः स्वयं स चेतयिता सर्वज्ञः सर्वलोकदर्शी च ।
प्राप्नोति सुखमनन्तमव्याबाधं स्वकममूर्तम् ॥ २९ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering
प्राणैश्चतुर्भिर्जीवति जीविष्यति यः खलु जीवितः पूर्वं ।
स जीवः प्राणाः पुनर्बलमिन्द्रियमायुरुच्छ्वासः ॥ ३० ॥

A living organism must have these four Prânas or life principles. You cannot think of a living being devoid of these characteristics. Hence the author trying to describe the nature of life as we know it, enumerates the four fundamental characteristics of organic life. These are :—

1. Balaprâṇa or strength which consists of
   (a) Manobala or strength of mind
   (b) Vâkbala or strength of speech.
   (c) Kâyabala or strength of body.
2. Indriya prânas are the senses
   (a) Sparśa or contact sense through skin.
   (b) Rasa or taste through tongue.
   (c) Ghrâna or smell through nose
   (d) *Śabda or sound through ears.*
   (e) Chakṣu or vision through eyes.

   Thus the Indriyas are five.

(3) Âyuh Prâna which is the duration or age of life and it is one.

(4) *Uchhvâsa or respiration is one.*

Thus the four Prâṇas become ten Prâṇas when details are taken into consideration. These Prâṇas need not all of them with all the details be present together in an organism, *i.e.*, there may be an organism which *has not all the five Indriyas. But there must be* the four main characteristics These Prâṇas are generated by the respective Karmas. The number and quality of the Prâṇas will be determined by the Karmic differences. These are considered to be the characteristics of *soul, only from Vyâvahârika point The particular* Vyâvahâra point adopted here is called by the Jaina Philosopher, अनुपचरित असद्भुत व्यवहारनय *i.e.*, non-conventional and relative aspect of attending to the unessential nature of a thing, *i.e.*, these characteristics do not *belong to Âtmâ according to the principle of absolute reality* or Śuddha Niśchayanaya.

31 and 32.

Next he enumerates the general and special characteristics of Jîva, the characteristics both manifested and unmanifested.

अगुरुलहुगा अणंता तेहिं अणंतेहिं परिणदा सव्वे ।
देसेहिं असंखादा सियलोगं सव्वमावण्णा ॥३१॥

**Sanskrit rendering :*

अगुरुलघुका अनन्तास्तैरनन्तैः परिणताः सर्वे ।
देशैरसंख्याताः स्याल्लोकं सर्वमापन्नाः ॥ ३१ ॥

केचिंत्तु अणावण्णा मिच्छादंसणकसायजोगजुदा ।
विजुदा य तेहिं वहुगा सिद्धा संसारिणो जीवा ॥३२॥*

31 32. The spiritual qualities of Jiva are infinite. Jivas assume different forms through the manifestation of these infinite attributes. Taking the point of world-space some souls through their complete manifestation may fill the whole world Others are not so fully manifested. These are filled with false faith-blinding emotions, erroneous knowledge and perception The former class of souls are free from these defects and are called the perfect ones. And the latter are the Samsâri, Jîvas or the imperfect ones Each class contains infinite number of individuals.

COMMENTARY.

That spiritual principle on account of which the Jîva Dravyas continue to manifest through all their different forms is called Agurulaghutva guṇa. On account of the explicit manifestations of these attributes Jivas have the chance of becoming complete and perfect. The number of Jîvas are infinite They have their abode only in the Lokâkâsa. A soul developed to perfection is called Siddha. That stage represents absolute freedom from Karmas The other class consists of Samsâri Jîvas. According to Jainas each class contains infinite number of individuals.

If we employ the terminology of modern philosophy we have to characterise the system as pluralistic The souls are not only different and distinct in their Samsâric state but also in the perfect state. A soul may become perfect, may acquire by self-manifestation infinite number of qualities and still it preserves its own individuality Individuality and perfection are not incompatible. Hence according *to the Jaina system realisation of Paramâtmâ does not mean absolute* nullification of self-identity. That means several Paramâtmâs or perfect souls may co-exist.

This attitude of uncompromising pluralism is evidently due to the extraordinary emphasis laid on individual conduct by the Jaina

**Sanskrit rendering*

केचित्तु अनापन्ना मिथ्यादर्शनकषाययोगयुताः।
वियुताश्च तैर्बहवः सिद्धाः संसारिणो जीवाः ॥ ३२ ॥

system. Bhakti and Jñâna are inadequate either severally or jointly to lead the soul to Moksa. Châritra or conduct is the indispensable third to constitute Moksamârga. If individuality is merely phenomenal appearance, moral value will also become purely relative. Ultimate reality may be complete without conserving moral value which becomes merely an unessential characteristic confined to the world of appearance. Any system that attaches great importance to moral value, that believes that reality would be incomplete without the conservation of values, cannot afford to play with individuality and must necessarily be pluralistic explicitly or implicitly.

33.

Next he explains the characteristic that soul is of the same dimensions as its own body which is acquired through Kârmas. He explains it by analogy.

जह पउमरायरयणं खित्तं खीरे पभासयदि खीरं ।
तह देही देहत्थो सदेहमत्तं पभासयदि ॥ ३३ ॥*

33. Just as the lotus-hued ruby when placed in a cup of milk imparts its lustre to the milk, so *Âtmâ* residing in its own body imparts its lustre or intelligence to the whole body.

COMMENTARY.

Âtmâ is in itself non-special hence it is not accurate to ask "Where does it reside in its body?" *It pervades through the whole body.* If it is located in any particular part of the body, the parts away from its residence *will have to be somehow related to consciousness.* The Jaina system avoids the whole difficulty by considering the soul to be completely *pervading in its own body.* This *pervading* is not to be interpreted as a sort of physical expansion. It is merely spiritual *manifestation still since the relation of consciousness* is intimate with its own body which is physical and special. *Âtmâ* is considered to be a Kâya. But this Kâyatva would not make it physical. It is distinctly defined to be spiritual.

34.

This characteristic of co-extensiveness with the body is true in its present as well as its past and future states or forms. Then

*Sanskrit rendering:

यथा पद्मरागरत्नं क्षिप्तं क्षीरे प्रभासयति क्षीरं ।
तथा देही देहस्थः स्वदेहमात्रं प्रभासयति ॥ ३३ ॥

the author mentions the substantiality of the soul, its distinctness from the body and the reason of its different states of existence

सव्वत्थ अत्थि जीवो ण य एक्को एक्ककाय एक्कट्ठो ।
अज्झवसाणविसिट्ठो चिट्ठदि मलिणो रजमलेहिं ॥३४॥*

34 Jiva pervades the whole body Still he is not one with the body though when functioning, he is identical with it Impelled by gross emotions, stained by Karmas he puts on different forms in the cycle of Samsâra

COMMENTARY.

The term Sarvatra is again interpreted to mean all the different bodies taken up by a soul during different births Then the Gâthâ will be interpreted slightly differently The very same soul exists in all its different bodies It is one with its body and yet distinct from them and so on Again Sarvatra may mean in all parts of the world. Then the interpretation will have to be as follows —

सव्वत्थ In all parts of the world

अत्थि Jîva exists

There are Jîvas everywhere, i.e , in all parts of the world

The Jivas णएक्को are not identical as they are distinct entities एक्को and yet they are one and identical एक्कट्ठो as they are substantially similar to one another etc , i e , they are one, from the generic point of view, but different from the specific point of view Though the Âtmâ has continued to exist and has an embodied existence from time immemorial, it is in its spiritual nature entirely distinct from its corporeal habitation It puts on a body because of Karmas and thus it roams in the world of Samsâra

35

Next, the characteristic of *Amurta* or incorporeality This quality is real absolutely in the case of a Siddha Jîva who is free from all taint of matter, karmic and non karmic, whereas the other Jîvas though in themselves *Amurtas*, are ordinarily associated with Mûrta Dravyas or physical characteristics

*Sanskrit rendering

सर्वत्रास्ति जीवो न चैक एककाये ऐक्यस्थः ।
तिष्ठति अध्यवसायविशिष्टश्चेष्टते मलिनो रजोमलैः ॥ ३४ ॥

जेसिं जीवसहावो णत्थि अभावो य सव्वहा तस्स ।
ते होंति भिण्णदेहा सिद्धा वचिगोयरमदीदा ॥३५॥*

35. Those Jivas which have not the life principles (Dravya Prânas or *the sense organs*) and yet are *not altogether devoid* of them (as the Bhâva Prânas are intact) are the ones that are free from corporeal limitation and they are the perfect ones beyond description.

COMMENTARY.

The body is the limiting condition of Âtma Pradeṣa or the dimension of Âtmâ. The size of the perfected soul is said *to be a little* less than that of its last body for it is free from the '*Yoga*' the *principle which brings about contraction and* expansion or *shrinking* and diffusing. It may be said to be merely an assemblage of pure knowledge and other qualities of perfection.

36.

That Siddha state is shown to be neither the cause nor the effect of the Samsâra series. *It being absolutely unconditioned* cannot be an item of the conditioned series of causation.

ण कुदोचि वि उपण्णो जह्मा कज्जं ण तेण सो सिद्धो ।
उप्पादेदि ण किंचि वि कारणमवि तेण ण स होदि ॥३६॥†

36. The Siddha is not to be born again at any time in Samsâra. Hence he is not to be an *effect* (*he is not to be* causally determined by anything else). Nor is he to bring about a change in anything else, therefore he is not a cause either.

COMMENTARY.

Siddha has secured the absolute Amûrta State, the state of perfect spirituality and is incapable of maintaining causal relation with the Samsâra series. The latter is determined by Karmic conditions. The

**Sanskrit rendering*:
येषां जीवस्वभावो नास्त्यभावश्च सर्वथा तस्य ।
ते भवन्ति भिन्नदेहा सिद्धा वागोचरमतीताः ॥ ३५ ॥

†*Sanskrit rendering*.
न कुतश्चिदप्युत्पन्नो यस्मात् कार्यं न तेन सः सिद्धः ।
उत्पादयति न किंचिदपि कारणमपि तेन न स भवति ॥ ३६ ॥

former is not so conditioned. The casual category, which is true of the conditioned series is not to be applied to the unconditioned reality. The argument is the same as that employed by *Kant* with the reference to the Thing in itself. What is true of the experience need not necessarily be true of the *metaempirical*. The Siddha state then is transcendental Self.

37.

Then he states that the soul maintains its intrinsic nature and is real even in its Siddha or perfect state. Thus the Buddhistic view of Nirvâna as the annihilation of self is condemned and rejected

सस्सदमध उच्छेदं भव्वमभव्वं च सुण्णमिदरं च ।
विण्णाणमविण्णाणं ण वि जुज्जदि असदि सब्भावे ॥३७॥*

37. That he is infinite in perfection and yet finite with reference to temporal life, that he is born into perfection and yet dead from Samsâra; that he is the negation of all extrinsic qualities and still the affirmation of his own intrinsic nature; that he has knowledge perfect and yet devoid of knowledge imperfect, these eight attributes will not be associated with him if 'Nirvâna' is interpreted nihilistically.

COMMENTARY.

As we said above, this Gâthâ defends the Jaina view of Self against the nihilistic interpretation of the Buddhists. Even in Siddha state the self does not lose its "Satbhâva" substantial reality.

It is only perfection of the already existing true nature which is in the germ in the finite self. Complete evolution is no annihilation. There must be more of its real nature and not less.

With this ends the Amûrta characteristic of Jîva.

38.

Next the characteristic of "*Chetanâ*". The author notices the three forms of *Chetanâ* or consciousness.

**Sanskrit rendering*:

शास्वतमथोच्छेदो भव्यमभव्यं च शून्यमितरच्च ।
विज्ञानमविज्ञानं नापि युज्यते असति सद्भावे ॥ ३७ ॥

कम्माणं फलमेक्को एक्को कज्जं तु णाणमध एक्को ।
चेदयदि जीवरासी चेदगभावेण तिविहेण ॥३८॥†

38. One kind of Jiva experiences merely the fruits of Karma, pleasure-pain. Another experiences conative activity as well; still another has pure and perfect knowledge. Thus consciousness is manifested in three-fold awareness.

COMMENTARY.

The first two states of experience are related to Samsâri Jiva, for they have reference to Karma; whereas the third has reference to pure *Chetanâ* Svabhâva and hence is associated with the perfect one. The implicit recognition by the author of the three different aspects of consciousness feeling, activity, and knowledge, is worth noticing from the point of modern Psychology.

39.

Then he specifies the Jivas according to the three aspects of consciousness noticed above.

सव्वे खलु कम्मफलं थावरकाया तसा हि कज्जजुदं ।
पाणित्तमदिक्कंता णाणं विंदंति ते जीवा ॥ ३९ ॥*

39. Indeed all fixed organisms like plants experience merely feeling; but the moving ones, the animals have besides feeling, conative experience. Whereas those that transcend the organic conditions or Prânas experience pure knowledge.

COMMENTARY.

Plants are fixed and incapable of movement, and can therefore only suffer the environmental changes. They can only feel the mechanical and climatic stimuli around. The moving organisms because of their movement are capable of experiencing their own *activity. In their experience then there is besides feeling, the*

†*Sanskrit rendering :*
कर्मणां फलमेकः एकः कार्यं तु ज्ञानमथैकः ।
चेतयन्ति जीवराशयश्चेतकभावेन त्रिविधेन ॥ ३८ ॥

**Sanskrit rendering :*
सर्वे खलु कर्मफलं स्थावरकायास्त्रसा हि कार्ययुतं ।
प्राणित्वमतिक्रान्ताः ज्ञानं विन्दन्ति ते जीवाः ॥ ३९ ॥

consciousness of activity, whereas to experience pure thought, there must be complete absence of physical and organic conditions. Such a being is certainly the Mukta Jîva.

After the wonderful discoveries of Dr. Bose with reference to plant life it is not necessary to defend the proposition that plants are capable of feeling. Western science, though it recognised the organic nature of plants was very much reluctant to admit the correlative organic characteristic of feeling in plants. This is only another phase of the *Cartesian prejudice with reference to plants and animals. Descartes* was responsible for the view that animals were skilfully created automata or machines. *Darwin* gave a death blow to this philosophical superstition and Bose did the same service to the plant world and thereby distinctly established the fundamental unity of the organic world and this is the thesis presupposed in the above Gâthâ.

Thus ends the discussion of Chetanâ characteristic of Jîva.

40.

Then the quality of Upayoga or the instrument of knowledge jnâna and Darśana—understanding and perception.

उवओगो खलु दुविहो णाणेण य दंसणेण संजुत्तो ।
जीवस्स सव्वकालं अणण्णभूदं वियाणीहि ॥४०॥*

40 Upayoga the instrument or means of knowledge is twofold—Jñâna or understanding and Darsana or perception. It is inseparable from and always present in Jîva. So do thou learn its nature

COMMENTARY.

One of the commentators says that this Gâthâ is addressed to a disciple who is a Naiyâyika. Perception and understanding are essentially related to Jîva There can be no Jîva which has not perception and understanding, similarly the faculties cannot exist apart from the self. This is the view of the author. He rejects the view that the faculties are adventitious and acquired.

41.

Then the author describes the different species of Jñâna which is one of the Upayogas referred to in the previous Gâthâ.

*Sanskrit rendering.
उपयोगः खलु द्विविधो ज्ञानेन च दर्शनेन संयुक्तः ।
जीवस्य सर्वकालमनन्यभूतं विजानीहि ॥ ४० ॥

आभिणिसुदोधिमणकेवलाणि णाणाणि पंचभेयाणि ।
कुमदिसुदविभंगाणि य तिण्णि वि णाणेहिं संजुत्ते ॥४१॥*

Abhinibodha (knowledge obtained by congenital mental capacity), Śruta (knowledge obtained by study), Avadhi (a kind of clairvoyant knowledge of events in different places and in different times), Manaḥ Paryaya (telepathic knowledge of another's mind), and Kevala Jñāna (the perfect knowledge) These are the five kinds of right knowledge. But, when the first three are associated with the error, or Ajñāna they form three kinds of erroneous knowledge, Kumati, Kuśruti, Vibhaṅga Avadhi, and are included in the forms of knowledge.

COMMENTARY.

Mati Jñâna refers to sense perception and the inferential knowledge based upon it. Śruta Jñâna is knowledge based upon testimony obtained mainly through books. Avadhi Jñâna is an abnormal faculty of perception, but the perception is not conditioned by sense organs. It is supposed to comprehend things and events of different places and of different times. The faculty is able to project itself *either to the past or to the future.* This *form of awareness is quite* analogous to sense perception. This in a way corresponds to the clairvoyant capacity possessed by certain "mediums." Manah Paryaya is the capacity of knowing the ideas in another's mind. This corresponds in a way to telepathy of modern psychology. This gives an insight into mental facts of persons at a limited distance—the distance limit being conditioned by the strength and the quality of the faculty. This should not be confounded with inferential knowledge obtained from facial expression. And lastly Kevala Jñâna is *the perfect knowledge which is associated with the Siddha State.* The first two are distinctly conditioned by sense perception, whereas the other three transcend sense *limitations. The last is absolutely free* from any kind of physical conditions, whereas the other four are still associated with corporeal existence. Avadhi and Manah Paryaya are the super-normal faculties acquired under peculiar psycho-physical

**Sanskrit rendering:*
आभिनिबोधिकश्रुतावधिमनःपर्ययकेवलानि ज्ञानानि पञ्चभेदानि ।
कुमतिश्रुतविभङ्गानि च त्रीण्यपि ज्ञानैः संयुक्तानि ॥ ४१ ॥

conditions. The normal and super-normal cognitive faculties which correspond to the revelations of modern psychic research are not facts to be passed over without notice.

42.

Then the five Jñânas are described in detail. First Mati-Jñâna is taken.

मदिणाणं पुण तिविहं उवलद्धी भावणं च उवओगो ।
तह चेव चदुवियप्पं दंसणपुव्वं हवादि णाणं ॥४२॥*

42. Matijñâna is of three kinds —Upalabdhi or perception, Bhâvanâ or memory, Upayoga or understanding. It is also said to be of four kinds. This Jñâna is always preceded by sense presentation or Darśana

COMMENTARY.

This Matijñâna is certainly consequent upon sense perception. It includes as the Sutra says apprehension of the object, memory, and understanding, *i.e.*, all that is given to us through sense perception and all that we elaborate out of these sense-elements in memory and imagination. Though it is mainly of three kinds it is also considered to be of four different forms. For example the author of Tattvârthasutra speaks of अवग्रहेहावाय धारणा· *This four-fold division* is not fundamentally different from the previous division. अवग्रह implies the sense datum, *e g*, *Perceiving a thing to be white through* the eyes is Avagraha. To attempt to determine what that white object is, is ईहा. This ईहा refers to the indecisive mental attitude where several alternative determinations are possible. Finally when the thing is determined, i e., out of several alternatives when one is chosen because of certain special characteristics perceived in the white object then we have Avâya This implies the inferential element in all perception. This should not be confounded with mediate inference about other things through sense perception. The very same act of perception involves all these three stages. And lastly whenever we remember these things after sometime it is called धारणा. This Matijñâna consists of 336 forms when viewed according to different principles of Division.

**Sanskrit rendering*.

मतिज्ञानं पुनस्त्रिविधं उपलब्धिर्भावना च उपयोगः ।
तथैव चतुर्विकल्पं दर्शन पूर्वं भवति ज्ञानम् ॥ ४२ ॥

—पं॰ जुगलकिशोर ।

आभिणिसुदोधिमणकेवलाणि णाणाणि पंचभेयाणि ।
कुमदिसुदविभंगाणि य तिण्णि वि णाणेहिं संजुत्ते ॥४१॥*

Abhinibodha (knowledge obtained by congenital mental capacity), Śruta (knowledge obtained by study), Avadhi (a kind of clairvoyant knowledge of events in different places and in different times), Manaḥ Paryaya (telepathic knowledge of another's mind), and Kevala Jñanâ (the perfect knowledge) These are the five kinds of right knowledge. But, when the first three are associated with the error, or Ajñâna they form three kinds of erroneous knowledge, Kumati, Kuśruti, Vibhanga Avadhi, and are included in the forms of knowledge.

COMMENTARY.

Mati Jñâna refers to sense perception and the inferential knowledge based upon it. Śruta Jñâna is knowledge based upon testimony obtained mainly through books. Avadhi Jñâna is an abnormal *faculty of perception, but the perception is not conditioned by sense* organs. It is supposed to comprehend things and events of different places and of different times. The faculty is able to project itself either to the past or to the future. This form of awareness is quite analogous to sense perception. This in a way corresponds to the *clairvoyant capacity possessed by certain "mediums."* Manah Paryaya is the capacity of knowing the ideas in another's mind. This corresponds in a way to telepathy of modern psychology. This gives an insight into mental facts of persons at a limited distance—the distance limit being conditioned by the strength and the quality of *the faculty. This should not be confounded with inferential know*ledge obtained from facial expression. And lastly Kevala Jñâna is the perfect knowledge which is associated with the Siddha State. The first two are distinctly conditioned by sense perception, whereas the other three transcend sense limitations. The last is absolutely free *from any kind of physical conditions,* whereas the other four are still associated with corporeal existence. Avadhi and Manaḥ Paryaya are the super-normal faculties acquired under peculiar psycho-physical

Sanskrit rendering :

आभिनिबोधिकश्रुतावधिमनःपर्ययकेवलानि ज्ञानानि पञ्चभेदानि ।
कुमतिश्रुतविभङ्गानि च त्रीण्यपि ज्ञानैः संयुक्तानि ॥ ४१ ॥

conditions The normal and super normal cognitive faculties which correspond to the revelations of modern psychic research are not facts to be passed over without notice

42

Then the five Jnanas are described in detail First Mati-Jñâna is taken.

मदिणाणं पुण तिविहं उवलद्धी भावणं च उवओगो।
तह चेव चदुवियप्पं दंसणपुव्वं हवादि णाणं ॥४२॥*

42 Matijñâna is of three kinds —Upalabdhi or perception, Bhâvanâ or memory, Upayoga or understanding It is also said to be of four kinds This Jnâna is always preceded by sense presentation or Darśana

COMMENTARY.

This Matijnana is certainly consequent upon sense perception It includes as the Sutra says apprehension of the object, memory, and understanding, *i e* all that is given to us through sense perception and all that we elaborate out of these sense elements in memory and imagination Though it is mainly of three kinds it is also considered to be of four different forms For example the author of Tattvârthasutra speaks of अवग्रहेहावाय धारणा This four fold division is not fundamentally different from the previous division अवग्रह implies the sense datum *e g*, Perceiving a thing to be white through the eyes is Avagraha To attempt to determine what that white object is is ईहा This ईहा refers to the indecisive mental attitude where several alternative determinations are possible Finally when the thing is determined *i e* out of several alternatives when one is chosen because of certain special characteristics perceived in the white object then we have Avâya This implies the inferential element in all perception This should not be confounded with mediate inference about other things through sense perception The very same act of perception involves all these three stages And lastly whenever we remember these things after sometime it is called धारणा This Matijñana consists of 336 forms when viewed according to different principles of Division

---

**Sanskrit rendering*

मतिज्ञानं पुनस्त्रिविधं उपलब्धिर्भावना च उपयोगः।
तथैव चतुर्विकल्पं दर्शनपूर्वं भवति ज्ञानम् ॥ ४२ ॥

—पं॰ जुगलकिशोर।

43.

Then Śrutajñâna, knowledge by testimony and not by acquaintance. The objects of *this* knowledge may be Múrta and Amûrta, Physical and non-physical.

सुदणाणं पुण णाणी भणंति लद्धी य भावणा चेव ।
उवओगणयवियप्पं णाणेण य वत्थु अत्थस्स ॥४३॥

43 The wise say that *Sruta Jñâna* is of *four kinds*—*Labdhi*, or association, Bhâvanâ or attention, Upayoga or understanding of things and Naya or the aspects of their meaning.

COMMENTARY.

Of these four forms of Śrutajñâna or knowledge by testimony, the first is Labdhi. This corresponds to association of ideas. Labdhi is defined to be the process of getting the meaning of one idea through its associated idea. Bhâvanâ is the direction of attention to one idea *with a view to get at the associated idea. Upayoga is* the process of understanding the meaning of ideas consequent upon Bhâvanâ Naya is viewing the meaning from different relations. The first three are concerned with the psychic process of acquiring knowledge through the ideas contained in books. The last is the way of *understanding things from different aspects. This Naya* plays a very important part in Jaina system of thought. This and the Sapta Bhangi mentioned above are the two pillars of Jaina Logic. The Nayas also are of seven different kinds. In order to distinguish the seven Nayas these are called Naya Sapta Bhangi as contrasted with *Pramana Sapta Bhangi. Naya is defined in "Naya Vivarana"* thus. नीयते गम्यतेऽनेन श्रुतार्थांशः स नो नयः that by which the various aspects of the meaning of the scripture are understood is for us the Naya or principle. This Naya or principle of interpretation is mainly of two kinds, 1. Dravyârthikanaya, that pertaining to Dravya or substance, 2. Paryâyârthika Naya *that pertaining to modifications. Again* Dravyârthikanaya is further sub-divided into three kinds, 1. Naigama, 2 Samgraha, 3. Vyavahâra. The Paryâyârthika Naya is sub-divided into four kinds, 1. Rijusûtra, 2. Sabda, 3. Samabhirûdha, 4. Evambhûta. These seven may be explained in detail,

1. Naigamanaya. Nigamah or Sankalpah or purpose. That which pertains to निगम. or purpose is नैगमनय. It may be said to be the Teleological aspect of a continuous activity. When the purpose of the activity is taken to represent the whole series then it is नैगमनय. It is defined in the Sûtra अनभिनिर्वृतार्थ संकल्पमात्र ग्राही नैगमः. Thus when a person who is drawing water or who is busy carrying firewood is questioned "What are you doing?" He answers "I am cooking." Here he is not actually cooking but it is the purpose which accounts for his action of carrying firewood or drawing water vide *Poojya Padya's* Commentary Sarvarthasiddhi Sutra 33 of *Ch* I. This Naya is misunderstood by M. D Desai (Nayakarnika)* and by S. C. Vidyabhusana (Nyayavatara).†

These passages give an entirely different interpretation of this *naya*. It is very clearly explained and illustrated by *Poojyapadya* in his *Sarvarthasiddhi*—Sutra 33 of the first chapter The same explanation and also the same illustrations are adopted by another commentator of the same sutra—*Srutasagara* the author of *Srutasagareyam*—an unpublished commentary on *Tattarthadhigama*. My own explanation is based upon these authorities and also on the great work on Logic—*Prameya Kamala Martandi* I consulted *Syadvadamanjari* also of the Benares Edition, page 166 and Bombay Edition of *Raichandrajaina granthmala* page 198. Here also the same interpretation is found If in a series of qualities or action any part is taken as the representative of the whole, this representative aspect is Naigama. The derivation given by Mr. *Desai* may also mean the same *Naikam, gahatiti Nigama nigamo bana—Naigama.* "The particular that is not restricted to itself, but goes beyond itself to unify and represent the whole"

This representative character is of course not to be identified with either the mere universal or particular. It is different from both. When a person is making preparations to start on journey, we say "He starts" At the moment of the statement he is not starting, but is going to start. Similary "He dwells here," need not mean that the person must be actually be in the residence at the moment;

*Naigama Naya (vide) Nayakarnika pages 7, 8 of introduction and 43.
Also Nyayavatara† pages 27 and 47.

These Nayas refer to the different relations that the several attributes have to the self. The soul owns these several attributes according to these several Nayas. That special aspect of possessing is different in different cases and the different Nayas define the several relations which may be real or relative; which may be pure or impure; which may be separable or inseparable and so on.

(44) Then Avadhi is described in detail.

ओहिं तहेव घेप्पदु देसं परमं च ओहिसव्वं च ।
तिण्णवि गुणेण णियमा भवेण देसं तहा णियदं ॥४४॥

Thus Avadhi also is of three kinds. Deṣavadhi, Paramavadhi and Sarvavadhi. *All the three are conditioned by Psychic qualities.* But Desavadhi is also conditioned by birth in the case of Deva and Naraka.

COMMENTARY.

Desavadhi is the very limited faculty of perceiving things beyond sense perception. It is able to apprehend *only* a *limited* number of *things within* a limited *space* and within a limited time. Paramavadhi is the higher Avadhi Jñâna which is free from such limitations. But the last. Sarvavadhi is the perfect faculty which perceives all reality. This is associated with the perfect self. These three faculties are *respectively* acquired by psychic development, i e. as long as *certain* Psychic qualites are present these metemperical faculties spontaneously manifest themselves. But in the case of the last when once it is acquired it becomes permanent and everlasting. Whereas the first is also present as a matter of birth right in *Devas and Narakas. i.e.* they need not acquire it by special Psychical effort and development. But in the case of man and some higher animals it is to be acquired by developing the psychical nature.

Thus Desavadhi, is said to be of two kinds. Gunapratyaya and Bhavapratyaya, conditioned by Gunas or Psychic qualities and by Bhava or Birth. Gunapratyaya Desavahi is associated with man and animals and Bhavapratyaya with Deva and Naraka.

Gunapratyaya is again divided into six kinds.—

1. Anugami (the following)
2. Ananugami (not following)
3. Vardhamana (the growing)
4. Hiyamana (decaying or decreasing)

5. Avasthita (limited or bounded).

6. Anavasthita (unlimited or indefinite)

The first is that which enlightens the things while marching as the sun does

The second is that which sticks to one and the same thing as the fixed idea of an insane person. In the first attention is continually flowing from things to things whereas in the second it is rivetted to the very same thing.

The third is that which begins like a spark of light and grows into a huge flame gradually lighting up a number of objects.

The fourth implies the opposite tendency in the faculty. Here the faculty gradually decreases like fire going out.

The fifth is the faculty that neither increases nor decreases but is limited and definite because of the Samyak qualities of the soul.

The sixth is the opposite of the fifth. It is unlimited and indefinite. It is wavering hither and thither like a column of fire or water that is subject to heavy gust of wind.

(45) Then the description of Manah Paryaya

विउलमदी पुण णाणं अज्जवणाणं च दुविह मणणाणं ।
एदे सजमलद्धी उवओगे अप्पमत्तस्स ॥४५॥

Manah Paryaya is of two Kinds· Rijumati and Vipulamati; telepathy which manifests straight and direct and telepathy that manifests crooked or in undulations. These appear only in a person of *appramatta Gunasthâna* who acquired *Samyama labdhi*, (*i. e*) a person who acquired complete harmony or steadiness of the spirit by thorough renunciation.

COMMENTARY.

Rijvi means straight that which manifests straight or direct is Rijumati. This apprehends straight and direct the ideas in another's mind. Vipula means crooked or zigzag. When the process of knowing the ideas in other's mind manifests in a zigzag way it is Vipula Mati. These are the two kinds of Manah Paryaya Jñâna. This capacity is distinctly an acquired one. It is associated only with a person who has risen pretty high in the ladder of spiritual evolution. That particular stage at which this faculty appears is known as Apramatta gunasthâna.

The stages in spiritual evolution are fourteen. They are called Gunasthánas. These are—

1. मिथ्यादृष्टिः ॥
2. सासादन सम्यग्दृष्टिः ॥
3. सम्यङ् मिथ्यादृष्टिः ॥
4. असंयत सम्यग्दृष्टि ॥
5. संयतासंयतः ॥
6. प्रमत्तसंयतः ॥
7. अप्रमत्तसंयतः ॥
8. अपूर्वकरणस्थाने उपशमकः क्षपकः ॥
9. अनिवृत्तिबादरसाम्परायस्थाने उपशमकः क्षपकः ॥
10. सूक्ष्मसाम्परायस्थाने उपशमकः क्षपकः ॥
11. उपशान्तकषायवीतरागछद्मस्थः ॥
12. क्षीणकषायवीतरागछद्मस्थः ॥
13. सयोगकेवली ॥
14. अयोगकेवली चेति ॥

1. The first is the stage which represents spiritual blindness. A person in this stage is incapable of either perception of or belief in true reality. This is the lowest stage of spiritual existence where *thought is without the value of truth and conduct without the value of goodness.*

2. The seacnd stage is the stage of retregression A person may advance *in the path of evolution* and become a Samyagdrishti (the fourth Gunasthána) *This stage is the opposite of the first. It* is only from this stage (the fourth) onwards that a person is capable of having either truth or goodness. But sometimes a soul after reaching the fourth stage which is really the next step from the first *may have the misfortune* of spiritual degeneration. *He may slip* down to the bottom of the ladder. *This process of slipping down is* the stage of Sasadana.

It is only a transition period The person will very soon settle *down in the first stage Hence the second stage does not really mean* the next slip from the first. *So also the third* stage *is the spiritual* oscillation between first and fourth. It is also a transition stage.

3. *The third stage represents the mixed quality. The characteristic of the first and of the fourth stage* get inextricably mixed together. The spiritual character is indeterminate. A person cannot be brought under either the first class or the fourth class. Hence it is called *Misragunasthána.*

4. The fourth stage represents the beginning of the spiritual well being. *Here is the possibility of truth and goodness* But still there is not active effort to elicit true thought and good conduct. The absence of this effort is associated with the right spiritual disposition. The latter *is called Samyaktva. A person who is in* this stage and who is without the effort to exhibit the innate powers is *Asamyata Samyakdrishti.*

5. The fifth stage represents partial effort to draw out the spiritual powers In this stage a person has not only the desirable spiritual disposition but also makes some effort towards further development. He is called *a Desavrati.*

6 The sixth stage represents whole-hearted effort. Complete and possible control over self is associated *with the true bent of* the spirit. But still the whole-hearted good will is not yet free from tempting desires and impulses There is the chance of these impulses getting the mastery *for there is not yet complete* renunciation. Hence this stage is *Pramatta Samyata.*

7. The seventh stage is called *Apramatta Samyata* In this stage the *tendency to be* attached by the outer things is thoroughly overcome. Spiritual strength is firmly established. Spirit has conquered the body This stage is the critical stage in the spiritual evolution. From here begins the double path of higher spiritual evolution. One path leads to absolute perfection And the other relative perfection. The former is associated with the annihilation of Karmas. The latter with the suppression of them. The former is called *Kshapaka Sreni* the ladder of annihilation, the lather is called *Upasama Sreni*—the ladder *of pacification of Karmas.*

Manaḥ Paryaya Jñâna appears *only in* a person who has *reached* this critical stage of higher spiritual evoloution.

Hence it must be considered as an extraordinary psychic quality acquired only after reaching a high stage of spiritual evolution Before proceding to describe the characteristics of the other stages *of evolution let us note the further qualities of Manaḥ* Paryaya. This Psychic capacity is peculiarly limited by time and space. Though it is higher than ordinary mental faculty, though it is supernormal still it should not be *considered even as approaching* Kevala Jñâna. Of the two kinds of mind-knowing Vipula Mati is considered to be greatly superior to the other. The limitations given are as follow :—

Rijumati Manah Paryaya from the point of time has a lower limit as well as a higher limit. In its lower limit it may apprehend the thoughts of another individnal during his lifetime or it may extend to two or three Bhavas or births before and after. The upper limit is upto seven or eight Bhavas or births before and after. From the point of view of space its lower limit is to the redius of a *Gavyuti Gavvuti* or about two leagues and the upper limit is the radius of one *Yojana*. The second, *Vipulamati* has the lower time limit of seven or eight births whereas the higher is innumerable Its lower distance limit is round a radius of one *yojana* and its higher distance limit is upto *Manushottara* mountain and not beyond that. This *Manushothara Saila* is according to Jaina Geography the limit of human habitation.

When we examine the limitations described above it is clear to us that the latter Vipula Mati is decidedly the higher supernormal faculty. Therefore the commentator's interpretation of vipula as kutila or crooked really means Rythmic or undulatory manifestation. Whereas the former is straight and direct. The rythmic manifeststion is naturally capable of greater efficiency. This is illustrated by several rythmic movements in Nature, as in the heartbeat. This Psychic faculty evidently through this rythmic or undulatory manifestation is able to achieve better and higher results than those of Rijumati.

8. The eighth stage represents the acquisition of a spiritual weapon called the first *Sukla Dhyana*. This is an instrument by help of which karmas are to be destroyed. This is a unique Psychic force never before experienced by the Self. Hence it is *Apurva Karana*. This stage is represented in both the ladders of development: Upasamakaha and Kshapakaha, *i e*, self in this stage may be in the path of annihilation or in that of pacification of Karmas.

9. The ninth stage represents spiritual warfare. Equipped with the weapon of Sukla Dhyana, Self—the warrior, destroys the grosser desires. This spiritual warfare is also associated with both the paths of development.

Badara Samparaya: Sampara means warfare: Badara means gross: warfare or conflict with gross desires and impulses of this soul.

10. The tenth stage is the stage of the same spiritual warfare when the subtle impulses of the soul get destroyed. This stage also

has representatives in either ladder, *i.e.* as the result of the spiritual struggle the gross and subtle desires may either be rooted out or supressed. One who roots them out is kshapaka and one who supresses them is upasamakaha.

Sukshma Samparaya. *Conflict with subtler impules.*

11. The eleventh stage is the stage where spiritual peace is secured, but here peace is the result of suppression. Hence it may not be quite secure. The spiritual harmony may yet be disturbed If it gets disturbed then there may be the misfortune of slipping down again. But the fall will be to the Apramatta Gunasthana from which the two Srenis branched off.

12. The twelfth stage represents the corresponding step in the ladder of annihilation, *i.e.* after the destruction of subtle and gross desires with the help of Sukla Dhyâna the self may pass on to *kshina kashayasthana* which is the twelfth. This is just below the stage of perfection.

13. This stage is certainly the stage of Perfect Emancipation. Kevala Jñâna is reached but there is still yoga (Manavachanakaya or mind, speech and body) Hence this stage is called Sayogakevali the kevali who has still yoga.

14. The last is the stage where even this yoga disappears. The stage immediately after the disappearance of yoga is called Ayogakevali The Siddha state is considered to be a transcendental stage. Therefore it is considered to be beyond this classification of Gunasthânas. It is purely metemperical and therefore description by *difference of degree will have no meaning with reference to this* transcendental Ego

46. Then the kevala jñâna—the ideal knowledge. This is the result of the destruction of the four Ghattya Karmas, co-existence with infinite qualities such as infinite bliss the desire of all the faithful and the pure and that which makes even a *Devendra* discontented in his own glory.

णाणं णेयणिमित्तं केवलणाणं ण होदि सुदणाणं ।
णेयं केवलणाणं णाणाणाणं च णत्थि केवलिणो ॥४६॥

Kevala Jñâna is knowledge pâr excellence. It is not conditioned by objects of knowledge. It is not even Srutajñâna which is consequent upon study. To the person who has

acquired perfect knowledge there is no diversity of knowledge. So let it be known.

COMMENTARY.

Kevala Jñâna completely comprehends all Dravyas and all their modifications. The author of Tatwartha Sutra says सर्वद्रव्यपर्यायेषु केवलस्य. The infinite number of Jiva Dravyas, the infinite number of Physical bodies, the two physical principles of rest and motion and infinite space and time all become transparent to Kevala Jñâna There can be nothing which is not comprehended by this knowledge. The contents of this knowledge constitute the whole of reality. This is not conditioned by objects. It is absolutely self-determined. Therefore all the Dravyas and the Paryayas are at the same time evident to Kevala Jnana. This unconditioned simultaneous comprehension of reality makes it fundamentally distinct from Mati Jñâna or Sruta Jñâna and also from the other two. The other four jñânas are limited in efficiency and extent. And Kevala Jñâna knows no such limitations. Again *Mati, Sruti, and Avadhi, are subject to* degeneration and corruption. But Manah Paryaya and Kevala do not have any such tendency. But the capacity of Kevala Jñâna is infinitely higher than even Manaḥ Paryaya. In short it is the absolute and unconditioned wisdom.

47. After describing the five kinds of right knowledge (Samyak-jñâna), the author mentions the three Ajñânas or the kinds of wrong knowledge.

मिच्छत्ता अण्णाणं अविरदिभावो य भावआवरणा ।
णेयं पडुच्च काले तह दुण्णय दुप्पमाणं च ॥४७॥

If Mithyatva which veils the faculty of perception of and faith in reality appears, then knowledge gets vitiated and becomes Ajñâna and the regulative principle of conduct also becomes corrupt. Again during the process of investigating reality the standard of truth and the methods of reaching it all become misleading and untrustworthy.

COMMENTARY.

Mithyatva is the condition of Ajñâna. Its presence in a soul is responsible for several *undesirable consequences.* This *Mithyatva may be innate or acquired. In the case of* persons who have congenital Mithyatva their faculty of understanding is also corrupt from

birth. They have innate Ajñâna: Kumati and Kusruti. But in the case of persons who acquired this Mithyatva after losing Samyaktva their right knowledge turns into erroneous one. The effect of Mithyatva is not confined to corrupting the faculty of understanding. It indirectly affects conduct also; such a person because of his Ajñâna is incapable of chosing the right path *Evil* becomes his good. And lastly even if there is any effort after truth it ends in mere illusion so long as there is the primary source of evil, Mithyatva, intact.

48. After describing Jñânopayoga he goes on to speak about Darsanopaya :—The faculty of perception.

दंदणमवि चक्खुजुदं अचक्खुजुदमवि य ओहिणा सहियं।
अणिधणमणंतविसयं केवलियं चावि पण्णत्तं ॥४८॥

Perception or Darsana is of four kinds. Perception through visual sensations, perception through non-visual senses, again that through the faculty of Avadhi, or clairvoyance, and lastly through kevala or infinite perception, which is unlimited and apprehends all reality.—Thus is it described.

COMMENTARY.

Darsana or perception implies merely the awareness that a thing exists. *It corresponds to knowledge by acquaintance. Understanding* the reality thus apprehended is Jñâna In a rough way Darsana and Jñâna may be said to correspond to the sensibility and understanding of Kant's system. Thus understanding and perception apprehend things gradually one after the other. But in the case of Kevalis the two faculties are co-extensive with the complete reality. The whole existence is perceived and understood at the *same time*, and as there is no reality beyond such faculty, it is not necessary for such a person to attend to things one after the other.

49. After describing Jñâna and Darsana the author in order to clear the doubt of a Naiyayika student for whom substance and quality are absolutely distinct, explains that the *distinction* is only relative; and he also mentions the diversity of Jñâna.

ण वियप्पदि णाणादो णाणी णाणाणि होंति णेगाणि।
तम्हादु विस्सरूवं भणियं दवियत्ति णाणीहि ॥४९॥

The soul is not distinct from its attribute of Jñâna or knowledge and because the ways of knowledge are diverse

the world of reality or the universe is also said to be multiverse by the wise

COMMENTARY.

There can be no knowledge apart from the knower. Self and its knowledge are inseparable. Again knowledge is also intimately *related to the objects known. There are diverse forms of knowledge.* This implies that the objects of knowledge are also diverse. Hence from the point of view of objects. They are both one and many —One because of the common Dravyatva and many because of the different ways of apprehending objects. The proposition that the *reality is one and also many is not self contradictory according to* the Jaina system; hence the statement that reality is universe is not incompatible with "the reality is a multiverse." The point emphasized in the gathâ is mainly the inalienability of the attribute from the thing.

50. *Then he points out the absurdity of the view that substance* and the attribute are entirely distinct.

जदि हवदि दव्वमण्णं गुणदो य गुणा य दव्वदो अण्णे ।
दव्वाणंतियमधवा दव्वाभावं पकुव्वंति ॥५०॥*

If the substance is entirely separate and distinct from its qualities, then it *may change into infinite other* substances or again if the qualities can exist separate from their substance, there will be no necessity for a substance at all. (In either way the result would be absurd.)

COMMENTARY.

The relation of substance and its qualities is an extremely difficult problem for a metaphysician.

Some would emphasize the qualities to the detriment of substance *and some would emphasize* the substance at the cost of qualities. In either case the result would be absurd because of the false emphasis

We may have the world of unchanging reality of Parmenides or a world of eternal flux of Heraclites, but both these worlds are

**Sanskrit rendering :*
यदि भवति द्रव्यमन्यद्गुणतश्च गुणाश्च द्रव्यतोऽन्ये ।
द्रव्यानन्त्यमथवा द्रव्याभावं प्रकुर्वन्ति ॥ ५० ॥

so far removed from the world of our concerete experience. In our world of concrete experience things and qualities are of equal importance. In fact the distinction is not absolute.

There can be no qualities apart from substance nor substance without qualities. If substance is deprived of all its qualities and if it is still the possible substratum of qualities then different groups of qualities may get associated with that substratum, *i.e.*, the same substace has the of qualities may chance of becoming infinite other substances

This is a manifest absurdity. Or again if the attributes can float themselves without any fixing substratum then they would by their own combination constitute a thing and the category of substance is no more necessary. To think of reality as identical with qualities apart from the qualified thing is also equally absurd On account of internal contradiction the view that qualities may be different from substance is condemned. The argument adopted by the author reminds us of Burkley and Hume

Burkley's argument against Locke's *doctrine of substance* similarly emphasizes the absurdity of an unknown 'x' which is substance for Locke This unknown 'x' may get several determinations and thus may become several distinct things But Burkley's main argument is slightly different from the author's. His attack on substance is based upon the absurdity of abstract ideas. Again Hume after reducing the world to a group of sense-presented ideas points out the absurdity referred to in the latter half of the Gatha by his doctrine that *anything may be the cause of anything else.*

Similar tendencies are not altogether absent in Indian thought. You have the one sided emphasis both in Vedantism and Buddhism. The idea of Nirguna reality and the principle of Kshanika Vada are the two rival doctrines; and both are condemned by the author; qualityless reality and the qualities bringing about a new reality every moment are both untenable according to the author.

(51) Next the author rejects the following views :—

1. That substance and qualities are absolutely identical.
2. That they are absolutely different
3. That they are absolutely identical and different at the sametime.

Then he establishes their conditional or relative identity and relative difference.

अविभत्तमणण्णत्तं दव्वगुणाणं विभत्तमण्णत्तं।
णिच्छंति णिच्चयह्लं तव्विवरीदं हि व तेसिं ॥५१॥*

Those that know the truth do not recognise any of following the views as to the relation of substance and quality: that they are absolutely identical and inseparable; that they are distinct and separate in every way; and lastly that they are both distinct and identical at the same time.

COMMENTARY.

The doctrine maintained by the author is that substance and quality are not distinct and separable in *rarum-natura;* but only in thought, and there too, the distinction is only relative, *i.e*, the quality cannot be thought of as absolutely independant of substance. Still it can be attended to as *distinct from the thing*. Hence it is that the three views mentioned in the gathâ are rejected

(52) From the point of view of Vyapadesa etc, substance and quality are in an aspect distinct.

ववदेसा संठाणा संखा विसया य होंति ते बहुगा।
ते तेसिमणण्णत्ते अण्णत्ते चावि विज्झंते ॥५२॥†

The difference between Dravya and guna, substance and attribute, may be determined by appellation, form, number, or locality. These determinants are various. They hold good among things and their attributes whether these are considered different or identical.

COMMENTARY.

These differences hold good not only among different things but also in the case of a single complex thing which is capable of internal distinction. The difference due to Vyapadesa or name is of two kinds.

---

*Sanskrit rendering:
अविभक्तमनन्यत्वं द्रव्यगुणानां विभक्तमन्यत्वं।
नेच्छन्ति निश्चयज्ञास्तद्विपरीतं हि वा तेषां ॥५१॥

† Sanskrit rendering:
व्यपदेशाः संस्थानानि संख्या विषयाश्च भवन्ति ते बहुकाः।
ते तेषामनन्यत्वे अन्यत्वे चापिविद्यन्ते ॥५२॥

1. SHASHTI VYAPADESA. This is the relation of the sixth case or the possessive relation

2. KARAKA VYAPADESA due to causal relation. Each of these may be true of different things or of the same thing. The Possessive relation among different things is illustrated thus. "Devadatta's cow." The same relation is illustrated by a single complex thing. "The branch of a tree" or "Jinas' attributes." Here the possessive relation is distinctly internal in the very same thing.

(2) Kâraka or causal relation. This is also Vyapadesa difference, *i.e.* difference due to Nomenclature or appellation Kâraka sanjñâ also holds good between two different things or in the same identical complex thing Kâraka or causal relation is recognised to be of six forms, i e in a complete causal relation six elements are implied—

1 Karta or agent or subject.
2. Karma, the object or effect
3. Karana, the instrument.
4. Nimitta, the purpose.
5. Sakâsa, the place from which the effect issues.
6. Adhikarana, the place in which the cause operates.

The illustration given below implies all these six elements.

(a) Causal relation among different things See the following sentence :—

देवदत्तः = Devadatta (Karta or subject or agent)

फलं = a fruit (Karma or object)

अङ्कुशेन = with the hook (Karana or instrument)

धनदत्ताय = for Dhanadatta (Nimitta or purpose)

वृक्षात् = from the tree (Sakasa or the place of issue).

वाटिकायां = from the orchard (Adhikarana or the place of operation)

अवचिनोति = plucks down.

This sentence illustrates the different aspects of causal relation that may exist among different things. The proposition "Devadatta plucks a fruit for Dhanadatta from a tree in his orchard with a book" relates several independent things. Whereas the next illustration *shows how the same causal relation with the six elements may exist* in an identical thing.

तदेव, आत्मा (कर्ता) आत्मानं कर्मतापन्नं आत्मना (करणं) भूतेन आत्मने निमित्तं आत्मनः सकाशात् आत्मनि अधिकरण भूते ध्यायति ।

"Atma about himself with his self-reflection for his own purpose drawing out of himself and yet reposing in himself contemplates." Here the causal relation is with reference to the same complex thing.

(2) Samsthana—the difference of figure or form. This determinant also is illustrated with the different things and with the same thing.

(a) Tall Devadatta's tall cow: The Samsthana determinant is applied to two different things.

(b) The tall branch of a tall tree. Here the determinant is applied to the branch and the tree which are not two separate things "*Murta Dravyasya* Murtaguna." Here also the determinant Murta or visual form refers to *Dravya* and gunâ which are not separate and distinct.

3. Sankhya or number.

(a) Devadatta's 10 cows. The quantitative difference here is between two distinct things—Devadatta and Cows.

(b) But the quantitative difference may exist internally in the same thing as the 10 branches of the tree or the infinite attributes of Dravya.

4 Vishaya or locative difference

(a) "In the cowshed is the cow." Here the Vishaya or the locality is external or Bheda Vishaya

(b) Abheda Vishaya or the internal locative relation "In the substance are the qualities"

Thus the difference due to Vyapadesa, Samsthana, etc, is seen among different things or in the same thing which is internally differentiated. Hence when one kind of relation is implied it need not be confounded with the other. If substance and attributes are said to be different this difference need not be interpreted to make the two distinct and separate Hence the relation between substance and attribute can certainly be from one aspect a relation of difference and still the two need not be absolutely distinct. In short the relation between substance and attribute may be one of identity and difference. That this relation of identity in difference is not self contradictory is supported by analogy. The illustrations of the same thing internally differentiated given above justify the attitude of the author.

(53) Again he speaks of the relation of ownership or possession. This relation may exist between two different things or in the same thing internally differentiated. Hence by analogy he brings out the Ekatva—Nanatva aspect of the relation.

णाणं धणं च कुव्वदि धणिणं जह णाणिणं च दुविधेहिं।
भण्णंति तह पुधत्तं एयत्तं चावि तच्चण्हू ॥ ५३ ॥*

Just as Dhana and Jñana (wealth and wisdom) make the owners Dhani and jñâni (the rich and the wise) thus expressing two ways of relationship (unity and diversity) so also the relation between substance and qualities implies both the aspects of identity and difference. Thus say those that know the truth.

COMMENTARY.

One who owns Dhana or wealth becomes on account of that ownership a Dhani—the rich Here too, different things because of the relation of possession are brought together, i.e., because of possession there is union and again because of possession the things uniting must be different. Things may exist as separate and distinct when the relation may unite them or there may be single thing which because of the relation may get differentiated. The illustration of Dhana, Dhani is of the former kind The illustration for the latter is jñâna, jñâni. The person to start with is one, but on account of this relation of possession the single entity gets differentiated. In order to be called jñâni one who possesses jñana or wisdom the possessed thing must be differentiated from the owner. Otherwise the relation of ownership will have no meaning. Hence we have to admit that the relation of ownership implies both unity and diversity whether the things related are different or identical in themselves. Thus the author concludes that the relation between substance and its qualities exhibits both these characteristics. It is not *incoherent* to associate both the characteristics with the relation.

(54) Then he points out the absurdity that would result if jñâna and jñâni (the knower and knowledge) are taken to be entirely distinct and separate

Sanskrit rendering:

ज्ञानं धनं च करोति धनिनं यथा ज्ञानिनं च द्विविधाभ्यां।
भणंति तथा पृथक्त्वमेकत्वं चापि तत्त्वज्ञाः ॥ ५३ ॥

णाणी णाणं च सदा अत्थंतरिदा दु अण्णमण्णस्स ।
दोण्ह अचेदणत्तं पसजदि सम्मं जिणावमदं ॥ ५४ ॥*

If self and its knowledge are always substantially distinct one from the other, then each will become non-conscious or non-spiritual entity. That view being self-contradictory would undoubtedly conflict with the truth revealed by Jina.

COMMENTARY.

Soul and knowledge are called spiritual or conscious entities only because of their identity. If the two are entirely absolute and distinct they would cease to be spiritual. Soul would be deprived of thought and hence will cease to be a conscious being and knowledge or thought *per-se* would have no association with the thinker and hence will become again non-spiritual. Thinker without thought would be blind and thought without thinker would be chimerical. The person who maintains such a view would contradict himself because of his own thought; the jaina view is free from such a contradiction.

Here we have to notice one important thing "Jinava matam" is not to be taken as the reason for rejecting the oppisite view.

The real standard of truth or Pramana is not the principle of revelation. Though no doubt the Jaina system of thought is very *often referred to as revealed by Jina,* the system is acknowledged to be true not because it is revealed by a great spiritual being but because the revelation is borne out by the nature of Reality.

Jaina thinkers therefore attach more importance to absence of self-contradiction than to revelation.

A doctrine must not contradict any previously accepted truth "Purvapara Virodha" is the main thing that is dreaded by the *Jaina thinker.* Hence the author's rejection of the opposite view because it is inconsistent with Jaina thought is really based upon the internal self-contradiction involved in the rejected view. If it is *interpreted otherwise* then the Jaina position would become self-contradictory. When the Jaina rejects the Vedas of Brahmanic thought, though they are claimed to be revelation from the divine

**Sanskrit rendering :*

ज्ञानी ज्ञानं च सदार्थान्तरिते त्वन्योऽन्यस्य ।
द्वयोरचेतनत्वं प्रसजति सम्यग् जिनावमतं ॥ ५४ ॥

being, on the ground that they involve internal inconsistency, he cannot have recourse to the very same method of depending upon revelation. For according to his principle even revelation must stand on logical evidence.

55.

If Self and thought be really distinct then the two would never be able to constitute a single spiritual being even by the process of combination.

ण हि सो समवायादो अत्थंदरिदो दुणाणादो णाणी ।
अण्णाणीत्ति च वयणं एगत्तप्पसाधगं होदि ॥५५॥*

55. *If the Self is entirely distinct in nature from thought then he cannot become, even by combination with thought, Jñâni or the thinker. "Unthinking thing" will still be the name denoting the identity brought about by the combination of substance and quality which are in themselves unthinking things.*

COMMENTARY.

If Self and thought are in themselves unthinking things then by combination they would still be unthinking. Consciousness is not to be derived from non-conscious elements existing severally or in combination. If thought is an adventitious characteristic of the self then before the acquisition of thought he must have been either jñâni or Ajñâni (thinking or unthinking). If he is thinking then the combination with jñâna is unnecessary and useless. But if he be unthinking then, is that attribute "unthinking" again innate or adventitious? If it is adventitious then the self cannot acquire thought for this attribute is incompatible with his former acquisition. If the unthinkig quality is innate then the thinking quality may as well be taken to be innate. *Thought then is not an adventitious attribute of the self. Self is jñâni not as a result of combination of self and thought. Even the perfect knowledge Kevala jñâna is innate in the soul, though it is veiled for the time being by the Karmas.*

* *Sanskrit rendering:*
न हि सः समवायाद् द्र्यर्थान्तरितस्तु ज्ञानतो ज्ञानी ।
अज्ञानीति च वचनमेकत्वप्रसाधकं भवति ॥५५॥

56

Then since there is no other relation than identity between substance and quality the explanation by the principle of comination is shown to be unwarranted and absurd.

समवत्ती सभवाओ अपुधब्भूदो य अजुदसिद्धो य ।
तह्मा दव्वगुणाणं अजुदा सिद्धित्ति णिद्दिट्ठा ॥५६॥*

56. The relation between substance and quality is one of co-eval identity, unity, inseparability, and of essential simplicity. That is why the unity of substance and qualities is said to be not the result of union or combination.

COMMENTARY.

The terms Samavâya implies mainly unity and also union. Union implies the existence of independent elements which constitute the unity. The elements must be prior to the unity. Then unity will be the result of combination. The relation between Guna and Guni is not one of combination.

Hence though the author designates the relation by the term Samavâya he strictly excludes the other implication of the term. The term means nothing more than oneness or unity. Dravya and Guna, substance and quality are merely the different aspects of the same reality and as such they must exist together without beginning and without end.

This eternal co-existence is implied by the term Samavâya. This co-existence of Dravya and Guna is termed Samavâya or unity by the author. The very same relation implies inseparability of the two though they are different in name. Hence is the relation called *Aprithag-bhutatvam.* Again since the unity is not brought about by combination of two independent elements it has *Ayutasiddhattvam.* Therefore the relation is one of unity and not of union.

57 and 58.

Then he establishes by analogy that substance and quality though distinguishable in thought are not distinct in nature.

---

* *Sanskrit rendering :*
समवर्तित्वं समवायः अपृथग्भूतत्वमयुतसिद्धत्वं च ।
तस्माद्द्रव्यगुणानां अयुता सिद्धिरिति निर्दिष्टा ॥५६॥

वण्णरसगंधफासा परमाणुपरूविदा विसेसा हि ।
दव्वादो य अणण्णा अण्णत्तपगासगा होंति ॥५७॥
दंसणणाणाणि तहा जीवणिबद्धाणि णण्णभूदाणि ।
ववदेसदो पुधत्तं कुव्वंति हि णो सभावादो ॥५८॥*

57-58. Colour, taste, smell and touch are the qualities of the primary atom. They are not said to be really distinct from their material substratum though they are undoubtedly distinguishable from it as regards name, form, etc. In the same way perception and understanding are really inseparable from the self and are not distinct from it; though from the point of name, form, etc., they may be spoken of as distinct from the substratum Ego. In short though distinguishable in thought the faculties are not really distinct.

COMMENTARY.

The author establishes the proposition that distinction in thought does not necessarily imply distinctness in nature. What may be distinguished by comparison may in reality exist in essential unity. This result is obtained by the principle of analogy. In the case of matter the qualities are not distinct and separate, from the substratum though they may be referred to by different names, by different forms, and so on. Exactly in the same way are the conscious qualities of perception and understanding related to Jiva. As attributes they are distinct from the ego and may be distinguished by name, form, number, etc. But still they are not really distinct from it.

Distinctness necessarily presupposes an underlying identity between the things compared. Apart from this identity there can be no comparison and distinction. What are distinct must really

*Sanskrit rendering:

वर्णरसगन्धस्पर्शाः परमाणुप्ररूपिता विशेषा हि ।
द्रव्यतश्च अनन्याः अन्यत्वप्रकाशका भवन्ति ॥ ५७ ॥
दर्शनज्ञाने तथा जीवनिबद्धे अनन्यभूते ।
व्यपदेशतः पृथक्त्वं कुरुते हि नो स्वभावात् ॥ ५८ ॥

be identical. Hence *distinction* in thought instead of presupposing distinctness in nature, implies identity. This view of the author is borne out by modern thought. Thus ends the section dealing with the attribute of *upayoga*.

59.

The next section deals with the three remaining qualities of Jiva. *Kartritva, Bhoktritva,* and *Karmasamyuktatva* acting, feeling and being associated with Karmas. In the beginning the author describes the nature and number of Jiva Dravya which is the substratum of all the nine attributes.

जीवा अणाइणिहणा संता णंता य जीवभावादो ।
सब्भावदो अणंता पंचग्गगुणप्पधाणा य ॥५९॥ *

59. Jivas according to their characteristics have *neither* beginning nor end, have beginning and end, have beginning but no end. Thus having these five fundamental qualities they are as existences infinite in number.

COMMENATRY.

Jivas really are the agents, since they bring about different modes with the different names. They are described as (1) without beginning or end, (2) with beginning and end (3) and with beginning and no end. *If we attend to the essential nature of Jivas* (*pârinamika bhâva,*) i e., their thought or consciousness then they may be said to have neither beginning nor end; as spiritual existences they are eternal. Neither are they created nor can they be destroyed.

2. The *very same Jivas from the Psychic qualities of Audayika* Aupashamika, and Kshayopashamika have both beginning and end.

3. But from the Kshayika Bhava they have beginning but not end. It cannot be said in the last case that because there is beginning there *must also* be an end. When they are *free from* Upadhis then they realise their true nature, then they become

---

**Sanskrit rendering*:

जीवा अनादिनिधनाः सान्ता अनन्ताश्च जीवभावात् ।
सद्भावतोऽनन्ताः पञ्चाग्रगुणप्रधानाः च ॥ ५६ ॥

Siddhâs Jîvas that are found with such characteristics are infinite in number. Again it cannot be said that in the case of these Jîvas which really have neither beginning nor end the other characteristics would be inconsistent. The other characteristics are, having both beginning and end and having beginning but no end. These characteristics are true of Jîvas because of Karmic entanglements. The presence of Karmâ with Jîva is the condition of Samsâric transformations and Jîvas in Samsâric cycles have both birth and death. But in the last stage towards emancipation from Karmâs, Jîvas may be said to have only birth but no death. For there is spiritual immortality as the result of complete emancipation.

The five fundamental characteristics implied in this gâtha are the five Jîva Bhavâs mentioned in the 62nd gâtha.

These are (1) औदयिक (2) औपशमिक, (3) क्षायोपशमिक (4) क्षायिक (5) पारिणामिक भावाः

The last one is the attribute of consciousness. This conscious nature is eternal. Hence Jîva is अनादिनिधन without beginning or end. The first three bring about Samsâric changes of birth and death. Therefore from their aspect Jîva has both beginning and end. The fourth is the characteristic of emancipation. The emancipated Self has beginning but no end.

60.

Though Jîvas are truly eternal yet they are born and they die because of accidental conditions of Kârmic associations. To be eternal and to have births and deaths are not really conflicting.

एवं सदो विणासो असदो जीवस्स होइ उप्पादो ।
इदि जिणवरेहिं भणिदं अण्णोण्णविरुद्धमविरुद्धं ॥६०॥*

60. Thus Jivas that are, may die and those that are not may be born ; thus sayeth the Jina. Though the statements (this Sutra and the 19th) are apparently conflicting they are not really contradictory.

*Sanskrit rendering :

एवं सतो विनाशोऽसतो जीवस्य भवत्युत्पादः ।
इति जिनवरैर्भणितमन्योऽन्यविरुद्धमविरुद्धम् ॥ ६० ॥

COMMENTARY.

From Dravyarthika Naya, *i. e.*, from the aspect of essential nature Jivas can have neither birth nor death. But from Paryayarthika Naya from the point of modifications they have births and deaths. The two propositions are quite compatible with one another as they state two different aspects of Jiva. The other proposition with which this gâtha appears to conflict is the gâtha 19.

एवं सदो विणासेा असदो जीवस्स णत्थि उप्पादो ।

There is no death for the existing Jivas; nor birth of the non-existing ones.

This certainly appears to contradict the present Sutra and the commentator establishes that the conflict is only apparent and not real.

61.

Then it is pointed out that the death of Beings that are and the birth of those that are not are the result of Gatinâmakarma: the Karma that brings about for the soul different modes of existence.

णेरइयतिरियमणुआ देवा इदि णामसंजुदा पयडी ।
कुव्वंति सदो णासं असदो भावस्स उप्पादं ॥६१॥*

61. Life in hell, life as plant or animal, as man or as Deva, these states of being are caused by their respective Nâma Karma Prakritis. These bring about death to the Jivas that are and birth to those that are not.

COMMENTARY.

The different states of existence are the different modifications of Jiva brought out by upadhi or Karmic conditions. Those Karmas that determine the next individual state of Jiva are Nâma Karmas. These Nâma Karmas are the real causal conditions that lead the soul to manifest in a particular form. These forms appear and disappear. Birth and death are characteristics associated with these forms or modes. Just as waves may appear and disappear in the

*Sanskrit rendering:

नारकतिर्यङ्मनुष्या देवा इति नामसंयुताः प्रकृतयः ।
कुर्वन्ति सतो नाशमसतो भावस्योत्पादं ॥ ६१ ॥

surface of ocean as the result of wind, while the sheet of water is really unaffected, so Jîva remaining eternal and changeless in its real essence is the basis of the different waves of existence appearing and disappearing. And these waves in the ocean of life are brought about by upadhis or Karmic conditions. The characteristics of birth and death which are really true of the form of existence are also predicated of Jîva

62.

After mentioning the Karmas as the condition of Samsâric cycle the author goes to describe their nature. Here he explains the origin of the five Bhâvas emotional states of consciousness.

उदयेण उवसमेण य खयेण दुहिं मिस्सिदेहिं परिणामे।
जुत्ता ते जीवगुणा वहुसु य अत्थेसु विच्छिण्णा ॥६२॥ *

62. On account of the rise, suppression, annihilation, mixed suppression and annihilation of karmas, by the intrinsic nature of self unconditioned by Karmas, Jiva has five Bhâvas or thought characteristics. These are fully described in the Âgamas.

COMMENTARY.

Karmas are considered to be physical in nature. These physical conditions determine the Psychic characteristics. Five different classes of Karmic conditions are mentioned. Each of these is the causal condition determining its corresponding Bhâva or thought state in Jîva.

These conditions are—

1. Udaya, or rise of Karmâs,
2. Upaśama, or suppression of Karmâs,
3. Kshâya or eradication;
4. Kshâyopaśama, the mixed process of eradication and suppression;
5. Pariṇâma, or the unconditioned thought.

*Sanskrit rendering.

उदयेनोपशमेन च क्षयेण च द्वाभ्यां मिश्रिताभ्यां परिणामेन ।
युक्तास्ते जीवगुणा बहुषु चार्थेषु विस्तीर्णाः ॥ ६२ ॥

These five conditions (four physical and one spiritual) determine respectively the Bhâvas.

And these are—

1. Audayika Bhâva ;
2. Aupashamika Bhâva ;
3. Kshâyika Bhâva ;
4. Kshâyopashamika Bhâva ;
5. Parinâmika Bhâva.

The last one is unconditioned by Karmas. It is Nirupadhi character, whereas the other four are generated by the changes in physical conditions or upadhis. The last Parinâmika Bhâva is not causally connected with Samsâra or Moksha. It is Nishkriya Bhâva.

मोक्षं कुर्वंति मिस्रौपशमिक क्षायिका भिधाः ।
बन्धमौदयिको भावो निष्क्रियः पारिणामिकः ॥

63.

Next it is pointed out how these Bhâvas or thought states are brought about.

कम्मं वेदयमाणो जीवो भावं करेदि जारिसयं ।
सो तेण तस्स कत्ता हवदित्ति य सासणे पढिदं ॥ ६३ ॥

63. Being affected by the change in Karmic material Jiva experiences certain emotional states. Whatever emotional state thus appears in consciousness is due to the direct causal agency of Jiva. Thus say the Scriptures of Jainas.

COMMENTARY.

Jiva is said to be the direct and immediate cause of the several emotional states brought about by Karmic materials. The extrinsic cause is physical matter and the proximate cause is jiva itself. Karmas are always spoken of as of two kinds: Dravya Karma and Bhâva Karma. Dravya Karma is distinctly physical. A peculiar combination of Paramanûs constitutes Karma Pudgala or Karmic-

matter. Matter under such modification has a special attraction towards Jivas ordinarily. Jiva in its world state is generally found in association with such Karmic matter. Karmic matter and conscious states are mutually determining each other. A change in Karmic matter may bring about a corresponding change in consciousness. This conscious change has a predominent affective tone. It is generally some form of emotion. This corresponding emotional state is Bhâva Karma. Since it is a Psychic event it is immediately determined by mind itself. It is this fact that is emphasized by the author in this gâtha.

The author recognises two distinct causal agencies as will be evident later on. *Nimitta Kartâ* and *Upadâna Kartâ*. Distant or remote cause and substantial cause. Jivâ is the substantial cause of all its modifications, and matter may still be an extrinsic cause. Then Jiva is the Upâdana Kartâ of the Bhâvas while Karmic matter is Nimitta Kartâ.

64.

It is this fact that is mentioned in the next gâtha. That Self is the immediate cause of the emotional state while Kârmic matter is the indirect cause.

कम्मेण विणा उदयं जीवस्स ण विज्भदे उवसमं वा ।
खइयं खओवसमियं तम्हा भावं तु कम्मकदं ॥ ६४ ॥*

64. The different forms of Bhâva Karmas such as, the rising, the sinking, the annihilating and partial annihilation and sinking cannot happen in the consciousness of a Jiva without corresponding changes in Dravya Karmas or Karmic matter. Therefore the Bhâvas such as Audayika which are brought about by the Bhâva Karmas may be said to be the effects of Dravya Karmas as well

COMMENTARY.

A change in Dravya Karma or physical karma immediately brings about a change in Bhâva Karma *i. e.*, a corresponding change pure or impure in consciousness. This Bhâva Karma in its turn brings

**Sanskrit rendering:*

कर्मणा विनोदयो जीवस्य न विद्यत उपशमो वा ।
क्षायिकः क्षायोपशमिकस्तस्माद्भावस्तु कर्मकृतः ॥ ६४ ॥

about its corresponding emotional state or Bhâva. It may be pleasant or unpleasant. The chain of causation is as follows:—Dravya Karma, Bhâva Karma and Bhâva. Kârmic matter, Kârmic thought and an affective state. The last affective state or Bhâva which is the immediate result of Kârmic thought or Bhâva Karma may also be said to be the effect of Dravya Karma. For there can be no Kârmic thought or Bhâva Karma in a jîva which is not determined by Dravya Karma.

65.

The next gâtha is in the form of *Purvapaksha* from the disciple. *An objection is raised against the doctrine that Âtmâ is the sole and immediate cause of Bhâva Karma.*

भावो जदि कम्मकदो अत्ता कम्मस्स होदि किध कत्ता।
ण कुणदि अत्ता किंचि वि मुत्ता अण्णं सगं भावं ॥६५॥*

65. If these states of emotion or Bhâva are really brought about by Kârmic matter how can Âtmâ be said to be the cause of these Bhâvas? But the soul's agency is such that while giving up its own state it can effect entirely alien or non-mental changes (i. e., it is the cause of its own mental states which are also indirectly conditioned by Kârmic matter).

COMMENTARY.

As has been *mentioned already* Dravya Karma or Kârmic matter and the nature of Jîva, both determine the occurrence of a Bhâva or an emotional state. Still Jîva is taken to be the causal agent or Kartâ *to these emotional state. If the Bhâvas are really due to* Dravya karma or Karmic matter then how can it be consistently held that Jîva is Kartâ. But the answer is given thus. Bhâva is Psychic change and as psychic change it can only be brought about by Jîva. Soul cannot *have direct causal relation with material and non-mental* things. Again if the Bhâvas have no causal relation to Jîva then there is no reason why it should be bound by Karma. Kârmic bondage *necessarily presupposes the intimate relation between Jîva and its* emotional states. Since there will be no *logical* ground for bondage

* *Sanskrit rendering:*
भावो यदि कर्मकृत आत्मा कर्मणो भवति कथं कर्ता ।
न करोत्यात्मा किंचिदपि मुक्त्वान्यं स्वकं भावं ॥ ६५ ॥

in the absence of causal relation then there is no chance for Samsâra which is the result of Kârmic bondage. This result contradicts our real experience for there is Samsâra. Therefore our original supposition that the soul is not causal agent for his emotional states is an impossible hypothesis. With this indirect demonstration, the author establishes that soul is the causal agent producing the emotional states which are also indirectly conditioned by Kârmic matter.

The disciple who raises the *Pûrvapaksha* is evidently a believer in the Sankhya system.

> अकर्ता निर्गुणः शुद्धो नित्यः सर्वगतात्क्रियः ।
> अमूर्तश्चेतनो भोक्ता जीवः कपिलशासने ॥

In answering *Pûrvapaksha* the author is really condemning the Sankhya view represented by the above sloka.

66.

The answer is again strengthened by further detailed argument.

भावो कम्मणिमित्तो कम्मं पुण भावकारणं हवदि ।
ण दु तेसिं खलु कत्ता ण विणा भूदा दुकत्तारं ॥ ६६ ॥*

66. Bhâva or emotional states are conditioned by Dravya Karma or matter. And Karma in its turn is indeed conditioned by Kârmic thought or Bhâva. Soul is not the essential cause in that case and still without essential cause those changes cannot happen.

COMMENTARY.

The author here makes use of the distinction between Upadâna Kartâ and Nimitta Kartâ. *Intrinsic or substantial conditions, extrinsic or alien condition. Soul is the essential cause of Kârmic* thought, the emotional states of desire etc., Karmic matter is the essential cause of the changes in Kârmic matter, i. e., the changes in each case form an independent series and yet the two series are corres-

* *Sanskrit rendering*

भावः कर्मनिमित्तः कर्म पुनर्भावकारणं भवति ।
न तु तेषां खलु कर्ता न विना भूतास्तु कर्तारं ॥ ६६ ॥

ponding and interrelated. Bhâva or the emotional states is distinctly a Psychic change. As a mental fact it is immediately determined by the nature of *consciousness. So is the change in Kârmic matter. It is* entirely determined by physical conditions. Matter cannot take the form of mental state nor the mind underago a physical change. The author seems to suggest a kind of Psycho-physical parallelism. But this parallelism is not merely the temporal correspondence of the two *series. The parallelism is transcended and reconciled* by the doctrine of *Nimitta kartâ* The author has in his mind such a sharp distinction between the thinking thing and unthinking thing as is associated with *cartisianism* and yet the two are related by a peculiar conception of causal relation. The unthinking thing may be the *Nimitta Kartâ of the thinking thing* and conversely the thinking thing may be the *Nimitta Kartâ* of the other, though certainly one cannot be the *Upâdâna Kartâ* of the other.

67.

The same view is further elaborated.

कुव्वं सगं सहावं अत्ता कत्ता सगस्स भावस्स ।
ण हि पोग्गलकम्माणं इदि जिणवयणं मुणेयव्वं ॥ ६७ ॥*

67. Soul which brings about changes in himself is the Upâdâna cause of such mental states. But not of changes in Kârmic matter which are distinctly physical in nature. Let the word of Jina be understood thus.

COMMENTARY.

The author strengthens his argument by referring to Âgama or Śruta. He draws the attention of the reader that this doctrine of causation is the right view upheld by the Scriptures.

68.

Then it is explained that *Jîva* and *Kârmic* matter are related to their respective *changes according to the six aspects of causal* relation

**Sanskrit rendering :*

कुर्वन् स्वकं स्वभावं आत्मा कर्ता स्वकस्य भावस्य ।
न हि पुद्गलकर्मणामिति जिनवचनं ज्ञातव्यम् ॥ ६७ ॥

कम्मं पि सगं कुव्वदि सेण सहावेण सम्ममप्पाणं ।
जीवो वि य तारिसओ कम्मसहावेण भावेण ॥ ६८ ॥*

68. Kârmic matter itself through its own essential nature indeed brings about its own changes Jîva too in the same manner through its own impure states of thought that are conditioned by Karma brings about its own thought charges.

COMMENTARY.

The author here emphasizes the fact that the mental states and the states of Karma *form two independent series. A change in* Kârmic matter is determined by antecedent physical change. *Similarly the mental change in the Jîva is entirely determined by* the antecedent mental change In short Jîva is the primary condi*tion of mental changes and Kârmic matter of its own changes.* The Physical changes of Kârmic matter cannot be attributed to Jîva nor *the mental changes of Jîva to matter.*

The *Shatrakâ* referred to by the commentator has reference to the six aspects of causal relation already explained. *These are* (1) Kartâ (2) Karma (3) Karana (4) Nimitta (5) Sakâsa and (6) Adhikarana Each series of causal changes has by *itself* these six aspects i. e., the physical and the mental series are self-sufficient and complete.

69.

Having heard that the two causal series are independent the student ignorant of the principles of reasoning or the Nayas raises an objection.

कम्मं कम्मं कुव्वदि जदि सो अप्पा करेदि अप्पाणं ।
किध तस्स फलं भुंजदि अप्पा कम्मं च देदि फलं ॥६९॥†

**Sanskrit rendering*:

कर्मापि स्वकं करोति स्वेन स्वभावेन सम्यगात्मानं ।
जीवोऽपि च तादृशकः कर्मस्वभावेन भावेन ॥६८॥

†*Sanskrit rendering*:

कर्म कर्म करोति यदि स आत्मा करोत्यात्मानं ।
कथं तस्य फलं भुङ्क्ते आत्मा कर्म च ददाति फलं ॥ ६९ ॥

69. If Karmic matter effects its own changes and similarly if Jiva brings about his own changes in himself why should he enjoy the results or fruits of Karma for which he is not responsible and how can Karma offer its fruits to him?

COMMENTARY.

If Kârmic changes form an independent physical series and if mental changes similarly form an independent Psychic series then why should Jiva be affected at all by physical changes and in what manner could the physical changes affect Jiva at all. The student asks for the justification why the two really independent series should affect each other at all.

70.

The *Purvapaksha* is answered by the seven following gathâs. This one states that the Loka is filled with matter.

ओगाढगाढणिचिदो पोग्गलकाययेहिं सव्वदो लोगो ।
सुहमेहिं वादरेहिं य णंताणंतेहिं विविहेहिं ॥ ७० ॥*

70. With material bodies of form perceptible and imperceptible, infinite of infinites in number, and of multifarious kinds by constitution, the world is in every respect filled without interspaces.

COMMENTARY.

The author is trying to answer objection by showing first the possibility of connection beteewn Jiva and Kârmic matter. The world space is throughout filled with material bodies. Some of these are minute and some of these are perceptible to the senses. Of these minute forms some have the peculiarly necessary constitution which would make them fit to be Karmas. These are called Karma-Vargaṇâs. Karma-Vargaṇâs are physical molecules of a particular constitution which gives them the tendency to be attracted by Jivas. They are otherwise known as karma-Prâyogya Pudgala. The world that is filled with such materials also contains Jivas. The Jivas and Karma Vargaṇâs co-exist and by the mere fact of contiguity Jiva and

---

Sanskrit rendering:
अवगाढगाढनिचितः पुद्गलकायैः सर्वतो लोकः ।
सूक्ष्मैर्बादरैश्चानन्तानन्तैर्विविधैः ॥ ७० ॥

Kârmic matter are brought together. The settling of Kârmic molecules in Jîva is evidently explained by the author as a necessary result of contiguous co-existence. He does not want to assume that Jîva has positive attraction towards Karmic matter. If any such active influence on the part of Jîva is presupposed the author will be forced to acknowledge the inevitable causal interaction between matter and Jîva. The author does not want to encourage that view. Hence he explains the contact between Jîva and matter as due to local conditions. The commentator explains the principle of contiguity as.

अंजनचूर्ण पूर्ण समुद्गकनय

The principle that the casket filled with collyrium powder becomes black by mere contact. Thus by analogy the author hopes to explain how two distinct things Jiva and matter become related together.

71

How is it relevent to say that the world is filled with Kârmic matter? How is it an answer to the above objection? The author in this gâtha shows the relation between the answer and the objection.

अत्ता कुणदि सहावं तत्थ गदा पोग्गला सभावेहिं ।
गच्छंति कम्मभावं अण्णोण्णागाहमवगाढा ॥ ७१ ॥

71. Jiva as determined by its own nature creates its own changes. But existing in the same place there is Kârmic matter. This Kârmic matter gets inseparably bound with Jiva and manifests as modes of Karma such as Jñânavaraniya.

COMMENTARY.

Here the author emphasizes the fact that Kârmic matter is entirely self determined in its modifications. So also is Jiva. Jiva according to Jaina belief has Samsâric changes from time immemorial i. e., the series of Samsâric changes is without beginning. In this state it is destined to lose its pure thought and has the gross emotional qualities such as desire anger, etc. While this Jiva is undergoing such

**Sanskrit rendering:*
आत्मा करोति स्वभावं तत्र गताः पुद्गलाः स्वभावैः ।
गच्छन्ति कर्मभावमन्योन्यावगाहावगाढाः ॥ ७१ ॥

emotional states determined by its own intrinsic Psychic nature there is in the same place Kârmic matter which as conditioned by those mental states undergoes modifications. These modifications are really determined by matter itself though externally conditioned by the mental states. The mental states of an impure character create a sort of adhesive quality in Jîva. The Kârmic particles merely by proximity cling to Jiva which has the adhesive quality. Jiva gets adulterated with Kârmic matters as milk and water. But this adulteration is not due to direct causal action upon Jiva.

72.

As a concomitent of the Psychic state Kârmic matter undergoes modification in its own way.

जह पुग्गलदव्वाणं पहुप्पयारेहिं खंधणिव्वत्ति ।
अकदा परेहिं दिट्ठा तह कम्माणं वियाणाहि ॥ ७२ ॥*

72. Just as several molecular arrangements in matter are seen in diverse forms though uncaused by alien agency so also the manifestations in Kârmic matter occur undetermined by alien cause. So do thou understand.

COMMENTARY.

The author makes himself clear by the illustration. The mere presence of light from the sun or the moon is enough to create the fiery sunset or sunrise or the rainbow or the halo. These changes are all due to molecular arrangement in matter. The sunlight is not directly interfering with matter in producing changes. The changes are the necessary concomitants of the presence of light. Similarly the presence of emotional states of desire or aversion in Jîva has as its concomitant, the changes in Kârmic matter. The rainbow of several iridescent colours is merely the concomitant of light and the different manifestations of Kârmic matter are also the concomitants of mental states as desire and aversion. From all these examples it is clear that the author wants to reject direct causal relation between the two series and yet he wants to make out that one series is the concomitant of other.

* *Sanskrit rendering.*

यथा पुद्गलद्रव्याणां बहुप्रकारैः स्कन्धनिर्वृत्तिः ।
अकृता परैर्दृष्टा तथा कर्मणां विजानीहि ॥ ७२ ॥

73.

The author explains why Jîva should enjoy the fruits of arma of which he is not the cause essential. In answering this oint the author employs the principles of *Naya*.

जीवा पुग्गलकाया अण्णोण्णागाढगहणपडिवद्धा ।
काले विजुज्जमाणा सुहदुक्खं दिंति भुंजंति ॥ ७३ ॥*

73. Jivas and Kârmic materials are bound together strongly. But when the time for their separation comes they fall apart. Karmas offer their results of pleasure and pain and the Jivas enjoy them.

COMMENTARY.

Jîva and matter in reality have only one causal function of generating their own respective modes and yet because of the concomitants they may be said to be interdetermining from the *Vyavahâra* view. Jîva because of its emotional states of desire and hatred develops an inclination towards matter. This inclination is only the *Nimitta* or an external condition. Karmic matter so determined gets bound to Jîva. It is to be imagined that the material particles somhow cling to Jîva and cloud its intrinsic radiance. Changes may occur in molecules as determined by temporal conditions. There may be aggregation or disintegration in them. When such changes take place in *Dravya Karma* Jîva experiences pleasure or plain. These are said to be offered by Karma from a relative point of view though as a matter of fact they are the modifications of Jîva. One of the commentators says that just as we experience the activity and the change in our body so also we experience the changes in our Kârmic body for both of them are physical. When we don't question ordinarily our experiencing bodily changes, we need not question the possibility of experiencing the changes of Kârmic body. Thus ends the quality of *Bhoktâ*—the enjoyer. Jîva is shown to be theenjoyer.

74.

Then the author has a *resume* of the nature of the relation between causality and affective experience.

*Sanskrit rendering :

जीवाः पुद्गलकायाः अन्योन्यावगाढग्रहणप्रतिबद्धाः ।
काले वियुज्यमानाः सुखदुःखं ददति भुञ्जन्ति ॥ ७३ ॥

75. The soul which is thus the agent of its own Karma, and the enjoyer of the fruits thereof, as conditioned by its own Karma gets blinded by the veil of ignorance and roams about in the world of *Samsâra* which is limited for the faithful and unlimited for the unfaithful.

COMMENTRY.

Jîva is the Lord of his own career, because he effects his own Karma, he enjoys the fruits thereof. He may roam about in the world of Samsâra as conditioned by his own actions, he may finally liberate himself from the bondage by walking the path of three jewels. Then he becomes free from his *upâdhi* This is the career of the *Bhabhya* Jîva. Throughout the career of the *Bh.bhya* Jîva, Jîva has the characteristic of Lordship. Again the *Abhavya* devoid of the benefits of the Jewels is denied the above career. He is destined to roam about for ever in Samsâra. The *Abhavya* Jîva also in his own way is the Lord of his own career. Thus the career of Jîva is entirely self determined.

76.

Then it is shown how the soul which obtains the benefit of the three jewels is able to realise its true nature through its Lordship over its own career.

उवसंतखीणमोहो मग्गं जिणभासिदेण समुवगदो ।
णाणाणुमग्गचारी णिव्वाणपुरं वजदि धीरो ॥ ७६ ॥*

76. Suppressing or annihilating the veil of ignorance which clouds the faculties of perception and will, well equipped with the three jewels which constitute the path revealed by *Jina*, the soul, the undaunted pilgrim that conquered the suffering and pain due to the environment, beckoned by the ideal of self-knowledge wades through the path and reaches the divine city of perfection.

COMMENTARY.

Jîva is co-eval with Samsâra. Ordinarily Jîva is associated with Upâdhis. The most important of these is *Mohanîya Karma*. This is

---

Sanskrit rendering :

उपशान्तक्षीणमोहो मार्गं जिनभाषितेन समुपगतः ।
ज्ञानानुमार्गचारी निर्वाणपुरं व्रजति धीरः ॥ ७६ ॥

a sort of veil of *ignorance* whose effect is twofold. *It may interfere with the faculty of perception or with the faculty of Will. On account of this interference there may be false knowledge or wrong conduct. In the former case it is called Darśana Mohaniya, in the latter Châritra Mohaniya. All the other Kârmic Upâdhis may be ultimately* traced to the operation of *this fundamental Karma. This Mohaniya* or the veil of ignorance *may sometimes get thin and transparent or* may altogether be annihilated. *On account of this happy occurrence* Jîva may start on a very *desirable career. On account of sup*pression or annihilation of Darśana Mohaniya Jîva is able to apprehend the nature of true reality. And thus has faith in the ultimate *tattvas* The faith in and comprehension of *tattvas* may lead to clear knowledge of reality. By this suppression and annihilation of Charitra Mohaniya, Will may be right in its decision, for right volitional choice is the consequence of true knowledge. Right perception and faith, Right knowledge and Right conduct form the true path. These are the three jewels. Soul equipped with these three jewels must further conquer the environment. The suffering and pain due to environmental conditions should not touch Jiva in any way. After conquering the environment Jiva has to pursue the path of righteousness having as the goal complete self knowledge. This pilgrim in the path of life finally reaches the city of Nirvâna which is *the Summum Bonum* of life according to Jainism.

77 and 78.

Then the author summarises the characteristics of Jivâstikâya.

एक्को चेव महप्पा सो दुवियप्पो त्तिलक्खणो होदि ।
चदु चंकमणो भणिदो पंचग्गगुणप्पधाणो य ॥ ७७ ॥*

छक्कापक्कमजुत्तो उवउत्तो सत्तभङ्गसब्भावो ।
अट्ठासओ णवत्थो जीवो दसट्ठाणगो भणिदो ॥ ७८ ॥†

**Sanskrit rendering:*

एक एव महात्मा स द्विविकल्पस्त्रिलक्षणो भवति ।
चतुश्चंक्रमणो भणितः पञ्चाग्रगुणप्रधानश्च ॥ ७७ ॥

†*Sanskrit rendering:*

षट्कापक्रमयुक्तः उपयुक्तः सप्तभङ्गसद्भावः ।
अष्टाश्रयो नवार्थो जीवो दशस्थानको भणितः ॥ ७८ ॥

79.

The perfect and the liberated soul has nothing to gain by going from one place to another. Therefore he may stay in the very same place where he attains Nirvâna. But according to Jaina view he goes to the summit of the world. The author explains why he should do so.

पयडिट्ठिदिअणुभागप्पदेसबंधेहिं सव्वदो मुक्को।
उड्ढं गच्छदि सेसा विदिसावज्जं गदिं जंति ॥ ७९ ॥*

79. When Jiva gets liberated from the bonds of Karma which are of different aspects of substance, duration, fertility, and extensity, he reaches the summit of the upper world. Others who are in Samsâra move about in all the directions except the four diagonal corners.

COMMENTARY.

This gâtha refers to a religious dogma. The liberated Jîva or Siddha Jîva has the intrinsic movement upwards. It tends to move vertically upwards till it comes to a stay at the summit of the Lokâ. For it cannot move beyond, because of the absence of the moving principle of *Dharmâstikâya*.

But Samsâri Jîvas after death are said to have movements in six directions. They are denied the four diagonal courses. Along the cardinal points and up and down they can move. These are the *ânusrenis* the ladder paths of disembodied Jîvas.

The disembodied Jîva has still the *Kârmâna Sarira*—body constituted by Kârmic matter. This body is *sukshma*—subtle body. Is there any electro-magnetic condition which constrains the Kârmic body to move only in the six directions? We dont want to speculate.

Sanskrit rendering :

प्रकृतिस्थित्यनुभागप्रदेशबन्धैः सर्वतो मुक्तः।
ऊर्ध्वं गच्छति शेषा विदिग्वर्ज्जां गतिं यांति ॥ ७९ ॥

CHAPTER II.

PUDGALASTIKAYA.

The author mentions the four different kinds of material objects.

खंधा य खंधदेसा खंधपदेसा य होंति परमाणू ।
इति ते चदुव्वियप्पा पुग्गलकाया मुणेयव्वा ॥ ८० ॥

These are the four basic modifications out of which the multifarious modes of matter are formed.

80. Be it understood that matter exists in four main modes: *Skandhas*, *Skandhadeṣas*, *Skandhapradeṣas* and primary atoms.

COMMENTARY.

Skandhas are the aggregates of atoms. This classe refers to complete molecular constitution. *Skandhadeṣa* is said to be incomplete. But still it is an aggregate. Similarly *Skandhapradeṣa*. These three are the differences in molecular constitution. The last class refers to the primary atom which is the unit constituting the other three classes. This is explained in the next *Gatha*.

81

The respective characteristics of these four classes are given below.

खंधं सयलसमत्थं तस्स दु अद्धं भणंति देसोत्ति ।
अद्धद्धं च पदेशो परमाणू चेव अविभागी ॥ ८१ ॥

---

*Sanskrit rendering:

स्कन्धाश्च स्कन्धदेशाः स्कन्धप्रदेशाश्च भवन्ति परमाणवः ॥
इति ते चतुर्विकल्पाः पुद्गलकाया ज्ञातव्याः ॥ ८० ॥

*Sanskrit rendering:

स्कन्धः सकलसमस्तस्तस्य त्वर्धं भणन्ति देश इति ॥
अर्द्धार्द्धं च प्रदेशः परमाणुश्चैवाविभागी ॥ ८१ ॥

81. The complete molecule of matter is *Skandha*; a half of it is *Skandhadesa*; a half of that half is *Skandhapradesa*; and what cannot be divided is the primary atom:—thus say (the learned).

COMMENTARY.

The complete *Skandha* refers to the molecule which has all the physical qualities without any exception. Any physical body perceived by us may be taken as an example of complete *Skandha*. If the *process* of bisection is continued to infinity the limit of the series is the *Paramânu*—that which cannot be divided further. Conversely starting from the atom an aggregate of two, three, etc., more atoms will generate *Skandhan*. An aggregate of infinite number of atoms is the complete *Skandha*.

(Note the atomic basis of Physics.)

82

Pudgala ultimately refers to the class of primary atoms. But the name is also applied to the derivative classes of *Skandhas*.

बादरसुहुमगदाणं खंधाणं पुग्गलोत्ति ववहारो ॥
ते होंति छप्पयारा तेलोक्कं जेहिं णिप्पण्णं ॥ ८२ ॥

82. *Skandhas* are of two kinds. Those that can be perceived by the senses and the minute ones beyond sense perception. These also are called matter conventionally. These manifest themselves in six different modes by which the three worlds are completely filled.

COMMENTARY.

The term *Pudgala* is specially applicable to the primary atoms. These are the indestructible material basis of the world. The *Skandhas* or molecules though derivative and secondary are also called by the same name *Pudgala*. These molecules or *Skandhas* have the characteristics of touch, taste, smell, sound and colour. They can increase or decrease being aggregates. They can grow or

*Sanskrit rendering:
बादरसौक्ष्म्यगतानां स्कन्धानां पुद्गलः इति व्यवहारः ॥
ते भवन्ति षट्प्रकारास्त्रैलोक्यं यैः निष्पन्नं ॥ ८२ ॥

decay. They are minute or large. These *Skandhas* or molecular aggregates are of six different kinds which are mentioned in the next gâtha. These aggregates or *Skandhas* in their six different forms completely fill the three Lokâs.

83

The six different kinds of Skandhas are enumerated.

पुढवि जलं च छाया चउरिंदियविसयकम्मपाओग्गा ।
कम्मातीदा येवं छब्भेया पोग्गला होंति ॥ ८३ ॥

83. The *Skandhas* or molecular aggregates exist in six different forms:—Earth, water, shadow, the objects of the four senses except sight, and kârmic matter, and molecules which are unfit to become karmic matter.

COMMENTARY.

The six kinds of *Skandhas* are otherwise called thus:—

1. Bâdara bâdara—Solid.
2. Bâdara—Liquid.
3. Sukshmabâdara—Apparently solid like a shadow.
4. Bâdarasukshma—Minute particles evident to the senses.
5. Sukshma—Minute, not perceptible.
6. Sukshma Sukshma—Very minute.

1. Is that which cannot become combined or one, when broken; like wood or stone.
2. Is the one whose parts become one again when broken; as water, etc.
3. The larger cannot be broken, or divided or caught as shadow, lightning darkness.
4. Though minute yet evident to the senses as taste, smell, colour, etc.
5. Minute and imperceptible as Kârmic matter.
6. Those below Kârmic matters upto Skandhas made up of two atoms.

84

Thus after describing the various *Skandhas* the author explains the nature of Paramânus or primary atoms which are the constituent elements of Skandhas.

physical existence. The atom has its own essential nature which is distinct from that of the four elements."

आदेशमत्तमुत्तो धादुचदुक्कस्स कारणं जो दु ।
सो णेओ परमाणू परिणामगुणो सयमसद्दो ॥ ८५ ॥

85. Whatever thing by its very name implies, perceptual form; is the essential cause of these four elements; is characterised by unthinking *mûrta* nature and is unsounding; that is the atom; so be it understood.

COMMENTARY.

The author denies the qualitative difference of paramânus. By the very name an atom implies the division of physical objects having the sense qualities of touch, taste, smell and colour. From the point of spaciality it is beginning middle and end in one. From the general principle that substance and quality are inseparable, it follows that the spacial unit of atom is also the spacial unit of contact, or of smell, or of colour, *i.e.*, the unit of space occupied by the atom is also the unit of space accommodating the sense colours. If the primary atom through its manifestation were to part with either smell or with the smell and taste or with smell taste and colour then the very atom would be annihilated. Therefore the separability of the quality cannot be associated with the atom. Again fire, air, earth, and water, have as their constitutive cause the atom. Wonderful are the qualities of primary atoms when their potential characteristics are taken into consideration. The non-manifested sense qualities become actual in the aggregates or Skandhas. But in the case of sound it can't be said that it is present in the atom even in *Sakti* or potentiality for sound implies several molecules of several spacial units. Therefore such a characteristic cannot consistently belong to an atom which has only one spacial unit. Paramânu is called *Mûrta* for another reason also; because it can be a perceptual object for *Paramavadhi*. It is called so not because it is perceived by our senses It is distinctly transcending the capacity of our senses though it can be perceived by the *Kevali*.

**Sanskrit rendering*:
आदेशमात्रमूर्तः धातुचतुष्कस्य कारणं यस्तु ॥
स ज्ञेयः परमाणुः परिणामगुणः स्वयमशब्दः ॥ ८५ ॥

86

Then he describes how sound is actually produced by atoms which are really without sound quality.

सद्दो खंधप्पभवो खंधो परमाणुसंगसंघादो ॥
पुट्ठेसु तेसु जायदि सद्दो उप्पादगो णियदो ॥ ८६ ॥

86. Sound is generated by skandhas. Skandhas themselves are the aggregates of atoms. When these aggregates strike one another sound is produced which may be natural or artificial (hence sound may be indirectly associated with atoms also).

COMMENTARY.

If the skandhas constituted by Primary atoms strike one another there is sound. *If they strike of their own accord then there is natural or svabhâvika sound. If the striking is due to other* agencies then it is *Prâyogika* or purposeful sound. The illustrations of *Svabhâvika* or natural sound are thunder of the clouds and the roar of the sea. *Prāyogika* or purposeful sound is again of two kinds *Bhashâtmaka* or Language and *Abhashâtmaka*, non-language. The language sound again may be *Aksharâtmaka* or *Anaksharâtmaka*, articulate and inarticulate. The articulate sound is made up of alphabetical sounds; the inarticulate is the language of animals.

Non-language sounds are of four kinds :—

1. *Tata* sound produced by stringed instruments.
2. *Vitata* the sound produced by drum.
3. *Gaṇa* sound produced by cymbals, etc.
3. *Sushira* sound produced by pipes and other wind instrument.

87

Further description of the primary Atom. That it is *Ekapradesa* or occupies one spacial point is specially referred to.

*Sanskrit rendering:

शब्दः स्कन्धप्रभवः स्कन्धः परमाणुसङ्गसङ्घातः ।
स्पृष्टेषु तेषु जायते शब्द उत्पादको नियतः ॥ ८६ ॥

णिच्चो णाणवकासो ण सावकासो पदेसदो भेत्ता ।
खंधाणं पि य कत्ता पविहत्ता कालसंखाणं ॥ ८७ ॥

87. The primary atom is eternal, is spacial, and yet non-spacial; is the differentiating factor of *skandhas* and is also the cause of their changes. It is also the determinent of time and number.

COMMENTARY.

Paramāṇu is associated with one space point. Since it is not capable of disintegration it is indestructible and eternal. Though it occupies only one space point since it is the substratum of colour and other sense qualites, it hasspaciality accommodating qualities. But as it has only one space point and as it is without beginning, middle, or end, and as it cannot accommodate another space point it may also be called non-spacial. Being the constituent element of skandhas it may be said to be the determinent of the differeitce of skandhas. For the same reason it is the substantial cause of skandhas. By its own change of position it becomes the measure of time. A single instant of time corresponds to a single shift of an atom from one position to the immediately next. It is also the measure of number or quantity. Being the constitutive element of skandhas it brings about quantitative difference of things (*Dravya Sankhya*). Since its associated space point is the constitutive element of space it is indirectly the cause of quantitative difference of space (*Kshetra Sankhya.*)

Since its motion from point to point corresponds to duration of time it is also the basis of quantitative difference of time.

(*Kāla Sankhya*)

Again because it is the basis of modification of things through aggregation or disintegration it is also the condition of the quantitative difference of modes or (*Bhava Saukya*).

Thus according to Jaina view the primary atom is the direct unit of things and the indirect unit of space, time, and change. The

---

Sanskrit rendering:
नित्यो नानवकाशो न सावकाशः प्रदेशतो भेत्ता ।
स्कन्धानामपि च कर्ता प्रविभक्ता कालसंख्यायाः ॥ ८७ ॥

q uantitative difference in these things and also the qualitative difference in physical objects may ultimately be traced to the constitutive of Paramâṇu.

88

Further description of the qualities of Paramâṇu and its modes.

एयरसवण्णगंधं दो फासं सद्दकारणमसद्दं ।
खंधंतरिदं दव्वं परमाणुं तं वियाणेहि ॥ ८८ ॥

88. That substance which has a single taste, colour, and smell and two contacts; which is the cause of sound, itself unsounding, which is different from skandhas though constituting them is the Paramâṇu. So do thou learn.

COMMENTARY.

The Primary atom is examined with reference to different sense qualities of physical objects. Five colours are recognised generally in external things of which only one colour can be associated with the Paramâṇu. According to Jaina view a Paramâṇu is an object of perfect *Avadhi* perception. Though an atom is metemperical to a finite individual it is distinctly a Rupa or Vismal object for the super-normal faculty of Avadhi. If the description in the *Gâtha* is based upon such super-normal perception, unfortunately it cannot be verified by our experience. But still there is a way of imagining the truth. An atom may be associated with a single light wave. If it is not able to obstruct more than a single light wave of a particular wave length then it must manifest itself as having only one colour to a super-normal faculty. Whether it is actually so constituted as to behave in that fashion it is for the physicist to determine. We have here only to notice the uncompromising realistic attitude of Jaina thought.

Of the five different states ordinarily recognised, an atom can have only cne. Of the two different smells it may have either. Of the eight contact qualities smooth and rough ; heavy and light ; are the

Sanskrit rendering:

एकरसवर्णगन्धं द्विस्पर्शं शब्दकारणमशब्दम् ।
स्कन्धान्तरितं द्रव्यं परमाणुं तं विजानीहि ॥ ८८ ॥

qualities of skandhas. These cannot be in the atom. The remaining four qualities may be present in an atom in pairs. The elements constituting the pair must be mutually compatible. *Snigdha* and Sita, Ruksha and Ushna, *may constitute* the *consistent pairs, i.e.*, viscosity or adhesiveness may co-exist with cold and hardness and repulsiveness may co-exist with heat.

This description would naturally introduce qualitative difference among atoms and yet according to the author there can be no qualitative difference among atoms as they are *identical material units.*

It is extremely interesting to notice the elaborate analysis of sense qualities which is even as minute as that of modern Psychology. But the ancient Psychological analysis of smell is as halting as the *modern one.* Smell could be *analysed only* into disagreeable and agreeable. Several *attempts made in recent* years to go beyond this crude *difference merely ended in failure where the modern scientists* succeeded there the ancient thinkers also achieved succes, *i.e.*, in the analysis of the other senses. Another point worth noticing is the analysis of cutaneous sensations into eight elements. This is almost modern in its achievement. This indirect Psychological value is *more important than the description based upon super-normal perception* which unfortunately cannot be verified by Science in its present state.

89

By way of summary, the author enumerates the different forms of corporeal existence. The description may also be taken as a sort of extensive definition of matter.

उवभोज्जमिंदिएहिं य इंदिय काया मणो य कम्माणि ।
जं हवदि मुत्तमण्णं तं सव्वं पुग्गलं जाणे ॥ ८९ ॥

89. Whatever is perceived by the senses, the sense organs, the various kinds of *Sarirâs*, or bodies of Jivas, the physical *manâs* or brain, the karmas, &c. are *Mûrta* objects. Understand that all these are *Pudgala* or matter.

**Sanskrit rendering:*

उपभोग्यमिन्द्रियैश्चेन्द्रियः काया मनश्च कर्माणि ।
यद्भवति मूर्त्तमन्यत् तत्सर्वं पुद्गलं जानीयात् ॥ ८९ ॥

The first alone is the object of sense perception, and the others are subtle bodies. The succeeding one is subtler than the peceeding one in order. *cf.* the *Sutra*, परंपरं सूक्ष्मं for further description of these *sariras*, we may refer the reader to *Tattvârtha Sutra* where the author describes the characteristics by several *Sutras*. (*Sutra* 36 to the end of 2nd chapter).

Thus ends the chapter on matter or *Pudgalâstikâya*.

CHAPTER ON DHARMA AND ADHARMA.

90

The author first describes *Dharma* or the principle of motion.

धम्मत्थिकायमरसं अवण्णगंधं असद्दमप्फासं ।
लोगोगाढं पुट्ठं पिहुलमसंखादियपदेसं ॥ ९० ॥

90. *Dharmâstikâya* is devoid of qualities of taste, colour, smell sound and contact. It pervades the whole world, it is continuous because of inseparability; has extension because of its co-existensiveness with space. Though in reality of *Ekapradesa* yet in *Vyavahâra* is of many pradesas.

COMMENTARY

The author introduces important principles without which the world would be incomplete. *Dharmâstikâya* and *Adharmâstikâya* are distinctly peculiar to Jaina system of thought. The former is the principle of motion and the latter of rest. These terms are used in a technical sense by Jaina writers. Non Jaina writers both European and Indian have many of them misunderstood these technical names. We shall reserve our discussion to the end of this chapter.

In the above *Gâtha* the author clearly describes the nature of *Dharma* or the principle of motion: Since it is non-corporeal or *Amûrta* it has no sense qualities which are generally associated with matter. The qualities of contact, colour, taste, smell and sound are not to be associated with *Dharma*. Therefore it is not physical. Again it is not an aggregate of simple element as matter is. Therefore *Dharma* is continuous and non-composite. Its influence is co-extensive with the whole world. Therefore it may be said to be co-extensive with *Lokâkâsa* without any gaps or intervals. It cannot be said to have manifested at any particular time of the World's History much less is it created. It is coeval with the world and co-extensive with space, and because of the latter character it is an *Astikâya*.

Sanskrit rendering:
धर्मास्तिकायोऽरसोऽवर्णगन्धोऽशब्दोऽस्पर्शः ।
लोकावगाढः स्पृष्टः पृथुलोऽसंख्यातप्रदेशः ॥ ९० ॥

91

Next *Gâtha* describes the remaining qualities of *Dharmâstikaya.*

अगुरुगलघुगेहिं सया तेहिं अणंतेहिं परिणदं णिच्चं ।
गदिकिरियाजुत्ताणं कारणभूदं सयमकज्जं ॥ ९१ ॥

91. Because it has the infinite manifestations of the incorporeal nature *Agurulaghu*, and because of its dialectic nature of persistence through appearance and disappearance it is a real existence. Itself being unaffected by movement it conditions the motion of those that can move, matter and life.

COMMENTARY.

The author next establishes the substantial reality of *Dharmâstikaya.* It has the characteristic change and modification of all the primary entities though it is incorporeal. Therefore it is permanent and real. It is the indispensable condition of movement in physical objects as well as in living beings. But itself cannot be moved by any other thing because it is incapable of movement.

92

The author explains by a well-known analogy how it is the condition of motion.

उदयं जह मच्छाणं गमणाणुग्गहयरं हवदि लोए ॥
तह जीवपुग्गलाणं धम्मं दव्वं वियाणेहि ॥ ९२ ॥

92. Just as water itself being indifferent or neutral, is the condition of movement of fishes so *Dharma* itself non-motive, is the *sine qua non* of motion of *Jîvas* and *Pudgalas.*

COMMENTARY.

The author explains the function of *Dharmâstikâya* by a very striking example. Water is the indispensable condition for the life

**Sanskrit rendering.*

अगुरुलघुकैः सदा तैः अनन्तः परिणतः नित्यः ।
गतिक्रियायुक्तानां कारणभूतः स्वयमकार्यः ॥ ९१ ॥

**Sanskrit rendering:*

उदकं यथा मत्स्यानां गमनानुग्रहकरं भवतिलोके ।
तथा जीवपुद्गलानां धर्मं द्रव्यं विजानीहि ॥ ९२ ॥

of the fish. The fish lives and moves only in water. But water neither moves with the moving fish nor does it stimulate the fish to move. It is practically indifferent towards the moving fish. If the fish moves, it is due to its own intrinsic and spontaneous activity, and not to the causal agency of water. Such is the relation of *Dharmâstikâya* to objects of the world. If objects move from one place to another, the movement is due to the intrinsic condition of the object. But still *Dharmâstikâya* is the *sine qua non* of motion of the objects of the world. *i e.*, in short it is merely the condition, and not the generative cause, of motion.

93

Next the author describes the *Adharmâstikâya* or the principle of rest.

जह हवदि धम्मदव्वं तह तं जाणेह दव्वमधमक्खं ।
ठिदिकिरियाजुत्ताणं कारणभदं तु पुढवीव ॥ ९३ ॥

93. The nature of *Adharma* is essentially similar to that of *Dharma*. But it is like the earth (which is the resting place of things) the *sine qua non* of rest for things in motion. (both animate and inanimate).

COMMENTARY.

Adharma or the principle of rest has all the characteristics associated with *Dharma* or the principle of motion. This is also devoid of sense qualities. This is also non-corporeal. This is in itself non-spacial and yet it is co-extensive with *Lokâkâsa*. These characteristics it has in common with the principle of motion. But it has its own differentiating quality. In this respect it is compared with earth which is the resting place of things. Moving things whether animate or inaninate are not arrested and brought to rest by the earth. But if there is no earth to support, there will be no possibility of rest for the moving things. Similarly the *Adharmâstikâya* without interfering with motion itself is the condition of rest for the moving things.

Sanskrit rendering:
यथा भवति धर्मद्रव्यं तथा तज्जानीहि द्रव्यमधर्माख्यं ।
स्थितिक्रियायुक्तानां कारणभूतं तु पृथिवीव ॥ ९३ ॥

94

Then the author gives the reason why *Dharma* and *Adharma* are considered *Astkáyas* or existences.

जादो अलोगलोगो जेसिं सब्भावदो य गमणठिदी ।
दो वि य मया विभत्ता अविभत्ता लोयमेत्ता य ॥ ९४ ॥

The two things which by their existence bring about the difference between the world and beyond, which are respectively the condition of motion and rest, which are different in function, but same in nature and *Pradesa*, are *Dharma* and *Adharma*. These are uncreated and of the same magnitude as *Lokâkâsa*.*

COMMENTARY.

The existence of these two principles must be postulated as the necessary condition of the world for without this there will be neither motion nor rest among things. There will be neither the world nor beyond. If the material particles and jivas are not kept together as a system then they will get scattered through the whole place resulting in sheer chaos. There will be no definite world. There will be neither the beyond or *Aloká*. The difference between Loka and *Aloka* is entirely due to the coherent system of molecules and *Jivas*, conditioned by these principles. *Dharma* and *Adharma* are said to be distinct because of the difference in function. The former is the condition of motion, the latter of rest. But they are quite similar in nature and are indistinguishable because of their non-exclusive co-existence in space. They are in themselves *Nishkriya Dravyas*. Non-active and non functional and yet condition the things living and non-living in their motion and rest. For this reason they are limited entirely to the world. Their function will not be felt beyond the world for the simple reason that there are no things beyond.

Sanskrit rendering:

जातमलोकलोकं ययोः सद्भावतश्च गमनस्थिती ।
द्वावपि च मतौ विभक्तावविभक्तौ लोकमात्रौ च ॥ ९४ ॥

95

Next the author points out that *Dharma* and *Adharma* are in themselves neutral, and indifferent condition respectively of motion and rest in other things

ण य गच्छदि धम्मत्थी गमणं ण करेदि अण्णदवियस्स ॥
हवदि गती स प्पसरो जीवाणं पुग्गलाणं च ॥ ९५ ॥

95. *Dharmâstikâya* does not move itself nor effect motion in other things. But it forms the condition of motion in living and non-living things.

COMMENTARY.

Then it is determined that *Dharma* and *Adharma* being in themselves entirely neutral from the external condition of motion and rest respectively. *Dharmâstikaya* itself is incapable of movement nor can it be an efficient cause of motion in other things such as, phyical objects and living beings. In what way can it be said to condition motion ? certainly not like the horses that, while themselves running, indirectly cause the motion of prersons on their back. *Dharmâstikâya* does not carry things ; locomotion of things and persons is not brought about by *Dharma* for it is a *Nishkriya Dravya*. But it behaves like water which by its mere presence is the condition of motion in fishes, i. e., *Dharmâstikâya* by its mere existence conditions motion without being the efficient cause of motion. *Jivas* and *Padgalas* have motion because of their own efficient causes and yet motion in them will be impossible, but for the external condition of *Dharmâstikâya*.

Similarly *Adharma* being neutral in itself is the external condition of rest. *It is merely a Bahirangahetu.* Just as the earth is the standing place for horses and the shadow of a tree, the place of rest for the pilgrims so *Adharma* is the non-efficient external condition of things at rest.

96

Then the reason why *Dharma* and *Adharma* are merely neutral conditions (*Udâsinahetu*).

* *Sanskrit rendering :*
न च गच्छति धर्मास्तिको गमनं न करोत्यन्यद्रव्यस्य ।
भवति गतेः सः प्रसरो जीवानां पुद्गलानां च ॥ ९५

विज्जदि जेसिं गमणं ठाणं पुण तेसिमेव संभवदि ।
ते सगपरणामेहिं दु गमणं ठाणं च कुव्वंति ॥ ९६ ॥

96. To whatever things there is motion to the very same there can be rest, or cessation of motion, such things of their own spontaneous efficiency effect either motion or rest.

COMMENTARY.

The author explains why these are called *udâsinahetu.* He wants to emphasize that Dharma is not the intrinsic condition of motion nor Adharma of rest, i.e., he wants to deny that they are *Mukhyahetu.* What if they are the *Mukhyahetu* for motion and rest, then the things that are in motion must continue to be so for ever and the things that are at rest must remain in the same state for ever. But things dont behave in that fashion. Therefore it is inferred that these are only *Udâsinahetus* or neutral or external conditions. This only means that they are not efficient causes. Ordinarily we perceive that things moving come to rest and things at rest begin to move. That shows that both motion and rest are associated with single things. Since this fact prevails in nature we have to infer that motion and rest are not produced by Dharma and Adharma as *Mukhyahetu.* Motion and rest must be traced to the intrinsic and efficient nature of things themselves. That clearly shows that Dharma and Adharma are merely *Bahirangahetus.*

NOTE.

After taking to task the several writers who misunderstood the technical terms Dharma and Adharma, Mr. J.L. Jaini writes (in pp. 25 of his Outlines of Janism).

"Matter goes to struggle with the unwary or *infatuated soul;* time times the conflict, space makes possible the arena; dharma keeps *the combatants to struggle on; and adharma assists them when they* are inclined to rest." Again in the same page: "dharma and adharma are the necessary *conditions* of its continuance in its endless vicissitudes, merit and demerit, high and low, happiness and misery, as

Sanskrit rendering:

विद्यते येषां गमनं पुनस्तेषामेव सम्भवति ।
ते स्वकपरिणामैस्तु गमनं स्थानं च कुर्वन्ति ॥ ९६ ॥

far as disturbance and tranquillity. Of course, dharma and adharma are in their nature and *modus operandi* the same. It is the same sword *in the hand of a devoted soldier or fanatic rebel.*"

I am afraid that Mr. Jaini is still thinking of dharma and adharma as *quasi*-moral instruments in the hands of a Jiva.

The terms shoud not in the least be associated with any kind of moral struggle and tranquillity. Motion and rest contemplated in this connection on distinctly physico-mathematical. They should not therefore be interpreted even metaphorically to mean anything more than that connotation. We have to remember the following points:—

1. Dharma and Adharma—are *amúrta dravyas.* They have no sense qualities of colour, etc.
2. They are *ajivas*—non-living.
3. They have spatial relation though in themselves *eka-pradesi.*
4. They are *Nishkriyas*—non-active.
5. They are *Bahiranga hetu* or *udásina hetu* and not *Mukhya hetu.*
6. They are non-discrete and continuous.

There are some of the important common qualities emphasised by the Jaina Thinkers. Of course that they are *astikáyas* need not be emphasised.

If we ponder over these qualities, then they can never be connected with moral struggle or evolution.

The Jaina philosopher recognised in the world matter, Life and Space. But are they enough? No. There would be no world. The Atoms and Jivas may be scattered throughout the infinite space. Therefore there must be something else besides these three. That something must be able to maintain a coherent system of Jivas and atoms, must have the function of preventing the flying atoms; must limit the boundary of the world of things and persons. For the author distinctly says that without *Adharma* there will be only chaos; there will be no world. Therefore the Jaina Thinkers pointed the existence of a fourth entity which binds together things and persons. So the hypothesis of *adharma.*

This is something like Newton's gravitation; but *adharma* is slightly different. Its main function is to arrest things. But then

there is this difficulty. If there were *adharma* alone how could their be motion at all in things? There would be an eternal paralysis of Reality. To remove this difficulty *Dharma* had to be posited. *The function of Dharma is to guarantee motion within the limits* imposed by *adharma*. This is the reason for the second hypothesis.

But the trouble is not yet over. If the two exist within a spatial limit one guaranteeing motion and the other rest, then the *things in motion must be in motion for ever; and things at rest* must be there for ever. But our experience is not of that kind. One and the same has motion or rest; it may move or it may come to stay. *Therefore Dharma and Adharma must be deprived of their* causality. They can be only *Bahiranga-hetu* or *Udâsina-hetu*, (i.e.) they must be indifferent and neutral in themselves and yet must be indispensible to the completion of the world.

This seems to be the logical development of the system. The *most* approximate modern conception answering to the description will be *Ether* of the physicist. But the Jaina systems require two such entities functionally different; one acting like Newton's *gravitation (adharma)* and the other guaranteeing *motion* within the limits. It would not be quite accurate to think of centripetal and centrifugal forces, because *dharma* and *adharma* are *Nishkriyas*. Does it mean the *duality of electro-magnetic influence of* Ether? The constitution of an atom is supposed to be a system of electrons (positive and negative) Had the Jaina thinkers any such idea about the whole world? We *can only contemplate*. But of this much we are certain that *dharma* and *adharma* are parts of the physical system. They are two different entities without which the system of reality would be impossible and incomplete

Again Dr. Seal suggests that *dharma* is "answering somewhat to *Leibneitz's* Pre-established harmony........ it is the cause (or condition) of the *system of movements*, the fact of an *order* in the *movements of Jîva and Pudgala*," (Note E at the end of Dravya Samgraha, S. B. J. pp LVIII)

As the whole letter is not quoted I am not in a position to know what Dr. Seal has to say about *adharma*. With due deference to the great Philosopher I beg to state that he misses the *point*. *Dharma* need not necessarily be associated with simultaneous

movements as I pointed out. *Adharma* seems to be logically prior to *Dharma*) in the construction of the system. Hence I am not able to appreciate this reference to Pre-established Harmony which has a special function in the system of a "*windowless monads*". There certainly is the idea of corresponding movements. Hence *Dharma* is not the "system of movements." Its meaning is distinctly *subsequent* to that of adharma. How could *adharma* be connected with Leibneitz's System? Then what is the force of that reference?

CHAPTER ON ÂKÂSA OR SPACE.

97

In this Chapter the author describes the nature and characteristics of space. The term Âkâsa here means space and not Ether as it is very often interpreted in other systems of Indian philosophy.

सव्वेसिं जीवाणं सेसाणं तह य पुग्गलाणं च ॥
जं देदि विवरमखिलं तं लोए हवदि आयासं ॥ ९७ ॥*

97. What contains or accommodates completely all Jivas and Pudgalas and the remaining Dravyas is the world space or Lokâkâsa.

COMMENTARY.

Space is considered to be objectively real in Jaina system. *Objectively real space is ordinarily considered to be self-contradictory* and impossible. On the so-called impossibility of space idealism bases its arguments. But in recent years Mathematicians have clearly shown that space and *time are not really self-contradictory*. Euclidian *space* is quite possible and may be real.

Philosophical description of space as real is not the characteristic of the other Indian systems of Philosophy. The term Âkâsa is used in an ambiguous sense referring to either space or Ether. As Doctor Thibaut points out the consistent translation of the word Âkâsa is Ether. He invariably translates the term into Ether. For according to the Hindu creation theory, Âkâsa is the primieval substance from which the other elements appear. Therefore Akâsa must mean some subtle form of matter and not the Mathematicians' space. But the Jaina thinkers reject the theory of creation. Therefore they found it possible to acknowledge the objective existence of space; space therefore is a fundamental element of the system of reality according to the Jaina view.

98

The same point is further elaborated.

**Sanskrit rendering* :

सर्वेषां जीवानां शेषाणां तथैव पुद्गलानां च ।
यद्ददाति विवरमखिलं तल्लोके भवत्याकाशं ॥ ९७ ॥

movements as I pointed out. *Adharma* seems to be logically prior to *Dharma*) in the construction of the system. Hence I am not able to appreciate this reference to Pre-established Harmony which has a special function in the system of a "*windowless monads*". There certainly is the idea *of corresponding movements*. *Hence Dharma is not the "system of movements." Its meaning is* distinctly *subsequent* to that of adharma. *How could adharma* be connected with Leibneitz's System? Then what is the force of that reference?

CHAPTER ON ÂKÂSA OR SPACE.

97

In this Chapter the author describes the nature and characteristics of space. The term Âkâsa here means space and not Ether as it is very often interpreted in other systems of Indian philosophy.

सव्वेसिं जीवाणं सेसाणं तह य पुग्गलाणं च ॥
जं देदि विवरमखिलं तं लोए हवदि आयासं ॥ ९७ ॥*

97. What contains or accommodates completely all Jivas and Pudgalas and the remaining Dravyas is the world space or Lokâkâsa.

COMMENTARY.

Space is considered to be objectively real in Jaina system. *Objectively real space is ordinarily considered to be self-contradictory* and impossible. On the so-called impossibility of space idealism bases *its arguments. But in recent years Mathematicians have clearly* shown that space and time are not really self-contradictory. Euclidian *space* is quite possible *and may be real.*

Philosophical description of space as real is not the characteristic of the other Indian systems of Philosophy. The term Âkâsa is used in an ambiguous sense referring to either space or Ether. As Doctor Thibaut points out the consistent translation of the word Âkâsa is Ether. He invariably translates the term into Ether. For according to the Hindu creation theory, Âkâsa is the primieval substance from which the other elements appear. Therefore Akâsa must mean some subtle form of matter and not the Mathematicians' space. But the Jaina thinkers reject the theory of creation. Therefore they found it possible to acknowledge the objective existence of space ; space therefore is a fundamental element of the system of reality according to the Jaina view.

98

The same point is further elaborated.

**Sanskrit rendering* :

सर्वेषां जीवानां शेषाणां तथैव पुद्गलानां च ।
यद्ददाति विवरमखिलं तल्लोके भवत्याकाशं ॥ ९७ ॥

movements as I pointed out. *Adharma* seems to be logically prior to *Dharma*) in the construction of the system. Hence I am not able to appreciate this reference to Pre-established Harmony which has a special function in the system of a "*windowless monads*". There certainly is the idea of corresponding movements. Hence *Dharma* is not the "system of movements." Its meaning is distinctly *subsequent* to that of adharma. How could *adharma* be connected with Leibneitz's System? Then what is the force of that reference?

CHAPTER ON ÂKÂSA OR SPACE.

97

In this Chapter the author describes the nature and characteristics of space. The term Âkâsa here means space and not Ether as it is very often interpreted in other systems of Indian philosophy.

सव्वेसिं जीवाणं सेसाणं तह य पुग्गलाणं च ॥
जं देदि विवरमखिलं तं लोए हवदि आयासं ॥ ९७ ॥*

97. What contains or accommodates completely all Jivas and Pudgalas and the remaining Dravyas is the world space or Lokâkâsa.

COMMENTARY.

Space is considered to be objectively real in Jaina system. Objectively real space is ordinarily considered to be self-contradictory and impossible. On the so-called impossibility of space idealism bases its arguments. But in recent years Mathematicians have clearly shown that space and time are not really self-contradictory. Euclidian *space* is quite possible and may be real.

Philosophical description of space as real is not the characteristic of the other Indian systems of Philosophy. The term Âkâsa is used in an ambiguous sense referring to either space or Ether. As Doctor Thibaut points out the consistent translation of the word Âkâsa is Ether. He invariably translates the term into Ether. For according to the Hindu creation theory, Âkâsa is the primeval substance from which the other elements appear. Therefore Akâsa must mean some subtle form of matter and not the Mathematicians' space. But the Jaina thinkers reject the theory of creation. Therefore they found it possible to acknowledge the objective existence of space ; space therefore is a fundamental element of the system of reality according to the *Jaina view*.

98

The same point is further elaborated.

**Sanskrit rendering* :

सर्वेषां जीवानां शेषाणां तथैव पुद्गलानां च ।
यद्ददाति विवरमखिलं तल्लोके भवत्याकाशं ॥ ९७ ॥

जीवा पुग्गलकाया धम्माधम्मा य लोगदोणण्णा ।
तत्तो अणण्णमण्णं आयासं अतवदिरित्तं ॥ ९८ ॥*

98 Life, matter, the principle of motion and that of rest and also Time, these are not distinct from the world But that which is the same as the world, and also distinct from it, is Âkâsa or space which is infinite

COMMENTARY

The constituent elements of the world are the infinite number of Jivas and the infinite physical objects the principles of motion and rest and space and time *Of these* space contains the other five. The space which is co extensive with these objects is called Lokâkâsa But that is only a part of the real space Beyond the Loka there is Âlokakâsa or Anantâkâsa, This Anantakâsa is pure space There are no objects animate or inanimate in this Infinite Beyond Not a tiny molecule of matter nor a stray Jiva, would step beyond the limits of Loka The system of objects is held together by the principles of Dharma and Adharma. And these principles are confined to Lokâkâsa

Thus we have to note that Mathematically pure space is recognised to be possible and real by Jaina thinkers Arguments against pure space have already been said to be generally fallacious.

99

Âkâsa thus accommodates the other Dravyas. Why should it not be taken also as the condition of motion and rest The author shows why it cannot be such a condition

आगासं अवगासं गमणट्ठिदिकारणेहिं देदि जदि ।
उद्धंगदिप्पधाणा सिद्धा चिट्ठंति किध तत्थ ॥ ९९ ॥†

**Sanskrit rendering*

जीवा पुद्गलकाया धर्माधर्मौ च लोकतोऽनन्ये ।
ततोऽनन्यदन्यदाकाशमन्त्यतिरिक्त ॥ ९८ ॥

†*Sanskrit rendering*

आकाशमवकाशं गमनस्थितिकारणाभ्यां ददाति यदि ।
उर्द्ध्वंगतिप्रधाना सिद्धा तिष्ठन्ति कथ तत्र ॥ ९९ ॥

99. If space, in addition to accommodating other things, conditions their motion and rest, then why do these Siddhas whose tendency is to go upwards come to stay at the summit of the world?

COMMENTARY.

The author evidently explains why it is necessary to postulate the existence of Dharma and Adharma. Cannot Âkâsa be credited with the functions of motion and rest in addition to its own function of accommodating things? According to the author such a Hypothesis would be impossible. It would be conflicting with other facts for if it is also the condition of motion and rest, then wherever there is Âkâsa there should be free chance for motion and rest. But neither a single Jīva or a single atom of matter could step beyond the limit of Lokâkâsa though there is Âkâsa beyond. Therefore the author concludes that space is not the condition of either motion or rest. These require independent principles as their condition. Âkâsa cannot be a substitute for Dharma and Adharma. This argument should be considered conjointly with the arguments in the previous Chapter for the necessity of Dharma and Adharma. We have to notice especially that one which points out the difference between Cosmos and Chaos to be based upon principles of state and motion. The Jaina system evidently considers the world incomplete and unreal without the statical and dynomical principles.

100

The author strengthens the argument by showing that according to Jaina faith the perfected ones come to a stay in the summit of the Loka.

जह्मा उवरिट्ठाणं सिद्धाणं जिणवरेहिं पण्णत्तं ।
तह्मा गमणट्ठाणं आयासे जाण णत्थित्ति ॥ १०० ॥*

100. Because the Siddhas or the perfected ones stay in the summit of the world—So it is revealed by the great Jina.

*Sanskrit rendering.

यस्मादुपरिस्थानं सिद्धानं जिनवरैः प्रज्ञप्तं ।
तस्माद्गमनस्थानमाकाशे जानीहि नास्तीति ॥ १०० ॥

Therefore there cannot be in space either the condition of motion or of rest.

COMMENTARY.

That the Siddhas reside in the summit of the world is one of the religious doctrines of Jainas. If space be credited to be the condition of motion and rest it would contradict the scriptures. To avoid this internal contradiction space should not be suppo sed to be the condition of motion and rest. The argument *prima facie* is based upon a religious Dogma. But really it is another form of the same philosophical argument which maintained that without the principles of Dharma and Adhrama there would be no distinction between Loka and Aloka. The argument in this Gâtha is merely the converse of the above. Since there is a definite Loka or Cosmos, and since there is *space beyond, there must be something besides space which maintains* the integrity of the system of things and persons. For space itself cannot have that function of maintaining the unity of the world.

101.

The author shows that the supposition about space is impossible by bringing in a really strong argument.

जदि हवदि गमणहेदू आगासं ठाणकारणं तेसिं ।
पसजदि अलोगहाणी लोगस्स य अंतपरिवुड्ढी ॥१०१॥*

101. If space be the condition of motion and rest, of life and matter, then there would happen the disappearance of Aloka or the beyond and the destruction and dissipation of Loka or the world.

COMMENTARY.

As a matter of fact the world is an integral system of things, living and non-living, existing in space. That there is some force or power which holds the constituent elements of the world together is a necessary pre-supposition even of modern science. It is really wonderful that Jaina thinkers several centuries ago felt the same intellec-

**Sanskrit rendering :*

यदि भवति गमनहेतुराकाशं स्थानकारणं तेषां ।
प्रसजत्यलोकहानिर्लोकस्य चान्तपरिवृद्धिः ॥ १०१ ॥

tual necessity as to suppose a physical force which maintains the cosmic unity. The reason given for that Hypothesis is still more interesting. If there is no such power and if things living and non-living were left in space by themselves without a further principle to hold them together there would only be chaos, no systematic world This argument must be considered very important for it gives us an insight into the scientific ideas of the ancients. The positive science of ancient Indians must have been fairly advanced in order to promulgate such physical theories as are contemplated by the author.

102.

If then space cannot be the determining condition of motion and of rest, the latter facts must be due to some other conditions. Therefore Dharma and Adharma must be admitted to be the necessary constituents of the system of reality.

तह्मा धम्माधम्मा गमणट्ठिदिकारणाणि णागासं ।
इदि जिणवरेहिं भणिदं लोगसहावं सुणंताणं ॥ १०२ ॥*

102. Dharma and Adharma alone are the condition of motion and rest respectively, and not Ākāsa or space. So was the nature of the Cosmos revealed by the great Jina to his audience (in Samavasarana).

COMMENTARY.

The author summarises his position as to the nature of Loka. He distinctly asserts that the coherence of the world is due to principles of Dharma and Adharma and not to space. The author further states evidently to strengthen his own case in the eyes of the faithful that such was the message delivered by the Jina to his audience, consisting of Ganadharas, and Chakradharas, and several others in Samavasarana. The description of the world is as revealed by the Omniscient to his disciples.

103.

The author states that Lokākāsa or world, Space, Dharma and Adharma, are all co-extensive and coincident. Hence they may

Sanskrit rendering :

तस्माद्धर्माधर्मौ गमनस्थितिकारणे नाकाशं ।
इति जनवरैः भणितं लोकस्वभावं शृण्वताम् ॥ १०२ ॥

be considered as one conventionally, as they are all incorporeal entities in the same locality. But they are in reality different from one another on account of their functional difference.

धम्माधम्मागासा अपुधब्भूदा समाणपरिमाणा ।
पुधगुवलद्धिविसेसा करंति एगत्तमण्णत्तं ॥ १०३ ॥*

103. Dharma, Adharma, and space, are mutually interpenetrating and coincident. Hence they are one from the point of locality; they are of the same size and form, and constitute an inseparable unity. But from the difference of function they also exhibit their diversity.

COMMENTARY.

This Gâtha is interesting for this reason that Dharma and Adharma being constitutive elements of the world are said to be confined to Lokâkâsa. Their influence is not felt beyond the boundary of the world for their influence is fundamentally related to things material and spiritual. These two mysterious physical principles are all-pervading and co-extensive with the world space. Their existence cannot be inferred from their difference of locality. There is no such difference. But yet they have fundamentally different functions and on account of these differences they are really diverse. In short they are one in Pradesa but different as Vastus i. e., they have a unity of Locality with diversity of function and nature.

This functional difference is emphasized by the author only because these three Dravyas are Amûrta ones. There is no other way of differentiating them unlike physical objects which can be distinguished by sense qualities and unlike Jivas which can be differentiated by conscious qualities. Dharma and Adharma have to be determined only by their function in the economy of the physical realm.

Thus Ends the Chapter on *Space.*

**Sanskrit rendering:*

धर्माधर्माकाशान्यपृथग्भूतानि समानपरिमाणानि ।
पृथगुपलब्धिविशेषाणि कुर्वन्त्येकत्वमन्यत्वं ॥ १०३ ॥

CHULIKA.

104.

Then the resume of the five Astikâyas and Dravyas. They are described as Mûrta and Amûrta (Physical and non-physical) and *Chetana and Achetana (conscious and non-conscious).*

आगासकालजीवा धम्माधम्मा य मुत्तिपरिहीणा ।
मुत्तं पुग्गलदव्वं जीवो खलु चेदणो तेसु ॥ १०४ ॥†

104. Space, Time, Life, Dharma and Adharma, these are Amûrta Dravyas and are therefore without sense qualities. Matter alone is Mûrta and has these qualities. Again of these life alone is conscious.

COMMENTARY.

In this Gâtha the author classifies the Dravyas according to two principles. According to the first classification, they are grouped into Mûrtas and Amûrtas. Mûrta Dravya is one which has the sense qualities of contact, taste, smell, sound, and colour. That which is devoid of these qualities is Amûrta. Here, space, time, Jiva in itself, Dharma and Adharma, are all Amûrtas Matter alone is Mûrta. That which has the nature of consciousness is *Chetana* and that which is otherwise is *Achetana.* Space, time, and matter, *Dharma* and Adharma are all *Achetanas.* Jiva alone is *Chetana* Dravya.

105

Again the Dravyas are classified into *Sakriyas* and *Nishkriyas,* active and non-active.

जीवा पुग्गलकाया सह सक्किरिया हवंति ण य सेसा ।
पुग्गलकरणा जीवा खंधा खलु कालकरणा दु ॥ १०५ ॥*

105. Jivas and physical objects become *Sakryas* or causal agents when determined by certain condition The rest are not

**Sanskrit rendering:*

आकाशकालजीवा धर्माधर्मौ च मूर्तिपरिहीनाः।
मूर्तं पुद्गलद्रव्यं जीवः खलु चेतनस्तेषु ॥ १०४ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering:

जीवाः पुद्गलकायाः सह सक्रिया भवन्ति न च शेषाः।
पुद्गलकरणा जीवाः स्कन्धाः खलु कालकरणास्तु ॥ १०५ ॥

be considered as one conventionally, as they are all incorporeal entities in the same locality. But they are in reality different from one another on account of their functional difference.

धम्माधम्मागासा अपुधब्भूदा समाणपरिमाणा ।
पुधगुवलद्धिविसेसा करंति एगत्तमण्णत्तं ॥ १०३ ॥*

103. Dharma, Adharma, and space, are mutually interpenetrating and coincident. Hence they are one from the point of locality; they are of the same size and form, and constitute an inseparable unity. But from the difference of function they also exhibit their diversity.

COMMENTARY.

This Gâtha is interesting for this reason that Dharma and Adharma being constitutive elements of the world are said to be confined to Lokâkâsa. Their influence is not felt beyond the boundary of the world for their influence is fundamentally related to things material and spiritual. These two mysterious physical principles are all pervading and co-extensive with the world space. Their existence cannot be inferred from their difference of locality. There is no such difference. But yet they have fundamentally different functions and on account of these differences they are really diverse. In short they are one in *Pradesa* but different as *Vastus* *i. e*, they have a unity of Locality with diversity of function and nature.

This functional difference is emphasized by the author only because these three Dravyas are *Amûrta* ones There is no other way of differentiating them unlike physical objects which can be distinguished by sense qualities and unlike Jivas which can be differentiated by conscious qualities. Dharma and Adharma have to be determined only by their function in the economy of the physical realm.

Thus Ends the Chapter on *Space*.

**Sanskrit rendering:*

धर्माधर्माकाशान्यपृथग्भूतानि समानपरिमाणानि ।
पृथगुपलब्धिविशेषाणि कुर्वंत्येकत्वमन्यत्वं ॥ १०३ ॥

CHULIKA.

104.

Then the resume of the five *Astikâyas* and *Dravyas*. They are described as Mûrta and Amûrta (Physical and non-physical) and Chetana and Achetana (conscious and non-conscious).

आगासकालजीवा धम्माधम्मा य मुत्तिपरिहीणा।
मुत्तं पुग्गलदव्वं जीवो खलु चेदणो तेसु ॥ १०४ ॥†

104. Space, Time, Life, Dharma and Adharma, these are Amûrta Dravyas and are therefore without sense qualities. Matter alone is Mûrta and has these qualities. Again of these life alone is conscious.

COMMENTARY.

In this Gâtha the author classifies the Dravyas according to two principles. According to the first classification, they are grouped into Mûrtas and Amûrtas. Mûrta Dravya is one which has the sense qualities of contact, taste, smell, sound, and colour. That which is devoid of these qualities is Amûrta. Here, space, time, Jiva in itself, Dharma and Adharma, are all Amûrtas Matter alone is Mûrta. That which has the nature of consciousness is *Chetana* and that which is otherwise is *Achetana*. Space, time, and matter, Dharma and Adharma are all *Achetanas*. *Jiva* alone is *Chetana* Dravya.

105

Again the Dravyas are classified into *Sakriyas* and *Nishkriyas*, active and non-active.

जीवा पुग्गलकाया सह सक्किरिया हवंति ण य सेसा।
पुग्गलकरणा जीवा खंधा खलु कालकरणा दु ॥ १०५ ॥*

105. Jivas and physical objects become *Sakryas* or causal agents when determined by certain condition The rest are not

Sanskrit rendering:
आकाशकालजीवा धर्माधर्मौ च मूर्तिपरिहीनाः।
मूर्तं पुद्गलद्रव्यं जीवः खलु चेतनस्तेषु ॥ १०४ ॥

†*Sanskrit rendering:*
जीवाः पुद्गलकायाः सह सक्रिया भवन्ति न च शेषाः।
पुद्गलकरणा जीवाः स्कन्धाः खलु कालकरणास्तु ॥ १०५ ॥

causally active. Jiva is active because of Kārmic matter. *Skandhas* or physical bodies are active because of time.

COMMENTARY.

According to this classification Dravyas are either *Sakryas* or *Nishkriyas*. Any causal activity is described to be *Sakrya*. If there is no such causal activity then it is *Nishkriya*. The activity contemplated here may be merely any change brought about by external conditions. Jivas and matter are *Sakrya* Dravyas for they become *Sakriya* under certain conditions; space, time, Dharma and Adharma are all *Nishkriyas* or non-active entities. The external condition of activity of Jiva is merely the group of Karmas These are material. The external condition of the activity of matter is time Temporal succession brings about changes either of aggregation or disintegration in physical objects There can be no change in matter without time as there can be no change in Jiva without Karmic matter; but Jiva *in perfect states can be free from Kārmic matter. In this state* the *Siddha* Jiva is practically *Nishkriya, i. e.,* it is not subjected to causal category. *But it* cannot be so with matter *for there is no* chance for matter to exist independent of time. It must always be subject to change due to time. Therefore *it is always Sakrya.*

One of the commentators relying on the religious dogma that *Siddha* Jiva gets to the summit of the world, speaks of *Siddha* also as *Sakriya.* If at all there is any causal change, it is this initial change of locality. But in the perfect state it will be more accurately described as *Nishkriya* for already Jiva is described to be beyond causal series in its state of perfection. To be consistent with that attitude it is better to consider *Siddha* as *Nishkriya.*

106.

The difference between Mūrta and Amūrta is again described in other words.

जे खलु इन्दियगेज्झा विसया जीवेहिं हुंति ते मुत्ता ।
सेसं हवदि अमुत्तं चित्तं उभयं समादियदि ॥ १०६ ॥*

*Sanskrit rendering:

ये खलु इन्द्रियग्राह्या विषया जीवैर्भवन्ति ते मूर्ताः ।
शेषं भवत्यमूर्तं चित्तमुभयं समाददाति ॥ १०६ ॥

105. All those objects that are apprehended or perceived by the senses are Mûrta objects. The rest are Amûrtas. Mind apprehends both Mûrta and Amurta objects.

COMMENTARY.

The author again tries to explain the difference between perceptual and non-perceptual objects. All those objects that are objects of the senses are Mûrta Dravyas The term Mûrta therefore implies the inherence in the object of the sense qualities of colour, taste, smell, etc. Those objects that have not these characteristics are Amûrta Dravyas. According to this description Physical objects are distinctly Mûrta Dravyas. But Physical objects may exist in different forms. There may be minute molecular constitution and the primary atoms. These are certainly not perceived by the senses and yet they also come under Mûrta category for they form the potential basis of the gross or physical objects which are evident to the senses. In short all those objects which are *Pratyaksha* to the senses are Mûrta objects and those objects which are known through *Paroksha* are Amûrtas. Under the Amûrta category come such facts as Dharma and Adharma and all Psychic states. (We have to note here that the term *Pratyaksha* is used in Vyavahâra sense.) *Mind, which is in itself an Amûrta* Dravya is able to know both Mûrta and Amûrta Dravyas. Mûrta Dravyas are apprehended *Pratyaksha* and Amurta *Paroksha* or mediately.

Thus ends the Chulika or Summary.

107.

In the treatment of Panchâstikâya, time has only a secondary place. Therefore the author gives a subordinate place to time and mentions about it in the summary. The section dealing about time therefore is merely a part of the *Chulika* and it is not considered as an independent chapter by the author as well as the commentators.

कालो परिणामभवो परिणामो दव्वकालसंभूदो ।
दोण्हं एस सहावो कालो खणभंगुरो णियदो ॥ १०७ ॥*

*Sanskrit rendering:

कालः परिणामभवः परिणामो द्रव्यकालसंभूतः ।
द्वयोरेष स्वभावः कालः क्षणभङ्गुरो नियतः ॥ १०७ ॥

107. Relative time is determined by changes or motions in things. These changes themselves are the *effect of time* absolute. The former time is ephemeral (having beginning and end). The latter is eternal, such are the characteristics of the two.

COMMENTARY.

The author differentiates between relative time and absolute time. The different conventional periods from *Samaya* or moment onwards are the relative time. The different periods of relative time are measured by changes in other things. Movement of Physical objects is mainly the unit of measuring the different periods of relative time. *The changes which measure the periods of relative time are themselves* the effect of real or absolute time. The periods of relative time have both beginning and end. But *Dravyakāla* or real time is eternal, is without beginning or end.

The author takes up an attitude which is very familiar to common sense and science. The distinction is quite identical with *Newtonian* distinction between relative and absolute time According to the author time is a real Dravya; it is not merely a form of mental activity. *The idealistic thinkers both in the east as well as in the west have* treated time as merely an appearance But the Jaina thinkers evidently form an exception for them, time is not an appearance but a reality. The main argument against the reality of time is the so-called self-contradiction in the motions of continuity and infinity. Time has these characteristics of continuity and infinity and yet it is also constituted by instants or *Dravyakālāṇus* as the Jaina writers call them. How can there be continuity constituted by primary elements of instants? This difficulty is not peculiar to time. It is common to space, as well as matter. In all these cases Philosophers emphasize the impossibility of obtaining continuity and infinity from simple elements. On account *of this impossibility space, time and* matter were condemned to be appearances.

But the problem has been taken up by the Mathematicians. The wonderful mathematical discoveries of the continental mathematicians such as, *Cantor, Peano* and *Frege* have shown clearly the intrinsic fallacy in all the arguments against the reality of time and space. The problem is developed by mathematicians as a special case of

" transitive and continuous series " To go into further details would be too mathematical. The discussion may very well be reserved to the general introduction. It is enough to note here the wonderful correspondence between the ideas of the author, and those of philosophical Mathematicians of our present day.

Another point worth notice is that time is the cause of changes or modifications in things. The author not only admits the reality of time but also recognises its potency. In this respect one is reminded of the great French Philosopher Bergson. Bergson has revealed to the world that time is a potent factor in the evolution of Cosmos. Changes and modifications in things are absolutely impossible without time, and that is just the view of the author.

103.

In order to clear the doubt of the disciple of a different *Sangha*, who disbelieves the reality of time, the author emphasizes the existential nature of time.

कालो त्ति य ववदेसो सब्भावपरूवगो हवदि णिच्चो ।
उप्पण्णप्पद्धंसी अवरो दीहंतरट्ठाई ॥ १०८ ॥*

108. *The name time or Kâla denotes an existential fact. The thing so denoted—Time is real but the other relative time has from the point of present moment, origin and end almost simultaneously. But it may also be of long duration.*

COMMENTARY.

Tha author differentiates the real time from relative time. Real or absolute time is eternal existence But relative time is merely of finite duration. But from the aspect of moment it has no duration at all. Origin and end are together in a single moment. It has *Kshanikatva* as its nature as against *Nityatva* of the other. But the *Kshanikatva* may apparently disappear and relative time may have long duration. Even then it has both beginning and end and as such it is different from Dravya Kâla or absolute time.

*Sanskrit rendering :

काल इति च व्यपदेशः सद्भावप्ररूपको भवति नित्यः ।
उत्पन्नप्रध्वंसयपरो दीर्घान्तरस्थायी ॥ १०८ ॥

109.

Then the quantitative appreciation of time and the absence of *Kayatva* or Corpus for the same.

एदे कालागासा धम्माधम्मा य पुग्गला जीवा ।
लब्भंति दव्वसण्णं कालस्स दु णत्थि कायत्तं ॥ १०९ ॥*

109. Time, space, Dharma, and Adharma, matter, and Jiva these things are called Dravyas. Of these to time alone there is no Kayâtva.

COMMENTARY.

In this Gâtha, the author emphasizes the fact that time has *Astitva* or existence but not *Kaydtva* speciality. It is one of the six Dravyas. The name Dravya is applicable to all those existences which have continuity through origin and decay. Time has such a nature. Therefore it shares the name Dravya with the other things herein enumerated.

But the other Dravyas are also called Astikâyas because they have extension or *Bahupradesa*. But time has no such *Bahupradesa* Therefore it is not an Astikâya.

This nature of time is described in mathematical terms by the author elsewhere. (*Pravachana Sâra*). Time has *Urdhva Prachaya* whereas the other Dravyas have *Tiryak Prachaya*. In the language of Modern Mathematics the former term corresponds to mono-dimensional assymetrical series, the latter multi-dimensional series. According to Mathematical Philosophy extension is multi-dimensional series. Kâyatva therefore is generated by *Tiryak Prachaya* but *Urdhva Prachaya* cannot be associated with extension since it is unilateral. Therefore time is not an Astikâya. More of this in the general introduction.

110

The fruit of contemplating upon these facts—Panchâstikaya.

Sanskrit rendering:

एते कालाकाशे धर्माधर्मौ च पुद्गला जीवाः ।
लभन्ते द्रव्यसंज्ञां कालस्य तु नास्ति कायत्वम् ॥ १०९ ॥

एवं पवयणसारं पंचत्थियसंगहं वियाणित्ता ।
जो मुयदि रागदोसे सो गाहदि दुक्खपरिमोक्खं ॥११०॥*

110. Thus one who with the knowledge of, and faith in this short summary of Panchâstikaya—the essence of the Divine word gives up desire and aversion (towards wordly things) realises freedom from sorrow.

COMMENTARY.

Here the author indicates the path to eternal bliss. The path consists of the three jewels or *Ratna Traya*. Right faith, Right knowledge and Right conduct. सम्यक् दर्शन ज्ञान चारित्राणि मोक्षमार्गः । and *Samyak Darsanam* is defined to be *Tattvarta Sraddhânam*. The Tattvas are the existence described in short in Panchastikâya or the reality itself may be considered as a system of Panchâstikâyas. One who believes in the nature of reality, one who tries to understand its constituent elements must next try to realise his own true nature. When faith and knowledge get the co-operation of effort or *charitra* then there is the surity of heavenly bliss.

111.

Then the manner of obtaining such a freedom.

मुणिऊण एतदट्ठं तदणुगमणुज्झदो णिहदमोहो ।
पसमियरागद्दोसो हवदि हदपरावरो जीवो ॥ १११ ॥†

111. Whoever knowing this truth (that self is the greatest reality) endeavours to reach or realise the same gets free from spiritual stupidity or *Darśna Mohanîya*, and as the result of that, roots out desire and aversion (charitra Mohanîya), and finally becomes the conqueror of Samsâra.

*Sanskrit rendering :

एवं प्रवचनसारं पञ्चास्तिकायसङ्ग्रहं विज्ञाय ।
यो मुञ्चति रागद्वेषौ स गाहते दुःखपरिमोक्षं ॥ ११० ॥

†Sanskrit rendering :

ज्ञात्वैतदर्थं तदनुगमनोद्यतो निहतमोहः ।
प्रशमितरागद्वेषो भवति हतपरापरो जीवः ॥ १११ ॥

COMMENTARY.

He describes the order of events that ends in Moksha. The greatest thing mentioned in this SCRIPTURE is the SELF. Whoever understands the glorious nature of self-consciousness cannot but attempt to realise the same. On account of that effort the wall round the faculty of faith or Darsana Mohanīya gets removed. By the removal of this ignorance dawns the knowledge of SELF. Through self-knowledge the rooting out of desire and aversion the destruction of Charitra Mohanīya or the palsy of the good will. Hence the shattering of kârmic shackles ; then with freedom radiates the eternal glory of the Divine Person.

Thus ends the Book I.

BOOK II.

NINE PADÂRTHAS,

112.

The six Dravyas and the five Astikayas are of two kinds, life and non-life. These two things life and non-life form the two primary elements among seven Tattvas and nine Padârthas. Besides these two the other Tattvas and Padârthas are derivative. They are due to the combination or separation of these two primary Tattvas. Life and non life. On account of combination occur the following Padârthas, Puñya (virtue), Pâpa (vice), Âsrava (incoming of Karma) and Bandha (bondage). The four which lead to Samsâra, originating by their separation the following Padârthas occur. Samvara (prevention of incoming Karma), Nirjara (withering away of existing Karma), Moksha (emancipation from all Karma or Freedom). Of these Moksha Tattva is the most important, being the summum Bonum of life. The path to this goal is described by the author who begins by praying to the last of the Jinas, Lord Mahâvira who revealed the path.

अभिवंदिऊण सिरसा अपुणब्भवकारणं महावीरं ।
तेसिं पयत्थभंगं मग्गं मोक्खस्स वोच्छामि ॥ ११२ ॥*

112. Bowing my head in reverence to Mahâvira, the saviour of the world, I describe those two primary Padârthas life and non-life, and the various derivative Padârthas and also the path to heaven.

COMMENTARY.

This *Namaskâra sloka* is *Madhyahamangala* (Salutation for the middle of the books). The author worships Vardhamana Mahâvir, the last of the Tirthankaras; he is considered to be the revealer of the true path. All *Sastras* are traced to Mahâvira as the originator.

In the second book the author is concerned with the career of life. In the first book, he described in detail the nature of the constitutive elements of the world. In the second book he is going to follow the spiritual evolution. Evolution or development implies a struggle and

**Sanskrit rendering*:

अभिवन्द्य शिरसा अपुनर्भवकारणं महावीरं ।
तेषां पदार्थभङ्गं मार्गं मोक्षस्य वक्ष्यामि ॥ ११२ ॥

the primary conditions of struggles are Jiva and Ajiva, life and non-life. Jiva is situated in an environment of Ajiva or non-living things. Of the Ajiva's matter is of primary importance. The struggle is mainly between life and matter. According to the Jaina doctrine the struggle is without beginning. The spiritual evolution consists in progressive emancipation of Jiva from physical shackles.

The reality therefore is looked at from a different angle of vision. The different aspects of the struggle and evolution form the Tattvas and the Padârthas. The author is no more concerned with Astikâyas and Dravyas The very same group appear in another form. The Mula Tattvas or the primary elements, are Jiva and its non-living environment. By the combination and separation of Jiva and Ajiva are generated, the other Tattvas and Padârthas which are derivative and secondary. The central actor in the Drama is Jiva. And the culmination of the development is Moksha. The second book therefore is concerned with the career of life from Samsâra to Moksha.

113.

First the author takes up *Mokshamârga* or the path to heaven as he wants to describe it in short.

सम्मत्तणाणजुत्तं चारित्तं रागदोसपरिहीणं ।
मोक्खस्स हवदि मग्गो भव्वाणं लद्धबुद्धीणं ॥ ११३ ॥*

113. Right conduct uninfluenced by the desire or aversion, together with right faith and right knowledge, forms the path to heaven to those faithful Jivas who realise self knowledge through the five attainments or Labdhis.

COMMENTARY.

Here the author indicates the path to Moksha or the three jewels. The Gâtha is merely the paraphrase of the very first Sutra of *Tattvarthadhigama.*

Three elements constitute the path. Darsana, or belief, Jñâna knowledge and Charitra or conduct. But all the three must be of the

*Sanskrit rendering:

सम्यक्त्वज्ञानयुक्तं चारित्रं रागद्वेषपरिहीनं ।
मोक्षस्य भवति मार्गो भव्यानां लब्धबुद्धीनां ॥ ११३ ॥

the right sort. Belief in the true nature of reality is Darśana, which is right. This Samyak Darsana, is considered to be the result of suppression or eradication of that particular Karma called Darsana Mohaniya whose function is to blind that faculty of belief or Darsana. The understanding of the nature of these Tattvas, the constitutive categories of reality is Samyak Jñâna. The term Samyak implies the absence of doubt and error Conduct as conditioned by right belief and right knowledge is Samyka Charitra or right conduct.

These form the indispensable elements of the *Moksha mâraga* Unless all the three are present there would be no path.

In this Gâtha the author indicates eight main conditions of the path.

1. The co-operation of right belief and right knowledge, without these there would be no path.

2. Conduct is the main constituent element; not any conduct but only right conduct.

3. This implies that there should be no *Râga* or *Dvesha*, Desire or aversion, the presenee of these would nullify the *Mârga*.

4. Conduct of that kind forms the path to Moksha or liberation, but does not lead to Bandha or bondage

5. The path so constituted is the right and the reliable one; and as such it is distinct from several *Mithya Mârgâs* or false paths.

6. The path is available only to *Bhavya Jivas* or the good matured ones and not to *Abhavyâs* of intrinsic evil disposition.

7. Even among the *Bhavyas* only to those who secured five attainments or the *Pancha Labdhis* but not to those who had not those attainments.

8 Only those who have eradicated completely all Kashâyas or the gross emotions which have the tendency to stain the purity of self; but one in whom such emotions are still present cannot walk the path of righteousness.

The three elements constituting the *path are the three jewels, or Ratnatraya*. This *Ratnatraya* is spoken to be of two kinds *Nischaya Ratnatraya* and *Vyavahâra Ratnatraya*. The former is from the absolute point of view and the latter is of relative point of view. When the *Ratnatraya* is distinctly based upon self then it is *Nischaya*

Ratnatraya. Darsana, Jñâna and Châritra, all have reference to self and self alone. This *Nischaya Ratnatraya* first implies the belief in the ultimate nature and importance of self, *i.e.*, the belief that *Paramâtmâ* is nothing but self. Again consequent upon this firm belief there must be knowledge of self. Complete knowledge of self is the next element of the *Nischaya Ratnatraya*. The knowledge of all other Tattvas centres round the Personality. Knowledge of the Person therefore is knowledge *par excellence*. And lastly realisation of the Paramâtmâ or the great Person would be Charitra *par excellence*.

Vyavahâra Ratnatraya is constituted by Darsana Jñâna and Châritra which are based upon *Parâtattvâs* or objective ideals. Belief in an objective divinity independent of our Self for example, would be Vyavahâra Darsana. Knowledge of such alien entities would be Vyavahâra knowledge and attempting to realise our ideals and aspirations through the help of such alien personlities either through sacrifices or propiciations is Vyavahâra Charitra. These three constitute *Vyavahâra Ratnatraya*.

The five Labdhis referred to in the Gâtha are, (1) *Kshâyopasama Labdhi*, (2) *Desana Labdhi*, (3) *Prayogya Labdhi*, (4) *Visudhalabdhi*, and (5) *Karaṇalabdhi*.

खयउवसमियविसोहि देसणपाउग्गकरणलद्धी य ।
चत्तारिवि सामण्णा करणं पुणहोदि सम्मत्ते ॥*

गोम्मटसारः Jivakânda, gâtha 650,

To Samsâri Jiva there is continuous fruition of old and existing Karmas and combination with novel and incoming Karmas. On account of this Kârmic encircling their should be no chance for such a Jiva to realise its pure and perfect form independent of Kârmic effects. Then how can we talk of Moksha or Emancipation for Samsâri Jivâs or the worldly souls ?

By way of reply to this objection from the desciple the Master says : "You have seen this in your experience—that a hero watches

---

*Sanskrit rendering :

क्षायोपशमिकविशुद्धिः देशनाप्रायोग्यकरणलब्धिश्च ।
चतस्रोऽपि सामान्याः करणं पुनः भवति सम्यक्त्वे ॥

for an opportunity for vanquishing his enemy. Whenever the enemy is in his minimum strength on account of several reasons, the hero without losing the chance carefully prepares for the struggle making use of his mature deliberation and select instruments. Thus is the enemy vanquished."

Similary Samsârî Jiva embarrassed by ancient as well as fresh Kârmic enemies patiently waits for an opportune momeht. As a natural consequence of Kârmic matter duration may come to an end; or its intensity and fertility may be declining to minimums. At that moment the *Bhavya Jiva* which is patiently aspiring for spiritual greatness, strikes with vehemence and vanquishes the enemy. This suppression of Karmas at their weakest moment is *Kshayopasama Labdhi* No. 1.

After this initial assertion of spiritual independence their may appear a change of disposition in the nature of Jiva which may thereafter be hankering for good. This hankering for good may manifest in good and useful conduct (*punya*); and as such it may be the condition for *Punya Karma Âsrava*. Nevertheless the declension of the disposition towards good is *Visudha Labdhi* No. 2.

Then with this changed disposition Jiva may have the good fortune to obtain a master who would instruct him in the path This instruction may lead to the removal of ignorance and error and to the acquisition of Jñâna. This may guarantee progress for the Jiva along the rungs of spiritual ladder. This good fortune of obtaining instruction is *Upadesa Labdhi*. (*Desana*) No 3.

The duration and intensity of some Karmas may go on mutually aggravating each other to their maximum. After reaching the maximum they have to decline of their own accord. This declining stage of Karmas after reaching maximum is another opportunity known as *Prayogyata Labdhi* (co-relative of Kârmic glow) No. 4.

Again after reaching a certain stage in the spiritual development—*Gunasthânas*, their may appear certain psychic instruments, *e g*, *Sukladhyana*. This attainment of spiritual instruments and other supernormal powers is known as *Karana Labdhi* No. 5.

These are the Labdhis or attainments which a Jiva by good fortune may secure

These *Labdhis* are not to be confounded with what are known as *Nava Kevala Labdhis.* Nine attainments about the time of Kevala Jñâna.

At the *Kevali* stage of development the following facts happen to the person.

1. The all penetrating *Kevala Jñâna* which is the result of annihilation of the *veil* of knowledge.

2. The all illuminating perception or *Kevala Darsana* or *Kshâyaka Darsana*; which is also the concomitant of the destruction of the veil of perception.

3. The all merciful attitude of the great spiritual Harmony known as *Kshâyika Abhaya Dânam.*

4. *Even after relinquishing all kinds of good and nourishment,* in order to maintain the *Sarira* for a time there is the incoming or assimilation of subtle physical principles This is *Kshâyika Labha* gain or income after *Kshâyika* state.

5. *Then this happy events introduced by Indras such as* showing flowers over head is *Kshayika Bhoga.* This is the consequence *of complete annihilation of Bhogantaraya Karma.*

6. Similary the introduction of *Simhasana.* (Lion thrones) Chattra, *Chamara,* etc., (umbrella, etc.,) is *Kshâyikaupabhoga* which is the consequence of destruction of *Upbhogantaraya Karma.*

7. Then the realisations of Omnipotence. *Ananta viriya* which is the result of complete eradication of *Viryantaray Karma.*

8. Then by this complete destruction of the seven *mula prakritis* (fundamental Karmas) happens *Kshâyika Samyaktvam* Absolute Belief in the true nature of Reality.

9. And finally *Kshâyika Châritra.* This implies the absolutely self-determined thought activity of the pure and perfect person *Siddha* or *Arhanta. This thought activity is again the consequence* of absolute emancipation from all *Upâdhis.*

The former class of *Labdhis* is always referred to as *Pancha Labdhi's* and the latter as *Navakevala Labdhis* in Sastras in order to avoid confusion. Therefore it is not necessary to emphasise the difference further.

It is enough to remember that Panch'a Labdhis have reference to (*Samsari Jiva,*) and Navakevala Labdhi to *Mukta Jiva.*

114.

Then Vyavahâra Samyak Darsana is described.

एवं जिणपण्णत्ते सद्दहमाणस्स भावदो भावे ।
पुरिसस्साभिणिबोहे दंसणसद्दो हवदि जुत्ते ॥ ११४ ॥

114. If a person who thus with great interest believes in the Padârthas revealed by Jina obtains Mati Jnâna. Then in his case the term Darsanika " he is a believer " has relevency.

COMMENTARY.

To believe in the real nature of Âtma and other Padârthas is *Vyavahâra Samyaktva.* Conventional or relative belief. This is the popular means of attaining salvation. The real immediate condition of salvation is the suppression or Annihilation of the *Sapta Prakritis* or *seven fundamental kinds of Kârmic matter.*

These are :—

1. Anantanubandhi Krodha.
2. Anantanubandhi Mâna.
3. Anantanubandhi Mâyâ.
4. Anantanubandhi Lobha.
5. Samyaktva.
6. Mithyâtva.
7. Samyak Mithyatva.

These seven constitute the Sapta Prakritis. The Prakritis 1 to 4 are sub-divisions of Charitra Mohaniya and the other three of Darsana Mohaniya.

If these get abated then there is the chance for *Samyak Darsana* or right belief.

115.

Then the description of the nature of the three Jewels or *Ratnatraya.*

सम्मत्तं सद्दहणं भावाणं तेसिमधिगमो णाणं ।
चारित्तं समभावो विसयेसु विरूढमग्गाणं ॥ ११५ ॥*

115. *Belief in the real existences or Tattvas is the right faith. Knowledge of their real nature without doubt or error is right knowledge. An attitude of neutrality without desire or aversion towards the objects of the external world is right conduct. These three are found in those who know the path.*

COMMENTARY.

The Gâtha may be interpreted either as referring to *Vyavahâra Ratnatraya* or to *Nischaya Ratnatraya*. The description of the three jewels may be consistent with the relative path or with the absolute path.

In describing Samyak Darsana and Samyak Jñâna right belief and knowledge, the author indicates the nine Padarthas which are the objects of the said belief and knowledge. The Second Book mainly treats of the nine Padarthas; And the description of the *Ratnatraya* may be considered as an indirect introduction to the Padarthas which are :—

1. Jiva = life.
2. Ajiva = non-life.
3. Pâpa = sin.
4. Punya = virtue.
5. Âsrava = flow-in of Karmas.
6. Samvara = the prevention of the incoming Karmas.
7. Nirjara = eradication of Karmas.
8. Bandha = bondage.
9. Moksha = liberation or emancipation.

The first two are the primary Padarthas and the others are derivative.

Sanskrit rendering :

सम्यक्त्वं श्रद्धानं भावानां तेषामधिगमो ज्ञानं ।
चारित्रं समभावो विषयेष्वविरूढमार्गाणाम् ॥ ११५ ॥

116.

Of the nine Padârthas or categories Moksha is the most important, as it is the goal of life. Hence *Ratnatraya* which is the means to realise the goal was first described. Then the nine categories or Padârthas are enumerated in detail.

जीवाजीवा भावा पुण्णं पावं च आसवं तेसिं ।
संवरणिज्जरबंधो मोक्खो य हवंति ते अट्ठा ॥ ११६ ॥*

116. Life and non-life (Jiva and Ajiva) are the two primary Padârthas. Out of these appear righteousness (Punya), sin (Pâpa), their source or inflow (Âsrava) their prevention (Samvara) their partial annihilation (Nirjarâ) Bondage (Bandha) and Salvation (Moksha). These are the nine Padârthas.

COMMENTARY.

Of these Jiva or life alone has consciousness Ajiva is so called because of the absence of consciousness. These are the five Dravyas mentioned previously matter, space, condition of motion and that of rest, and finally time. These five constitute the non-life Life and non-life are the root Padârthas. Seven other Padarthas enumerated above originate from the different relations of Jiva to Pudgala or matter.

Purity of thought in self is the subjective righteousness or Bhâva Punya. As conditioned by this there is the corresponding objective righteousness of Kârmic matter, or Dravya Punya. Similarly evil thought or the impurity of the heart is known as subjective sin or Bhâva Pâpa. As the result of this there is the Kârmic matter or Dravya -Pâpa, whose nature is vicious. The appearance of lust, desire, and aversion, is the subjective influx of Karmâs, Bhavâsrava. As the concomitent of these affective states Kârmic matter flows in towards the soul, which flowing is Dravyâsrava or the physical current of Karmâs Suppressing the states of lust, desire, and aversion

Sanskrit rendering :

जीवाजीवौ भावौ पुण्यं पापं चास्रवस्तयोः ।
संवरनिर्जराबन्धा मोक्षश्च भवन्ति ते अर्थाः ॥ ११६ ॥

by the principle of renunciation is the subjective inhibition or prevention which is *Bhâva Samvara*. This refers to the closing up of the spring of evil thought as the concomitant of this Psychic inhibition of evil, there appears the withering away of Kârmic matter which is *Dravya Nirjarâ*. *Moha* or spiritual stupor, desire, and aversion, these bring about a characteristic proneness, towards Kârmic matter in the nature of Jiva. This proneness towards the Kârmic environment is of the nature of Psychic disposition which spins out a cocoon of evil thoughts enshrouding the self. This is *Bhâva Bandha*. On account of this disposition there results the settling in of Kârmic matter on the Jiva. This is objective bondage or *Dravya Bandha*. Lastly realisation of the purest and perfect self after complete emancipation from evil is the subjective salvation or Bhâva Moksha. The absolute annihilation of Kârmic matter and the liberation of Jiva from the physical shackles is the objective Moksha or *Dravya Moksha*. In all these cases the Bhâva aspects refer to Jiva and the Dravya aspects to matter.

117.

Then the duality of Jiva the first of the Padarthas.

जीवा संसारत्था णिव्वादा चेदणप्पगा दुविहा ।
उवओगलक्खणा वि य देहादेहप्पवीचारा ॥ ११७ ॥*

117. Having the nature of consciousness, characterised by Upayoga—faculties of perception and understanding, Jivas are of two kinds. One incarnate of the world; and the other discarnate of heaven.

COMMENTARY.

Chetanâ or conscious nature and its manifestation through perception and understanding are the intrinsic characteristics of all Jivas which are of two classes. *Samsari Jivas and Mukta Jivas. The famer has the limitation of Upâdhis,* Samsari Jivas are always associated with some kind of body, gross or subtle. The Mukta Jiva

---

**Sanskrit rendering:*

जीवाः संसारस्था निर्वृताः चेतनात्मका द्विविधाः ।
उपयोगलक्षणा अपि च देहादेहप्रवीचाराः ॥ ११७ ॥

is free from such bodily limitations, because of complete emancipation from material conditions Kârmic and non Kârmic. As a result of *Upâdhis, Chetana* and *Upayoga* of the former get limited and encircled and as a result of the destruction of *Upâdhis* the very same become perfect and pure in the case of *Siddhas.*

The five kinds of Sariras have already been mentioned

118.

Samsâri souls are again twofold—fixed ones and the moving ones The fixed ones or the *Sthâvara* Jivas are here described.

पुढवी य उदगमगणी वाउवणप्फदिजीवसंसिदा काया?।
देंति खलु मोहवहुलं फासं वहुगा वि ते तेसिं ॥ ११८॥*

118. Vitalised by Jivas are the following bodies —Earth, water, fire, air, and also plants. These are many in number. They yield to their respective Jivas only one kind of feeling contact; and that too associated with highly intensified stupor of ignorance

COMMENTARY

This Gâtha refers to *Ekendriya* Jivas. *Jivas having only* one sense. These as a result of their Kârmic intensity may degenerate to such an extent as to be associated with the five kinds of physical objects enumerated above. Earth, water, fire, air and plants These kinds of physical objects are used as bodies by these Jivas.

There is no difficulty in understanding the organic nature of the plant world especially after the discoveries of Dr. Bose, it is not necessary to elaborately defend that plants are living organisms. But the organic nature of the other four kinds, earth, water, fire and air, is somewhat obscure The commentators themselves do not help *us in the difficulty,* so much so, that some of the European Scholars who have studied Jainism have come to the conclusion that Jainism is very primitive since it believes *in the existence of souls in material* and inorganic things. This argument of the existence of primitive

*†*Sanskrit rendering*

पृथिवी चोदकमग्निर्वायुर्वनस्पती जीवसंश्रिताः कायाः।
ददति खलु मोहबहुलं स्पर्शं बहुका अपि ते तेषां ॥ ११८ ॥

beliefs in Jaina system is brought forward in favour of the antiquity of Jainism. Certainly it is very pleasing to be assured of a hoary past; but it is no compliment to Jainism if its beliefs are identified with the primitive notions of the Hottentot.

It is almost incredible to believe that Jaina thinkers with their uncompromising dualistic attitude accepted the doctrine that *Achetana* physical objects had souls of their own. The definitions of Jiva and Pudgala are clearly unmistakable There is no possibility of any confusion. Mutually they are as much contradictory to a Jaina thinker as to a *cartecian* philosopher.

The clue to the difficulty is supplied by the doctrine that the four kinds of *Ekendriya* Jivas associated with fire, air, earth and water are *Sukshma Ekendriya* Jivas, *i.e.*, microscopic organisms *having only one sense.* That the Jainas believed in the existence of microscopic organisms needs no elaborate evidence. The rules of conduct prescribed for Jaina *Grahastas and Yatis* are sufficient testimony. Again this interpretation is further strengthened by the following point. All the five kinds of *Sthavara* Jivas are considered *to have four kinds of Prâṇâs or life principles.*

1. Feelings of Contact.
2. *Kayabala Prâṇa* or strength of body.
3. *Uchhvâsa Nischvasa Prâṇa* or respiration.
4. *Ayuh Prâṇâ* or duration of life.

To suppose that these four Prâṇâs are associated with really inorganic bodies would be inconsistent with the other aspects of the system. Therefore it is incumbent upon us to emphasize that the Jivas associated with inorganic bodies are mainly *Sukshma Ekendriya* Jivas or microscopic organisms; for it is only with an organism that Prâṇâs can be consistently associated.

This does not remove all our difficulties. Whether there can be organisms associated with fire is still an unintelligible problem. We don't want to dogmatise on the matter. Evidently for the sake of symmetry fire is added on to the enumeration of the other kinds of physical forms. We can only confess that the doctrine for want of sufficient light from the commentators remains a very obscure part of Jaina thought leading to strange conjectures. Where there

is scope for speculation we beg to offer our own Hypothesis as an *alternative interpretation.'*

119.

These have monosensic and non Psychic vitalism.

एदे जीवणिकाया पंचविहा पुढविकाइयादीया ।
मणपरिणामविरहिदा जीवा एगेंदिया भणिया ॥ ११९ ॥*

119. These Jivas such as the earth-bodied ones are of five different castes. All of them are devoid of mental states. They have a single sense. *So are they described in the* scripture.

COMMENTARY.

The author points out that these *Stharara* Jivas are utterly devoid of Psychic states. They have only one kind of feeling of contact. *This description indicates a difference between the botanical and* the zoological realms and the *Sukshma Ekendriyas* or the microscopic organisms of the four kinds also share the nature of the plant world.

120

Though devoid of mental states they are not non-conscious in essence. Really they are to be considered as unconscious but not *non-conscious. The author explains by illustration their unconscious* nature.

अंडेसु पवड्ढंता गब्भत्था माणुसा य मुच्छगया ।
जारिसया तारिसया जीवा एगेंदिया णेया: ॥ १२० ॥†

120. Just as life or *Chetana* is associated with unconsciousness in the *following cases eggs, foetus growing in mother's* womb and the man in a trance so also the monosensic

---

*Sanskrit rendering

एते जीवनिकायाः पञ्चविधाः पृथ्वीकायिकाद्याः ।
मनःपरिणामविरहिता जीवा एकेन्द्रिया भणिताः ॥ ११९ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering :—

अण्डेषु प्रवर्धमाना गर्भस्था मानुषाश्च मूर्च्छां गताः ।
यादृशास्तादृशा जीवा एकेन्द्रिया ज्ञेयाः ॥ १२० ॥

organisms are unconscious, though having life or Chetana. Thus be it understood.

COMMENTARY.

The author establishes that these monosensic beings have life and also potential Chetanâ or consciousness. It is ordinarily acknowledged that there is life and consciousness in the germ in the case of eggs, foetuses, and in men in trance. Here unconsciousness is no objection to the belief of their living nature. Similarly these monosensic organisms though devoid of consciousness have life and potensy for consciousness.

121

Then the author by way of illustration enumerates some of the organisms having two sense organs.

संवुक्कमादुवाहा संखा सप्पी अपागदा य किमी ।
जाणंति रसं फासं जे ते वे इंदिया जीवाः ॥ १२१ ॥*

121. Sea snail, cowrie shell fish, conch shell fish, mother o'pearl and earth-worm are organisms which have two senses, touch and taste. Hence are they bisensic.

122.

Then author enumerates some of the organisms having three senses.

जूगागुंभीमक्कणपिपीलया विच्छियादिया कीडा ।
जाणंति रसं फासं गंधं ते इंदिया जीवा ॥ १२२ ॥†

122. The louce, the bug, the red and ordinary scorpion, the ant and other insects have three senses are triaesthetic.

*Sanskrit rendering :—

संबूकमातृवाहाः शङ्खाः शुक्तयोऽपादकाः कृमयः ।
जानन्ति रसं स्पर्शं ये ते द्वीन्द्रियाः जीवाः ॥ १२१ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering :—

यूकाकुम्भीमत्कुणपिपीलिका वृश्चिकादयः कीटाः ।
जानन्ति रसं स्पर्शं गन्धं त्रीन्द्रियाः जीवाः ॥ १२२ ॥

123.

Then the author enumerates some of the organisms having four senses.

उद्दंसमसयमक्खियमधुकरभमरा पतंगमादीया ।
रूपं रसं च गन्धं फासं पुण ते वि जाणंति ॥ १२३ ॥*

123. Again, the Gadfly, the mosquito, the fly, the bee, the beetle and the dragon fly and the butterfly—These organisms experience, touch, taste, smell and sight hence they are quadraesthetic—have four senses.

124.

Then the beings with five senses, are enumerated.

सुरणरणारयतिरिया वण्णरसप्फासगंधसद्दण्हू ।
जलचरथलजरखचरा वलिया पंचेंदिया जीवा ॥ १२४ ॥†

124. *Devas*, human beings, hell beings, and higher animals all these have five senses; colour, taste, smell, touch and sound Some of the animals are water animals, some land animals and some birds of the air. There are very strong ones also among these

COMMENTARY.

The classification of *Jivâs* according to sense organs is based more upon the behaviour of insects and animals, than on the structure. In the case of bisensic insects given in *Gâthâ* 121, the classification seems to be correct. Taking the sea snail for example it has touch all over the body and very sensitive in the tentacles on the head. It has no tongue but the base of the respiratory organs determines the kind of water that should enter the respiratory chamber The mobile lips

**Sanskrit rendering.*—

उद्दंशमशकमक्षिका मधुकरी भ्रमराः पतङ्गाद्या. ।
रूपं रसं च गन्धं स्पर्शं पुनस्तेऽपि जानन्ति ॥ १२३ ॥

†*Sanskrit rendering.*—

सुरनरनारकतिर्यञ्चो वर्णरसस्पर्शगन्धशब्दज्ञाः ।
जलचरस्थलचरखचरा बलिनः पञ्चेन्द्रिया जीवाः ॥ १२४ ॥

of the snail also act as gustatory orgns There is no special auditory organ but there is an organ in the foot, called the otocyst which enables the creature to keep its balance in the water. This evidently corresponds to the semicircular canals of the human ear whose functiors is to determine the positions of our body in space. Generally they have some sensitive parts to light also, but this is not considered as an eye by the author. *Cowrie*, conch, and mother of pearl do have similar structures and ordinary earth-worms also have the *sense* of contact and some kind of gustatory sense. In their case also the skin is sensitive to light, but it is treated as insignificant.

Next in the case of organisms with three senses the enumeration contains some dubious specimens. The louce and the bug have the sense of touch, taste and smell Ants also have these three senses But some of them have sight also. But ordinarily their sense of smell is the most predominent. Lord Avebury *Sir John Lubbock* after several years of patient observation comes to the conclusion that ants become aware of objects in the environment only through smell But in the case of *caterpillars and scorpions there are eyes. But anyhow* they are included under this class.

In the next class are included the mosquitoes, flies, bees, etc. These insects have clearly four senses Contact, taste, smell and sight. But in the case of some for example, beetle and the bee a peculiar humming sound is produced. Naturalists suppose that these insects must respond to sound and they have some organ in the abdomen which *is supposed to be responsive to sound vibrations.* Whether what they experience is sound or some other vague sensation of contact nobody can be certain. Therefore we may take the author's description as almost accurate. Lastly many of the higher animals and human beings are included under the next class, five sensed organisms. They have also sense of hearing to boot. But the distinction between other higher animals and human beings is *that the latter have a well developed consciousness These are Samanaska Panchendriya Jivas*, where as the other *Panchendriya Jivas* are devoid of mind. Evidently the distinction implies the presence of self-consciousness in the one class and the absence of the same in the other.

125.

Then the author enumerates the several subspecies of the four

fundamental kinds of *Jivas* already differentiated according to the four *gatis*.

देवा चउण्णिकाया मणुया पुण कम्मभोगभूमीया ।
तिरिया बहुप्पयारा णेरइया पुढविभेयगदा ॥ १२५ ॥*

125. *Devas* are of four classes. Human beings are of two classes. Inhabitants of *Karma Bhoomi* and those of *Bhoga Bhoomi*. Animals are of numerous kinds. Hell beings of seven according to their respective regions.

COMMENTARY.

This *Gâtha* presupposes the peculiar Jaina cosmogony. According to the Jainas *Loka* is arranged in three orders, the lower world, the middle world and the upper world. In the upper world there are different regions one above the other, so also in the lower world. The different regions of the upper world are inhabited by *Devas*; the different regions of the lower world one below the other are inhabited by beings thrown into hell The conception is something analogus to that of *Dante*.

This *Gâtha* classifies *jivas* according to the principle of *gati*, *i.e.*, the principle of *gatimargana*. But the previous *gathâs* had the clasification according to the principle of sense organs or *Indriya Marganâ*.

Devas are said to be of four kinds:—

Vide—*Tattvartha Sutra Chapter IV*, *Bhavanavasis*, *Vyantaras*, *Jyotishkas*, *kalpavasis*, or *Vaimanikas* Each class is further subdivided into several species. Each sub class has its own special characteristics physical and Psychical, and has the characteristic periods of life. It is not possible to enter into the details.

The hell beings are seven. According to the hells inhabited by them. The seven hells are, *Ratna Prabha*, *Sarkara Prabha*, *Valuka*, *Panka*, *Dhuma*, *Tama*, and *Maha Tama*. The hell beings again have their respective characteristics of suffering, age, and other

*Sanskrit rendering:—

देवाश्चतुर्निकायाः मनुजा पुनः कर्मभोगभूमिजाः ।
तिर्यञ्चः बहुप्रकाराः नारकाः पृथिवीभेदगताः ॥ १२५ ॥

Psycho-physical characteristics with graduated intensity. These two classes of beings are only of doctrinal importance to us.

Coming to human beings and animals the principle of classification is much simpler The animals are recognised to be of numerous species, and human beings again are divided into two classes those born in *Karma Bhoomi* and those born in *Bhoga Bhoomi*. This classification is again only the result of the peculiar geography of the Jaina system. Geography and cosmogany form an important branch of Jaina Literature. It is one of the four *Anuyogas*. Jainas recognise four main departments of their Scripture. (1) *Prathamânuyoga* dealing with the life of the *Tirthankaras* and the other great personalities. (2) *Karananuyoga* dealing with the structure and constitution of *Lokâ*, the cosmos (3) *Charanânuyoga*, dealing with principles of conduct prescribed for the householder as well as *Sannyâsi*. (4) *Dravyanuyoga* dealing with the metaphysical aspects of reality. Jainas whenever they speak of *Jivas* and other *Dravyas*, always assume the special constitution of the world according to their religious dogma. If more detailed knowledge of these things is desired reference must be made to treatises on *Lokaswarupa* or the form of the world.

126

Jivas described according to the different *Gati Marganas*, are not to be supposed to maintain that state permanently. *Jivas* undergo several modifications assuming different states of existence with the different durations of life Thus do they roam about in *Samsara*.

खीणे पुव्वणिबद्धे गदिणामे आउसे च ते वि खलु ।
पापुण्णंति य अण्णं गदिमाउस्सं सलेसवसा ॥ १२६ ॥*

126. When the existing Karmas determining the *gati* and the age of a *Jiva*, decay, then that *Jiva* get into another *gati* with a different duration of life as determined by its last conative state or aspiration known as *Lesyâ*.

**Sanskrit rendering*:—

क्षीणे पूर्वनिबद्धे गतिनाम्नि आयुषि च तेऽपि खलु ।
प्राप्नुवन्ति चान्यां गतिमायुष्कं स्वलेश्यावशात् ॥ १२६ ॥

COMMENTARY.

The *Gati* or state of existence of a particular *Jiva* is determined by a particular *Karma* known as *Gatinâmakarma*. So is the duration of a particular *Jiva* determined by *Ayuh Karma*. When these two *Karmas* exhaust themselves to the very last then age of the *Jiva* will come to an end and the *Jiva* has to change its state of existence *i. e.* it will have to enter into another *Gati* with a different duration of life. This entrance into the next state is generally determined by *Karmas* acquired during the lifetime But the fundamental factor which immediately determines the passage into the other stage must be determined by *Gatinamakarma* and *Ayuh Karma* of the succeeding stage. *Jiva* before quitting a particuler *Gati* acquires these two fresh Karmas determined by the last conative state or *Lesya*. The term *Lesyâ* is used not in its usual sense In this place it implies merely the particular activity of *Yoga* or *Mana, vachana, kaya*, manifesting in the last desire or aspiration of life. This *lesyâ* may be pure or impure according to the ideal aimed at. And according to its value it forms the two *Karmas* in their pure form or impure form. According to the determining antecedent *Karmas* the *Jiva* incarnates in a particular place with a particular body and with particular Psycho-physical development. Thus he may have a pleasant life or drag on a miserable existence.

127.

But the *Samsâric* cycle is not eternal for *Jiva*. On account of *Labdhis* or lucky spiritual attainments a *Jiva* may realise the three jewels. Then it may free itself from *Kârmic* matter as gold is purified from drops. Then it is the pure self.

एदे जीवणिकाया देहप्पविचारमस्सिदा भणिदा ।
देहविहूणा सिद्धा भव्वा संसारिणो अभव्वा य ॥१२७॥*

127. These different classes of *Jivas* are again said to be of two kinds: incarnate ones and discarnate ones. The latter are *Siddhas*; whereas (the former) are the *samsari* souls who are again of two species *Bhavyas* and *Abhavyas*.

**Sanskrit rendering*:

एते जीवनिकाया देहप्रविचारमाश्रिता भणिताः ।
देहविहीनाः सिद्धाः भव्याः संसारिणोऽभव्याश्च ॥ १२७ ॥

COMMENTARY.

Here the author summarises the nature of *Jivas*. The first principle of division is the possession of a body. All the incarnate ones are said to be *Samsari Jivas* and all the discarnate once are *Siddha Jivas* or pure souls. But the former class is again sub-divided; the principle of division being the capacity to become perfect. Those *Samsari Jivas* which have this capacity under special opportunities are called *Bhavyas* whereas those *Samsari Jivas* which have no such capacity are called *Abhavyas.*

This distinction of *Samsari Jivas* into *Bhavyas* and *Abhavyas* corresponds to Drummond's division of souls into organic and inorganic. The organic souls, given the proper opportunity, have the capacity to develop and attain spiritual perfection; whereas inorganic ones have no such capacity of spiritual growth This is one of the Jaina religious dogmas whose metaphysical basis is not quite clear. Most probably the distinction is as arbitrary as that of Drummond's.

128.

The five senses and the six bodies examined above are not essential elements of *Jiva.*

ण हि इंदियाणि जीवा काया पुण छप्पयार पण्णत्ता ।
जं हवदि तेसु णाणं जीवो त्ति य तं परूवंति ॥ १२८ ॥*

128. The five senses and the six kinds of bodies mentioned above these are not of the essence of soul. Whatever in the midst of these manifests as consciousness that they call by the name *Jiva.*

COMMENTARY.

The sense organs and the various bodies are associated with Jiva only from the conventional point of veiw. The very same characteristics are really its accidental adjuncts. Senses such as touch taste, etc. and bodies such as earth body, etc., are not *Jiva,* because they have

*Sanskrit rendering :

नहीन्द्रियाणि जीवाः कायाः पुनः षट्प्रकाराः प्रज्ञप्ताः ।
यद्भवति तेषु ज्ञानं जीव इति च तत्प्ररूपयन्ति ॥ १२८ ॥

nothing in common with the thought which is the true nature of *Jiva*. But in the midst of these sense organs and physical conditions there is the principle of consciousness which sheds light upon itself and other objects, *i.e.* which manifests as knowledge of the subject and the object. That thinking thing is said to be *Jiva* or soul.

129.

Then the author mentions the special characteristics of *Jiva*, characteristics which distinguish *Jiva* from material and other *Dravyas*

जाणदि पस्सदि सव्वं इच्छदि सुक्खं विभेदि दुक्खादो।
कुव्वदि हिदमहिदं वा भुंजदि जीवो फलं तेसिं ॥१२९॥*

129. *What knows and perceives the various objects*, desires pleasure and dreads pain, acts beneficially or harmfully and experiences the fruit thereof—that is *Jivá*.

COMMENTARY.

In this *Gátha* the characteristic behaviour of *Jivá* is described. What is mentioned to be consciousness in the previous *Gátha* is here indicated by several purposeful activities which have meaning only with *reference to consciousness*. *Perception* and *understanding* of objects are the function of *Jiva* or consciousness. This function cannot be associated with matter. So also is the tendency to desire pleasure and to avoid pain. It is distinctly the nature of life to continue beneficial activity and to discontinue harmful activity. Such *conduct can have reference only to Jivá. Inorganic mechanical* activity can never exhibit such purposive nature These various instances of purposeful activity as against mechanical activity clearly mark out *Jivá* from the other *Dravyas* The whole *gathá* then may be taken as the definition *of Jivá through its* behaviour.

130.*

The author summarises the characteristics of *Jivá Padartha* in the first half of the *Gátha* and introduces the other *Padarthas* in the second half.

**Sanskrit rendering* :

जानाति पश्यति सर्वमिच्छति सौख्यं बिभेति दुःखात्।
करोति हितमहितं वा भुङ्क्ते जीवः फलं तयोः ॥ १२९ ॥

एवमभिगम्म जीवं अण्णेहिं वि पज्जएहिं बहुगेहिं ।
अभिगच्छदु अज्जीवं णाणंतरिदेहिं लिंगेहिं ॥ १३० ॥*

130. Thus having seen the nature of *Jiva* through the numerous and distinct characteristics, well do thou grasp the nature of non-life that is absolutely of non-thinking nature.

COMMENTARY.

The author generalises the characteristics of *Jiva*. *Jiva* and its modifications were studied under different principles of *Gunasthana* and *Margnasthana*. In all these multifarious changes there is the one constant character of *Jiva*-consciousness or, thought. Thought may exist in its impure form in *Samsara* and in its pure and perfect form is *Moksha*. Whether pure or impure *chetana* is the fundamental nature of life. Before introducing the other *Padarthas* the author emphasizes the fact that consciousness should not be associated with *Ajiva* or non-life. The absence of consciousness is the mark of *Ajiva*. Its activity or change is purely mechanical and non-teleological. We are asked to remember this fundamental nature of *Ajiva* before the author describes the *Ajiva Padartha* or non-life. Thus ends the chapter on *Jiva Padartha*,

131. Chapter on Ajiva Padartha.

Then the author enumerates the different Ajiva Padarthas Taking absence of consciouness as the mark of Ajiva

आगासकालपुग्गलधम्माधम्मेसु णत्थि जीवगुणा ।
तेसिं अचेदणत्तं भणिदं जीवस्स चेदणदा ॥ १३१ ॥†

COMMENTARY.

Consciousness is not the only reality. There are several *Achetana* or nonconscious entities which are grouped under *Ajiva Padartha.* In this respect Jaina thought is fundamentally distinct from the idealism which admits the reality of only one thing, consciousness. One tendency in philosophic thought tries to reduce everything to consciousness. The other tendency tries to maintain that matter alone is real and everything is unreal and derivative Both these extremes are avoided by Jaina thought. There are conscious entities as well as non-conscious entities constituting the system of reality.

This *Gatha* is said to be the condemnation of the *advaitic* view that everything is *Brahma*

132

In this *Gâtha* the author explains what *Achetanatva* or non-consciousness means

सुहदुक्खजाणणा वा हिदपरियम्मं च अहिदभीरुत्तं ।
जस्स ण विज्जदि णिच्चं तं समणा विंति अज्जीवं ॥१३२॥*

132. Wherever such attributes of life are never found as the feeling of pleasure and pain, desiring only the beneficial activity and avoiding the harmful activity that the wise ones call *Ajiva* or non-life

COMMENTARY.

What is *achetanatva* the characteristic of *Ajiva Padarthas* ? That which has not got the fundamental characteristics of life. These characters are feeling pleasure, pain, continuing beneficial activity and avoiding harmful activity. Whatever is devoid of these characteristics is Ajiva. This may be taken as negative definition.

133

Though matter in the form of *karma* and *no-karma* is intimately related to *Jiva* yet it is quite distinct in nature.

**Sanskrit rendering* :

सुखदुःखज्ञानं वा हितपरिकर्म चाहितभीरुत्वं ।
यस्य न विद्यते नित्यं तं श्रमणा विंदंत्यजीवं ॥ १३२ ॥

संठाणा संघादा वण्णरसप्फासगंधसद्दा य ।
पोग्गलदव्वप्पभवा होंति गुणा पज्जया य बहू ॥१३३॥*

133. From, structure, colour, taste, touch, smell and sound, these are associated with matter. They are again of various kinds They are either attributes or modes of matter.

COMMENTARY.

The physical attributes are colour, taste, smell, sound and touch. Each of these is again of many kinds. Configuration or form is innumerable according to the different forms of physical objects. Combination or structure is of infinite kinds The structure of *skandhas* from two atoms onwards is referred to. These are modes of matter. These modifications may be organic related to life or inorganic. Just as the inorganic matter is distinct from life so also this organic matter distinct from it though associated with it.

134

If form, structure and other characteristics are not to be associated with *Jiva* than what is the real nature of Jiva.

अरसमरूवमगंधमव्वत्तं चेदणागणमसद्दं ।
जाण अलिंगग्गहणं जीवमणिद्दिट्ठसंठाणं ॥१३४॥†

134. Understand that life has no sense qualities of taste, smell colour, touch and sound. It has no form either. It has only thought or consciousness.

COMMENTARY.

The several sense qualities associated with matter are not present in *Jiva*. *Jiva* or life is not to be apprehended through sense perception Its nature is not to be inferred through any of its sense qualities for

*Sanskrit rendering:

संस्थानानि संघाताः वर्णरसस्पर्शगन्धशब्दाश्च ।
पुद्गलद्रव्यप्रभवा भवन्ति गुणाः पर्यायाश्च बहवः ॥ १३३ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering:

अरसमरूपमगन्धमव्यक्तं चेतनागुणमशब्दं ।
जानीह्यलिङ्गग्रहणं जीवमनिर्दिष्टसंस्थानं ॥ १३४ ॥

it has no such attributes. Again it has no form corresponding to that of physical objects. *Jiva* is formless being spiritual. Such are the characteristics of life and consciousness.

Thus ends the Ajiva Padartha.

135, 136 & 137

After describing the primary categories of life and non-life the author goes to seven other derivative *Padarthas*, originating from either the synthesis or analysis of the two primary ones. *Jiva* and *Kârmic* matter are the primary generating categories for the rest. Hence these two are taken up here for examination

जो खलु संसारत्थो जीवो तत्तो दु होदि परिणामो ।
परिणामादो कम्मं कम्मादो होदि गदिसु गदी ॥१३५॥
गदिमधिगदस्स देहो देहादो इंदियाणि जायंते ।
तेहिं दु विसयग्गहणं तत्तो रागो व दोसो वा ॥१३६॥
जायदि जीवस्सेवं भावो संसारचक्कवालम्मि ।
इदि जिणवरेहिं भणिदो अणादिणिधणो सणिधणोवा१३७

135—7. To a *Jiva* in *Samsara* desire and aversion will naturally occur. On account of these states Karmic matter clings to the *Jiva*. The *Karmic* bondage leads the *Jiva* through the four *Gatis* or states of existences. Entering into the *Gati*, Jiva builds up its own appropriate body, being embodied he gets the senses. Through the sense objects of the environment are pursued. From perception appears desire or aversion towards those objects and from desire the cycle begins again.

*Sanskrit rendering

यः खलु संसारस्थो जीवस्ततस्तु भवति परिणामः ।
परिणामात्कर्म कर्मणो भवति गतिषु गतिः ॥ १३५ ॥
गतिमधिगतस्य देहो देहादिन्द्रियाणि जायन्ते ।
तैस्तु विषयग्रहणं ततो रागो वा द्वेषो वा ॥ १३६ ॥
जायते जीवस्यैवं भावः संसारचक्रवाले ।
इति जिनवरैर्भणितोऽनादिनिधनः सनिधनो वा ॥ १३७ ॥

Thus desire brings *Karma*, *Karma* leads to *gati*, *gati*, means body, body implies senses, senses lead to perception, and perception again to desire or aversion and so on *adinfinitum*. But the cycle ends in the case of *Bhavya Jiva* whereas it is unending to the *Abhavyas*. But it has no beginning in either case. Thus is it taught by the *Jina*, the conqueror of *Samsâra*.

COMMENTARY.

The author describes the causal series that constitute the cycle of *Samsara Jiva* according to Jaina doctrine is enshrowded by *Kârmic* conditions from eternity. On account of this association with *Kârmic* matter *Jiva* experiences the emotional states of desire, etc. These emotional states are conditioned by the *Kârmic upâdhis*. But these states in their turn bring about the acquisition of fresh *Kârmic* matter. The acquisition of *Kârmic* matter means that the *Jiva* should manifest in any one of the four *gatis* Manifestation means embodied existence. Body implies sense organs. Sense organs again are the windows for the soul to apprehend the environment. Awareness of the objects in the environment generates the affective states in the soul. These affective states once again begin the series of the above mentioned causal series.

Thus by the mutual interaction between mind and matter there appears the cycle of *Samsara*. In the case of the fortunates ones who are capable of spiritual emancipation this whirligig comes to an end. But in the case of the unfortunate ones who are incapable of spiritual salvation the cycle goes on for ever.

138

THEN THE CHAPTER ON *PUNYA* AND *PÂPA* OR VIRTUE AND VICE.

After describing the veil of *samsara* which is the condition of the nine catagories or *padarthas* the author examines *Punya* and *Pâpa* and their respective Psychic antecedents.

मोहो रागो दोसो चित्तपसादो य जस्स भावम्मि ।
विज्जदि तस्स सुहो वा असुहो वा होदि परिणामो ॥१३८॥*

*Sanskrit rendering:
मोहो रागो द्वेषश्चित्तप्रसादश्च यस्य भावे ।
विद्यते तस्य शुभो वा अशुभो वा भवति परिणामः ॥ १३८ ॥

138. Whatever *Jiva* has in himself *Moha* ,corrupting the faculty of belief, desire and aversion, or the purity of thought is subject to the hedonic state of happiness or misery.

COMMENTARY.

The Psychological conditions determining virtue and vice are described. *Moha* is the mental state brought about by the ripening of *Darsana Mohaniya Karma.* The *Kárma* that clouds the faculty of perception and belief. *Raga* and *Dvesha,* desire and aversion, are the result of *Charitra Mohaniya* The karma that misleads the will while the former misleads cognition Thus when cognition and will are determined by the *Kármic* conditions they may manifest in Volitional states marked by virtue or vice. If the objects of cognition and will is desirable and good then the mental state is *Subha Parinama.* If it is undesirable and bad then the mental state is *Asubha Parinama* In the former case there results happiness to the individual whereas in the latter misery.

139

Next the author describes the subjective states of good and evil *Bhava Punya Pápa* and their corresponding *karmic* conditions or *Dravya Punya Papa.*

सुहपरिणामो पुण्णं असुहो पावंति हवदि जीवस्स ।
दोण्हं पोग्गलमत्तो भावो कम्मत्तणं पत्तो ॥१३९॥*

139. Good will or pure thought is righteousness. Bad will or evil thought is sin. Conditioned by these two mental states of the *Jiva* the classes of *karmic* molecules which are physical in nature undergo modifications and manifest as *Dravya karmas* such as *jñánavarniya.*

COMMENTARY.

Pure thought is *Bháva Punya.* This conditions *Dravya Punya,* the *Kármic* matter facilitating the purity of the heart. Evil thought is *Bháva Pápa* sinning in the heart. This conditions the *Dravya*

*Sanskrit rendering:

शुभपरिणामः पुण्यमशुभः पापमिति भवति जीवस्य ।
द्वयोः पुद्गलमात्रो भावः कर्मत्वं प्राप्त. ॥ १३९ ॥

Pâpa which aggrevates the evil disposition of the soul. Thus from the Psychic conditions which are *amurta* their result the different *Cârmic* modifications which are physical and *murta*. Thus the *Bhâva karmas* and the *Dravya kârmas* are mutually interacting.

140

He establishes that *karmic* matter is physical in nature and therefore is *Murta*.

जह्मा कम्मस्स फलं णिसयं फासेहिं भुंजदे णियदं ।
जीवेण सुहं दुक्खं तह्मा कम्माणि मुत्ताणि ॥१४०॥*

140. Because the fruits of *karma* the objects of happiness or misery are experienced by *Jiva* through the sensations of touch, etc , therefore the *karmas* are physical and *Mûrta*.

COMMENTARY.

The fruit of *karma* is either a desirable or an undesirable object pleasant or unpleasent to the *jiva* This object is experienced through sense perception. Senses are physical, objects apprehended through the sense organs are also physical. Therefore the *kârmic* effects are physical and *Murta*. Cause and effect are identical. Therefore the author concludes that the *karmâs* themselves are physical and *Murta*. Since their effects are physical Of course this refers to *Dravya karmas*.

141

Karmas past or present are physical and *Murta*. *Samsari Jiva*, because of its *Karmas* is also physical and *Murta*. Hence there is the chance for fresh accretion of *Karmâs*. Hence the liability to continued bondage.

मुत्तो फासदि मुत्तं मुत्तो मुत्तेण बंधमणुहवदि ।
जीवो मुत्तिविरहिदो गाहदि ते तेहिं उग्गहदि ॥१४१॥†

141. Past Karma which is physical in nature comes into contact with the present Karma which is also physical in nature.

---

*Sanskrit rendering :
यस्मात्कर्मणः फलं विषयः स्पर्शैर्भुज्यते नियतं ।
जीवेन सुखं दुःखं तस्मात्कर्माणि मूर्त्तानि ॥ १४० ॥

†Sanskrit rendering :
मूर्त्तः स्पृशति मूर्त्तं मूर्त्तो मूर्त्तेन बन्धमनुभवति ।
जीवो मूर्त्तिविरहितो गाहति तानि तैरवगाह्यते ॥ १४१ ॥

Thus existing *Kârmic* matter enters into combination with incoming Kârmic matter *Jiva* though in itself spiritual and *Amûrta* is certainly corporeal (in its *Samsâric* state) because of its coeval *Karmas* Therefore it absorbs the fresh *Kârmice* matter and is absorbed by that (because of mutual attraction of molecules)

COMMENTARY

In this *Gatha* the author explains how there could be a contact between *Jiva* and *Karma* which are *Amurta* and *Murta* respectively That there is the possibility of combination among physical molecules is accepted by all and it is a fundamental presupposition of Jaina thought that Jiva is in *Samsara* to start with, i e it is from time immemorial associated with *Karmic* matter • Because of this associated *Karma*, *Jiva* itself has body and is *Murta* Because of this intimate association with *Karmic* matter there is the chance for fresh bondage and *Samsara* The *Gatha* must be taken as an explanation of the perpetuity of the *Samsaric* cycle Given the initial presupposition that *Jiva* in its natural state exists in *Karmic* bondage then we can understand the reason for the *samaric* cycle from bondage to *Gati* and *Gati* to bondage and so on The series of causality is certainly assumed to be infinite i e without beginning though it may come to an end with the emancipation An infinite past is not a mathematical impossibility Therefore though it is admitted that the series may come to an end it need not necessarily have a beginning Through the infinite causal interaction therefore, a *Jiva* may acquire fresh *Karmas* though in itself it is spiritual and *Amurta* Thus ends the chapter on *Punya Pâpa Padarthas*

142

CHAPTER ON *Âsrava Padârtha*

Asrava means the *fountain source of righteousness or sin* First the *Punyasrava* or the spring of virtue is taken for description

रागो जस्स पसत्थो अणुकंपासंसिदो य परिणामो ।
चित्ते णत्थि कलुस्सं पुण्णं जीवस्स आसवदि ॥१४२॥*

*Sanskrit rendering

रागो यस्य प्रशस्तोऽनुकम्पासंश्रितश्च परिणामः ।
चित्ते नास्ति कालुष्यं पुण्यं जीवस्यास्रवति ॥ १४२ ॥

142. Whatever *Jiva* has desires, high and noble, thoughts based on love and sympathy and in whose mind there are no evil impulses towards the same, the pure *Kârmic* matter flows in as conditioned by the above mentioned springs of righteousness.

COMMENTARY.

Noble desires and thoughts of charity are the springs of right conduct—*Bhâva punyasrava*, as conditioned by these springs there flows *Punya Dravya Karma* pure *Kârmic* matter into the soul: noble desires and pure thoughts, those springs of subjective righteousness may be followed by objectively evil deeds if they have not the co-operation of *Samyak Darsana* or right belief. But if those springs are saturated with right belief then there is no confict between subjective states and objective conduct. The subjectively pure springs of conduct have the chance of being succeeded by series of right conduct till the attainment of heavenly bliss. In short subjective purity unaccompanied by right belief will still keep the soul tied to the wheel of life whereas the same in association with the right belief will gradually lead the soul to *Nirvâna*.

143

Then the nob'e desires are i lustrated.

अरहंतसिद्धसाहुसु भत्ती धम्मम्मि जा य खलु चेट्ठा ।
अणुगमणं पि गुरूणं पसत्थरागो त्ति वुच्चंति ॥१४३॥*

143. Love and devotion towards *Arahanta*, *Siddha* and *Sadhus*, living according to the rules of conduct household and ascetic, and faithfully following the Masters, these are said to be the noble ideals.

COMMENTARY.

Noble ideals are associated with noble objects deserving of worship and devotion. These are what are known as the *Pancha Parameshtis*, *Arahantâs*, *Siddhâs*, *Sâdhus*, *Acharyâs* and *Upadyayâs*. The term *Arahanta* denotes a perfected being who is still in the world, i.e., who

*Sanskrit rendering.

अर्हत्सिद्धसाधुषु भक्तिर्धर्मे या च खलु चेष्टा ।
अनुगमनमपि गुरूणां प्रशस्तराग इति ब्रुवन्ति (?) ॥ १४३ ॥

has still his bodily state It corresponds to the term *Sayogakevali*, the person who attained *Keval gyana* or perfect knowledge and who still has *Yoga* or *Mana vachana Kaya* The term *Siddha* represents the perfect soul, without the *Yoga* or *Mana vachana Kaya* *Sadhu* represents the great ones who are on the path of perfection It represents mainly the *Yatis* who havs attained great spiritual advancement through *Tapas* *Ācharya* represents the organiser of the *Sangham*, the chief of a group of ascetics as well as the householders The term *Upadhyāya* represents the great religious teachers whose function it is to instruct the people lay and ascetic about the chief tenets of religion and also about the rules of conduct Reverence and devotion to these great ones and a desire to follow the path marked out by them constitute the noble aspiration which leads to *Punya*

144

Then *Anukmpa* or charity is described

तिसिदं वुभुक्खिदं वा दुहिदं दट्ठूण जो दु दुहिदमणो ।
पडिवज्जदि त किवया तस्सेसा होदि अणुकंपा ॥१४४॥*

144 If anyone moved at the sight of the thirsty, the hungry, and the miserable offers relief to them out of pity, then such behaviour of that person is love or charity

COMMENTARY

This is the second condition generating *Punya Bhava* or the good will The act of charity implies two things The feeling of sympathy at the sight of the needy and the sufferers and secondly active relief to them Mere feeling of sympathy is ineffective Active relief as the result of the feeling of sympathy is essential to charity This kind of charity is common to the ordinary mortals and it manifests in only temporary relief But in the case of the wise ones *Anukampa* or charity manifests in a higher form at the sight of the struggling souls in the ocean of *Samsara* they manifest a generons sympathy and help them towards emancipation Thus *Anukampa* is of two kinds lower and higher according as its result is temporary and superficial or radical and permanent

---

**Sanskrit rendering*

तृषितं बुभुक्षितं वा दुःखितं दृष्ट्वा यस्तु दुःखितमनाः ।
प्रतिपद्यते तं कृपया तस्यैषा भवत्यनुकम्पा ॥ १४४ ॥

145.

After describing the ideals and aspirations forming the positive condition of good will, the author describes its negative condition, i.e., the impure emotions that are to be avoided in every way to secure the purity of the heart or *Subha Pariṇāma.*

कोधो व जदा माणो माया लोभो व चित्तमासेज्ज ।
जीवस्स कुणदि खोहं कलुसो त्ति य तं वुहा वेंति ॥१४५॥*

145. Whenever anger, pride, deceit, and covetousness, appear in the mind of a *Jiva* they create disturbing motion, interfering with calmness of thought. This emotional agitation of thought is called impure thought by the wise.

COMMENTARY.

Impurity of thought is explained to be the interference of thought and will by grosser emotions, enumerated in the *Gâtha*. Freedom from such emotional interference is also a necessary condition of righteousness Thus noble desires (*Prasasta Râga*), charity (*Anukâmpa*) and freedom from impurity of the heart (*Chitta Akalushya*) these three constitute the spring of righteousness or *Punyâsrava*.

146.

Then the springs of evil or Pâpâsrava.

चरिया पमादवहुला कालुस्सं लोलदा य विसयेसु ।
परपरितावपवादो पावस्स य आसवं कुणदि ॥१४६॥†

146. Inordinate taste for wordly things, impure emotions, hankering for and indulging in sensual pleasures, causing anguish to fellow beings, and slandering them openly or covertly; these constitute the springs of evil.

---

*Sanskrit rendering :

क्रोधो वा यदा मानो माया लोभो वा चित्तमासाद्य ।
जीवस्य करोति क्षोभं कालुष्यमिति च तं बुधा वदन्ति ॥ १४५ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering :

चर्या प्रमादबहुला कालुष्यं लोलता च विषयेषु ।
परपरितापापवादः पापस्य चास्रवं करोति ॥ १४६ ॥

COMMENTARY.

The five above mentioned ignoble thoughts constitute the subjective side of the springs of evil (*Bhâva Pâpa Asrava*) conditioned by these mental states impure *Karmic* matter flows into the *Jiva*. And this inflow is the objective side of the evil or *Dravya Pâpa Asrava*, i.e., there is the acquisition undesirable and dark physical conditons by *Jiva* on account of the above mentioned, impurities of thought.

147

Again the subjective springs of evil are described in detail.

सण्णाओ य तिलेस्सा इंदियवसदा य अत्तरुद्दाणि ।
णाणं च दुप्पउत्तं मोहो पावप्पदा होंति ॥ १४७ ॥*

147. The different animal instincts, the different soul-soiling emotions, the tempting senses, suffering and wrath, undesirable thoughts and corruption of the faculties of perception and will, these constitute the springs of evil.

COMMENTARY

Samjnâ are the instincts, these are—

Âhara Samjñâ—Preying instinct.
Bhaya Samjña—The instinct of fear.
Maithuna Samjna—or the sexual instinct.
Parigraha Samjnâ—The acquisitive instinct

These instincts are liable to generate evil Next
Lesya or the soul-soiling tints

These are six in number—

Krishna or the black
Neela or the blue
Kapota or the grey
Peela or the yellow
Padma or the lotus-hued
Sukla or the white

**Sanskrit rendering*

संज्ञाश्च त्रिलेश्या इन्द्रियवशता चार्त्तरौद्रे ।
ज्ञानं च दुःप्रयुक्तं मोहः पापप्रदा भवन्ति ॥ १४७ ॥

१. 'अट्टरुद्दाणि' इत्यपि पाठः ।

These *lesyas* or the tints of the soul, perhaps denote a peculiar kind of *Aura* of each soul corresponding to its grade of spiritual development and ethical purity. Very often these tints are associated with the different emotional states present in *Jiva*. Therefore this Psychic *Aura* is not a fixed and permanent adjective of a *Jiva*. They change and appear as concomitants of Psychic conditions. We have to assume that these colours are apprehended only by an occult and supernormal vision. It would be simply absurd to associate these colours as the intrinsic colours of the *Jiva* itself for that would make the *Jiva* a *Mûrta* and *Rûpa Dravya*—a material thing. That would be quite inconsistent with the Jaina system.

Of the six *lesyas* or the tints the first three *Krishna*, *Neela* and *Kapota* the black, blue and grey are associated with the darker emotions which constitute the springs of evil.

The next constituent of the spring of evil is yielding to the temptations of the senses. Spiritual development depend upon controlling the senses. The soul is very often compared to the charioteer and the sense to restive steed. If the charioteer is led away by the horses that means danger and destruction because there would be no good in life much less the possiblity of spiritual emancipation.

Ârta or suffering refers to the painful feeling experience when desirable things and persons are lost and when undesirable and unpleasant ones are got. This experience is also the fountain of evil. *Raudra* refers to wrath or misplaced enthusiasm in cruelty, deceit, theft and sensuality. Evil thoughts consist in shunning good objects and apprehending and attending to evil ones. And lastly *Mohaniya* that spirit-paralysing stupor in its dual form corrupts the faculties of perception or will. *Darsana Mohaniya* and *Charitra Mohaniya*. In either form it is a source of evil.

These are the subjective conditions of evil. *Bhâva Pâpa-Asrava*, the inner springs of sin, whereas these bring about the inflow of the dark *Kârmic* matter.

This inflow is the Physical or objective side of evil *i.e.*, the *Dravya-Pâpa-Asrava*. *Kârmic* material of an undesirable kind flows towards the soul as the result of the above mentioned Psychic conditions.

Thus ends the chapter on Âsrava.

184.

CHAPTER ON SAMVARA PADÂRTHA.

The category that denotes the process of suppressing or blocking, the springs of good and evil treated in the previous chapter, is *Samvara*. The author considers first *Pâpa Samvara* or the prevention of evil.

इंदियकसायसण्णा णिग्गहिदा जेहिं सुट्ठमग्गम्मि ।
जावत्तावत्तेहिं पिहियं पावासवं छिद्दं ॥१४८॥*

148. To whatever extent the five senses, the four taints of emotions, the four instinctive appetites, are suppressed by a person, well established in the path or righteousness, to such extent the door way for the entrance of evil is closed for that person.

COMMENTARY

The volitional suppression of the above mentioned Psychic tendencies is *Bhâva Samvara* or the subjective inhibition of the evil. This condition is the antecedent of the physical arrest of the inflow of the *Kârmic* matter which is *Dravya Samvara*. This *Samvara* or the inhibition of the springs of evil is possible only to that person who has the three jewels or *Ratnatraya*, right belief, right knowledge and right conduct. One who has not adopted the path cannot succeed in the attempt to block the spring of evil.

149.

Evil thoughts and sin are the cause of misery as they lead to suffering in the world as well as in hell ; hence they ought to be avoided. Noble thoghts and the consequent happiness of *Deva* state in *svarga* or *Devaloka* is also insignificant when compared with heavenly bliss. To one whose ideal is self—realisation therefore, the happiness of *Devaloka* is also worthless He should shun that course also. Pleasure consequent upon *Punya*, and pain of *Papa* are both imperfect and undesirable by the side of the ultimate ideal *Moksha*. Both the doorways of *Punya* and *Pâpa* have to be blocked. Shunning

*Sanskrit rendering.

इन्द्रियकषायसंज्ञा निगृहीता यैः सुष्ठुमार्गे ।
यावत्तावत्तेषां पिहितं पापास्रवं छिद्रं ॥ १४८ ॥

action that leads to misery is natural But action which leads to pleasure and which stimulates desire is also a hindrance towards self attainment and therefore must be avoided. Itis this sentiment that is expressed in the next *Gâtha*.

जस्स ण विज्जदि रागो दोसो मोहो व सव्वदव्वेसु ।
णासवदि सुहं असुहं समसुःदुक्खस्स भिक्खुस्स ॥१४९ ॥*

149. If a *Bhikshu* looks upon happiness and misery as same, if he is free from desire, aversion, and stupor of perception and will, then *Karmâs* both beneficial and harmful do not approach that being.

COMMENTARY.

There are three fundamental states of consciousnes. *Subha Parinâma, Asubha Parinâma*, and *Suddha-Parinâma*, pleasant and beneficial, unpleasant and harmful, and pure and perfect respectively. The last alone is the ultimate ideal. The other two have to be transcended.

150

Next the author describes the mental states conducive to *Samvara* or the prevention of Karmas

जस्स जदा खलु पुण्णं जोगे पावं च णत्थि विरदस्स ।
संवरणं तस्स तदा सुहासुहकदस्स कम्मस्स ॥ १५० ॥†

150 As long as a person pure in life, is really free from action conducive to pleasure or pain through either thuoght, speech or body, so long is he protected from karmas, beneficial and harmful; that is, they are prevented from approaching him.

COMMENTARY.

Effective states of desire and aversion, and activity of thought, speech or body are the conditions that attract *Karmâs* good and

*Sanskrit rendering

यस्य न विद्यते रागो द्वेषो मोहो वा सर्वद्रव्येषु ।
नास्रवति शुभमशुभं समसुखदुःखस्य भिक्षोः ॥ १४९ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering

यस्य यदा खलु पुण्यं योगे पापं च नास्ति विरतस्य ।
संवरणं तस्य तदा शुभाशुभकृतस्य कर्मण ॥ १५० ॥

bad towards the soul. When those conditions are removed there will be *Karmâs* approaching the *Jiva*; that is complete *Samvara*—a protective wall round the self shutting out all karmas is established. This *Samvara* again is twofold *Bhâva Samvara* and *Dravya Samvara*. The subjective exclusion of thoughts and desires that may lead to bondage, and the objective exclusion of *Kârmic* matter from self. Thus ends the *Samvara Padartha*.

151

THE CHAPTER ON *NIRJARA PADÂRTHA*.

The author describes the nature of *Nirjara* or the withering away of *Karmâs*.

संवरजोगेहिं जुदो तवेहिं जो चिट्ठदे वहुविहेहिं ।
कम्माणं णिज्जरणं वहुगाणं कुणदि सो णियदं ॥१५१॥*

151. That mighty personality which after closing the springs of *Karmâs*, good and evil, and equipped with the faculty of pure thought, controls its life according to manifold forms of *Tapas*, will undoubtedly be able to rid itself of *Karmâs* manifold.

COMMENTARY

The faculty of pure thought, protected from all *Karmâs*, associated with twelve kinds of *Tapas*, and leading to immortality, to annihilation of all *Karmâs*, is the subjective side of *Nirjara* or *Bhâva Nirjara*. As a concomitant of this there appears the annihilation of *Kârmic* dust, that clouds the divine beam of pure self.

The means for obtaining *Nirjara* is *Tapas* which is of two main forms, outer and inner. Each of these is again of six different kinds. These are —

(*a*) Outer Tapas consisting of—

(1) *Anasana*

(2) *Avamodarya*,

(3) *Vritti Pari Sankhyâna*,

---

*Sanskrit rendering:—
संवरयोगाभ्यां युक्तस्तपोभिर्यश्चेष्टते बहुविधैः ।
कर्मणां निर्जरणं बहुकानां करोति स नियतं ॥ १५१ ॥

(4) *Rasa Parityaga.*

(5) *Vivikta Sayyasana.*

(6) *Kayaklesa.*

(b) Inner Tapas consisting of—

(1) *Prayaschitta.*

(2) *Vinaya*

(3) *Vaiya Vritya.*

(4) *Swadhyaya.*

(5) *Vyutsarga.*

(6) *Dhyana*

(1) *Anasana* is abstaining from food To obtain control over the senses and will, to root out desires and appetites to destory *Karmas*, to facilitate meditation and to study peacefully the scriptures, fasting is the means and fasting in order to secure such results is *Anasana Vrata.*

(2) *Avamodarya.*

To sustain control of the will and the senses, to regulate disorders of, *Vata*, *Pitta*, and *Sleshma*, the humours of the body, to secure self knowledge, and meditation, eating with a limit or a little less than the normal is *Avamodarya.*

(3) *Vritti Pari Sankhyana.*—In order to control the will which would by nature hanker after all the objects of taste, limiting the number of items of *Dharma*, or in the case of *Bhikshus*, resolving in one self to accept food only from a particular house is *Vritti Pari Sankhyana* or numbering or limiting the items of food.

(4) *Rasa Parityaga* In order to control the flesh to get rid of drousiness and sleep, to promote clearness of thought, abstaining from fatty and sweet substances is *Rasa Parityaga* or relinquishing sweet essences.

(5) *Vivikta Sayyasana* To have ones bed, in separate and vacant rooms or caves or on rocks free from insect pests is *Vivikta Sayyasana* or lonely bed The place must be free from insect pests in order that the person may have peace of mind, preparatory to meditation and separate beds of course to avoid temptations of the flesh.

(6) *Kayaklesa* getting the body ennured, to pain and suffering by standing in the sun, living under a tree and sleeping in the open in

the winter cold, etc., is *Kâyaklesa* or mortification of the body. This will harden the body and make the person fit for the arduous task of religious life. How is this *Kâyaklesa* different from what is known as *Parishaha Jaya* or the victory over troubles. The latter means overcoming the suffering due to the natural environment; whereas the former is voluntary training of the body. If it is voluntary why is it called outer *Tapas*. Because it pertains mainly to physical objects. *Next Inner Tapas*. Because the object is mainly to control the mind. These are called innner Tapas.

(1) *Prâyâschitta* is removing the evil ideas that are born of intoxication of worldliness.

(2) *Vinaya* is humility towards gurus and masters.

(3) *Vaiyavritya*. Personal attendance and other kinds of service to Munis who are weary, sick, or infirm.

(4) *Swâdhyaya* is quickening of thoughts by concentation of attention

(5) *Vyutsarga* renouncing the belief that this body is mine, is Vyutsarga or isolation of self

(6) *Dhyâna* calm meditation on the self after controlling the vagaries of thought is *Dhyâna*

152.

Meditation on self is showa to be the main condition of *Nirjarâ*.

जो संवरेण जुत्तो अप्पट्ठपसाधगो हि अप्पाणं ।
मुणिऊण झादि णियदं णाणं सो संधुणोदि कम्मरयं १५२*

152. Clinging to the ideal of self realisation, being fortified against *Karmâs* through *Samvara*, the yogi, who truly understands the word of the master, and meditate upon Self—Pure thought with controlled senses, will completely wash off the Kârmic dust.

COMMENTARY

The main condition for annihilating Karmas is stated here. The person is to be equipped with *Samvara* or fortification round the

*Sanskrit rendering :

य. संवरेण युक्तः आत्मार्थप्रसाधको ह्यात्मानं ।
ज्ञात्वा ध्या नि

self against Karmâs, desirable and undesirable. The springs of *Parinama*, *Subha* and *Asubha*, are to be completely blocked Instead of diverting ones attention to environmental objects, thought is to be fixed on Self. This reflection upon the Self is to be made secure enough by controlling the senses. If a person under such circumstances meditates upon the Self, according to the instructions from the Masters, he is sure to attain purity of self by completely washing off the *Kârmic* dust by the flood of *Dhyâna*.

Then the divine glory of the Self will shine without interruption.

153

The origin, nature, and effect of meditation.

जस्स ण विज्जदि रागो दोसो मोहो व जोगपरिकम्मो।
तस्स सुहासुहडहणो ज्झाणमओ जायए अगणी।१५३॥*

153. In the person that has neither desire nor aversion, and that is free from ignorant attachment to sense pleasures and from the activity of thought speech and body, there flames forth the fire of meditation that burns out all *Karmas* beneficial as well as baneful

COMMENTARY.

Dhyâna or meditation is thought directed towards the pure self This is the means of self realisation Ignorance that stupifies the faculties of perception and will must be got rid of. There should be neither attachment nor hatred towards the objects of the environment. Then there should be unruffled peace, in thought, speech and body Meditation attended by such circumstances manifests as the fire that destroys the rubbish heap of Karmas. It is this fire of meditation that reveals the stirling beauty of pure Self. This is *Nirjara*.

Thus ends the Chapter on *Nijara*.

CHAPTER ON *BANDHA PADARTHAS*.

154

The nature of *Bandha* or *Kârmic* bondage is described.

*Sanskrit rendering.
यस्य न विद्यते रागो द्वेषो मोहो वा योगपरिकर्म।
तस्य शुभाशुभदहनो ध्यानमयो जायते अग्निः ॥ १५३ ॥

जं सुहमसुहमुदिण्णं भावं रत्तो करेदि जदि अप्पा ।
सो तेण हवदि बंधो पोग्गलकम्मेण विविहेण ॥१५४॥*

154. When *Âtma* out of desire aversion, and corruption of knowledge and will, experiences affective states pleasant and unpleasant, then because of the very same states the self gets bound by *Kârmic* matter of various kinds.

COMMENTARY.

Bandha is of two kinds *Bhâva Bandha* and *Dravya Bandha* The former refers to the appropriate psychological conditions that bring about the actual bondage with *Kârmic* molecules. The latter is *Dravya Bandha* On account of desire the *Âtma* experiences happiness or misery. Such emotional states create in the *Âtma* a disposition peculiarly favourable for the *Kârmic* molecules to settle in. This Psychological disposition is the intrinsic condition of bondage.

155

The two aspects of bondage internal and external are again described.

जोगणिमित्तं गहणं जोगो मणवयणकायसंभूदो ।
भावणिमित्तो बंधो भावो रदिरागदोसमोहजुदो ॥१५५

155. Combination of *Kârmic* matter with *Jiva* is due to *Yoga*. *Yoga* is the action of mind, speech and body. The opportunity for combination is created by *Bhâvas* or the affective states and such affective states are due to desire, aversion and perverse cognition.

COMMENTARY.

Here is described bondage both internal and external, Psychical and physical. The *Kârmic* matter that flows towards the soul is the

---

*Sanskrit rendering.

यं शुभाशुभमुदीर्णं भावं रक्तः करोति यद्यात्मा ।
स तेन भवति बद्धः पुद्गलकर्मणा विविधेन ॥ १५४ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering

योगनिमित्तं ग्रहणं योगो मनोवचनकायसंभूतः ।
भावनिमित्तो बन्धो भावो रतिरागद्वेषमोहयुतः ॥ १५५ ॥

manifold *Kármic Skandha* around the *Jiva*. This attraction of *Skandhas* is due to *yoga*, i.e. the *Kárma Skandhas* get aggregated and intermixed with *Jiva* because of the activity of *yoga*, or of *mana vachana kaya*, mind, speech and body.

Bandha then is the state of being so bound by *Kármic* matter. This *Kármic* formation around the *Jiva* is occasioned by the Psychological dispositions known as *Bháva*. *Bháva* is the emotional state of desire or aversion, or perverse cognition and will. All these states are brought about by *Mohaniya*, that fundamental *Karma* responsible for spiritual delusion. *Yoga* is the external condition of bondage since it brings about directly the combination of *Kármic* matter with *Jiva*. But the internal condition is the *Bháva* or the disposition of the self.

156.

Again the conditions of bondage from another point of view are described.

हेदू चदुव्वियप्पो अट्ठवियप्पस्स कारणं भणिदं ।
तेसिं पि य रागादी तेसिमभावे ण वज्झंति ॥१५६॥*

156. The eight kinds of *Karmas* are said to be caused by the four external conditions or *Dravya Pratyayas*. But these conditions themselves are the result of desire, etc., or *Bháva Pratyayas*. Without these intrinsic conditions there will be no bondage.

COMMENTARY.

In some Philosophical works of Jainas, the eight Karmas are traced to the four causal conditions *Mithyatva*, *Avirata*, *Kasháya* and *Yoga*. Our author here shows that these four conditions themselves are the result of the Psychological disposition effected by the emotional states of desire, etc. Hence he insists on recognising these Psychological states as the real and intrinsic condition of bondage. Whereas the above four are only subsidiary and external conditions. Without the ultimate condition of *rága* there can certainly be no *Kármic* bondage.

*Sanskrit rendering :

हेतुश्चतुर्विकल्पोऽष्टविकल्पस्य कारणं भणितम् ।
तेषामपि च रागादयस्तेषामभावेन न बध्यन्ते ॥१५६॥

The external conditions are called *Dravya Pratyayas* because they are directly associated with *Kármic* matter and the ultimate Psychological conditions are called *Bháva Pratyayas* because they refer to the disposition of *Átma*.

The conditions of bondage are enumerated thus in *Tattvartha Sutra*. Chapter VIII, Sutra 1.

मिथ्यादर्शनाविरतिप्रमादकषाययोगाबन्धहेतवः ॥

It is to be noted that five conditions of bondage are enumerated here whereas the *Gátha* mentions only four. For the fifth and additional condition *Pramada* is also included in the above mentioned four.

Mithyatva is the opposite of right faith or *Samyak Darsana*. This *Mathyatva* may manifest in the form of belief in false doctrines and disbelief in the true one. *Avirata* is the opposite of right conduct or *Samyakcharitra*. This may manifest in an enthusiasm for the veil conduct and a hesitation for righteousness. *Kashaya* refers to the grosser emotions such as anger, Pride, deceit, etc., and *yoga* refers to the uncontrolled and useless activity of *Mana vachana Káya*. These are the four *Dravya Pratyayas* or external conditions generating the eight *Karmás* which are—

(1) *Jñanávaraniya.*

(2) *Darsanavaraniya.*

(3) *Mohaniya.*

(4) *Vedaniya.*

(5) *Antaráya.*

(6) *Ayuh*

(7) *Náma.*

(8) And *Gotra.*

(1) *Jnanavaraniya* is the veil round the pure consciousness.

(2) *Darsanavaraniya* is that which corrupts the faculty of perception and also of belief.

(3) *Mohaniya* is a sort of spiritual intoxication interfering with cognition and will.

(4) *Vedaniya* is the feeling of pleasure and pain.

(5) *Antaraya* is the frustration of the useful efforts of righteously minded persons

(6) *Ayuh* determines the duration of life that a *Jiva* has in a particular state of existence.

(7) *Náma* determines the generic and the specific characteristics of a *Jiva*, i.e. on account of this *Náma* Karma a *Jiva* is born as a particular organism in a particular *Gati*

(8) *Gotra* determines the value of life for example in a human being. This Karma determines the birth of a *Jiva* in a higher status or in a lower status

These eight *Karmás* are of various sub-divisions which we need not enumerate in detail. These eight effects, though they are supposed to be due to the above four conditions are ultimately due to *Bháva Pratyayas* or the disposition of the heart. The author wants to emphasize the fact that if the *Bhávas* or the Psychic dispositions are absent then even if the *Dravya Pratyayas* or the external conditions are present still, there will be no bondage of the eightfold kind; hence the intrinsic condition of bondage is *Bhava* or Psychic.

Thus ends the chapter on Bandha Padartha

CHAPTER ON MOKSHA PADÁRTHA

157

Moksha or emancipation is begun with the description of *Bhava Moksha* or the inner perfection of the soul. This *Bhava Mohska* leads to the annihilation of the four *Ghatia Karmas*. The very same *Bháva Moksha* again is the great *Samvara* or the absolute obstruction to *Karmas*.

हेदुमभावे णियमा जायदि णाणिस्स आसवणिरोधो ।
आसवभावेण विणा जायदि कम्मस्स दु णिरोधो ॥१५७॥*
कम्मस्साभावेण य सव्वण्हू सर्वलोगदरसी य ।
पावदि इंदियरहिदं अव्वावाहं सुहमणंतं ॥१५८॥*

**Sanskrit rendering :*

हेत्वभावे नियमाज्जायते ज्ञानिनः आस्रवनिरोधः ।
आस्रवभावेन विना जायते कर्मणस्तु निरोधः ॥ १५७ ॥
कर्मणामभावेन च सर्वज्ञः सर्वलोकदर्शी च ।
प्राप्नोतीन्द्रियरहितमव्याबाधं सुखमनन्तं ॥ १५८ ॥

157—58. If the causal condition of *Karmâs* disappears in the case of wiseman through the control of senses and thought, then the springs of *Karmâs* get blocked. When the springs of *Karmas* thus get blocked the *Dravya-Karmâs* get repulsed. When the *Dravya Karmâs* completely disappear then the person becomes all-knowing and all-perceiving and attains the state of infinite bliss which transcends the sense feeling and which is untouched by the sorrows of life

COMMENTARY

Through the instrumentality of the five *Labdhis* a *Bhavyatma* obtains the three jewels On account of this acquisition he is able to get rid of the four-fold condition of Karma, *Mithyatva, Avirata, Kashaya* and *yoga*, both in their subjective and objective aspects. When he gets rid of *Dravya* and *Bhâva Pratyayas* or *Kârmic* adjuncts, then he attains the great *Samvara or repulsiveness to Kârmas*. This *Samvara* leads to the annihilation of Kârmic shackles Thus ascends the ladder of higher life which leads to destruction of ignorance. This brings on the inner purity. Finally through second *Sukla Dhyâna* or the great meditation, the *Ghâtiya Karmas* get burnt away. Then the self rises to eternal wisdom, eternal perception, infinite bliss, and infinite power. This is *Anantachatushtaya*, the four infinite qualities. This is *Bhâva Moksha, the spiritual freedom* When this *Bhâva Moksha is attained* the inevitable destruction of *Dravya Karmâs* follows With the attainment of *Bhâva Moksha* the person becomes a *Kevali* worshipped by men and *Devas*. He becomes really *Paramatma*.

159

Then we have the description of *Dhyâna* or meditation which is the direct cause of repulsing and eradicating all *Karmâs*.

दंसणणाणसमग्गं ज्झाणं णो अण्णदव्वसंजुत्तं ।
जायदि णिज्जरहेदू सभावसहिदस्स साधुस्स ॥१५९॥*

159 The meditation that is completely determined by right belief, right knowledge and right conduct and that is not

*Sanskrit rendering :

दर्शनज्ञानसमग्रं ध्यानं नो अन्यद्रव्यसंयुक्तं ।
जायते निर्जराहेतुः स्वभावसहितस्य साधोः ॥ १५९ ॥

related to objects alien to the self becomes the cause of *Nirjara* or annihilation of *Karmas* to the *Yogi* that is in the path of self realisation.

COMMENTARY.

The great meditation on the self is shown to be the condition of complete *Nirjara* or the absolute annihilation of the existing *Karmas*. In the previous *Gâtha Bhâva Moksha* was described. On account of this *Bhâva Moksha* the person becomes a *Kevali* with the four infinite qualities equipped with the infinite perception and infinite knowledge. The self no more becomes attached to any other alien ideal. The only object of attraction and adoration is the perfect self consciousness. When meditation thus manifests in self rapture because of self purity and self perception, then it leads to the eradication of the remaining *Karmas*, i.e. it is the causal condition of complete *Nirjara*.

160

Dravya Moksha or the absolute emancipation is next described.

जो संवरेण जुत्तो णिज्जरमाणोध सव्वकम्माणि ।
ववगदवेदाउस्सो मुयदि भवं तेण सो मोक्खो ॥१६०॥*

160. When a *Jiva* being rid of the four Ghâtiya and being equipped with absolute repulsiveness to Karmas succeeds in eradicating the remaining *Karmas*, then he becomes freed from *Vedaniya* and *Ayu* and finally from *Nâma* and *Gotra*. This eradication of the latter four *Karmas* means absolute and complete *Moksha* or *Dravya Moksha*.

COMMENTARY.

This Gâtha speaks of *Dravya Moksha* or the final and complete emancipation. After attaining *Bhâva Moksha* mentioned in the previous *Gâthas Jiva* has to obtain absolute emancipation from *Karmic* or physical conditions for the attainment of *Kevalajñâna* is still associated with the bodily condition. The person is merely

Sayogi Kevali. No doubt he got rid of the four Ghâtiya Karmâs which lead to the corruption and degeneration of *Âtma.* Because they injure the soul they are called Ghatiya Karmâs. These are *Jñâna Varaniya*; *Darsanâvaraniya*; *Mohaniya* and *Antaraya.* But still there are the other four Karmas known as *Aghatiya Karmas. Vedaniya Ayuh, Nama* and *Gotra* These four also must be annihilated. When a *Bhava Moksha Jiva* has the perfect *Dhyana,* then *Vedaniya* and *Ayuh* first wither away and finally *Nama* and *Gotra* also. Then the *Mukta Jiva* becomes *Ayogi Kevali* or a *Siddha. Atma* has attained its intrinsic spiritual purity and is absolutely free from any kind of association with the matter. This state is *Dravya Moksha.*

Thus ends *Moksha Padârtha.*

This is the end of the second Book of the great work dealing with *Sapta Tattva* and *Nava Padarthas.*

Next the Resume or the *Chulika* dealing with Jina the great Victor and the perfect *Brahma* who is the ideal of *Moksha Padârtha.* This *Chulika* supplements the ideas already mentioned about heaven, and the path. The author indicates here, the importance of conduct leading to self realisation. Self and self alone is the goal. Anything other than self as an ideal would lead away the self from the path. All these facts are emphasized in the *Chulika.*

161.

The intrinsic nature of *Jiva* is described, thus indicating the path to *Moksha.*

जीवसहावं णाणं अप्पडिहददंसणं अणण्णमयं ।
चरियं च तेसु णियदं अत्थित्तमणिंदियं भणियं ॥१५१॥*

161. Unlimited perception and unlimited knowledge are inseparable from the nature of *Jiva.* Permanently associated with that nature, spotless conduct is the path to *Moksha* because it is the immediate antecedent.

**Sanskrit rendering :*

जीवस्वभावं ज्ञानमप्रतिहतदर्शनमनन्यमयं ।
चारित्रं च तयोर्नियतमस्तित्वमनिन्दितं भणितं ॥ १५१ ॥

COMMENTARY.

The characteristic of *Moksha* is described here.- Right conduct which is always associated with the intrinsic nature of self is the path to *Moksha*. The intrinsic nature of *Jiva* is existence which is inalienable from *Jñāna* and *Darsana*. Inalienability implies that the nature of *Jiva* manifests generically and specifically through knowledge and perception. The existence which is associated with such characteristics and which has the dialectic nature of activity is the intrinsic conduct of self. It is irreproachable because it is not influenced by either desire or aversion. That same conduct is the path to emancipation.

Conduct in *Samsāri Jiva* is of two kinds, intrinsic conduct and extrinsic self-deterimined or other deterimined. Self-determined conduct is that which is based upon the intrinsic nature of self. The other determined conduct is that which is due to the influence of non-self. The path then is related to self and is uninfluenced by non-self; hence it is the means to the realisation of self.

162.

That Jewel or *Ratnatraya* is internally distinguished as lower and higher, the lower aspect is associated with the ideal only indirectly whereas the higher is directly associated with it One who has the lower jewel is known as *Parasamayi* or the self that is determined by the other. But the self which has the higher jewel is absolutely self conditioned and is called *Svasamayi*

जीवो सहावणियदो अणियदगुणपज्जओध परसमओ ।
जदि कुणदि सगं समयं पब्भस्सदि कम्मबंधादो ॥१६२॥*

162. The *Jiva* that is associated with the essential qualities is called *Svasamayi* or the self-determined whereas that which is associated with accidental and unessential qualities and modes is called *Parasamayi* or the other determined. The *Jiva* that has the former, i.e. the essential nature as its ideal, is able to get itself freed from *Karmic* bondage.

**Sanskrit rendering.*

जीवः स्वभावनियतः अनियतगुणपर्यायोऽथ परसमयः ।
यदि कुरुते स्वकं समयं प्रभ्रस्यति कर्मबन्धात् ॥ १६२ ॥

COMMENTARY.

The *Ratnatraya* which is self-determined has corresponding stages of development to the spiritual evolution of *Jiva*. *Abhedadratnatraya* is certainly *Svasamayi*, but the early stages of this *Ratnatraya* when compared to the last stage of perfection would be considered as *Parasamayi*. It is not even necessary to mention the fact that faith in alien deity, etc., is distinctly *Parasamayi*, i.e. when *Samyaktva* itself in its earlier stage requires to be transcended much more therefore *Mithyatva*. But a person while still with *Karmic* bondage may have the thought 'I am *Siddha*' '*I am Shuddha*' i.e. I am the realised, I am the pure. This contemplation is also called *Abhedaratratraya*, the pure jewel by convention. Such subtle distinctions in the nature of the path of Self-realisation can only be understood by the great Ones.

163.

Then the duality of the outer path or *Parasamayâ* and also the duality of the other-determined or *Parasamayi*.

जो परद्व्वम्मि सुहं असुहं रागेण कुणदि जदि भावं ।
सेा सगचरित्तभट्ठो परचरियचरेा हवदि जीवेा ॥१६३॥*

163. That *Jiva* which through desire for outer things experiences pleasurable or painful states loses his hold upon Self and gets bewildered and led by outer things. He bec mes the other determined.

COMMENTARY.

The author describes here the characteristics of the self that is still determined by the other. According to this view even the traditional worship of *Jaina* orthodoxy would not escape this sweeping condemnation by the author. All that would be merely *Paracharita* conduct determined by the other. This other determined conduct must be transcended by one who perceives the ideal of Self.

164.

Next the author points out that the other determined-conduct is only the means to bondage and not to *Nirvana*.

*Sanskrit rendering.

य परद्रव्ये शुभमशुभं रागेण करोति यदि भावं।
स स्वकचरित्रभ्रष्टः परचरितचरो भवति जीवः ॥ १६३ ॥

आसवदि जेण पुण्णं पावं वा अप्पणोध भावेण ।
सेा तेण परचरित्तो हवदित्ति जिणा परूवंति ॥१६४॥*

164. On account of the pleasurable or the painful states of the *Âtma* there may flow in *Punya Karma* or *Papa Karma*. Such an *Âtma* on account of such states becomes the other determined. So say the *Jinas*.

COMMENTARY.

Conduct that is determined by outer things leads to bondage and blocks the way to liberation, for, the pleasurable mental states is the spring of *Punya Karma* and the painful mental state of *Pâpa Karma*, i.e. both merit and demerit in their subjective and objective aspects lead the soul to *Kârmic* bondage. Therefore if a *Jiva* experiences those mental states which form the springs of those *Karma* then for that very reason his conduct becomes other determined. He therefore becomes the other determined one.

165.

Then the author describes the characteristics of the self-determined *Jiva* or the *Purshottama*.

जो सव्वसंगमुक्को णण्णमणो अप्पणं सहावेण ।
जाणदि पस्सदि णियदं सेा सगचरियं चरदि जीवो ॥१६५॥†

165. That Jiva which being free from relations to others, and from alien thoughts through its own intrinsic nature of perception and understanding perceives and knows its own eternal nature to be such, is said to have conduct that is absolutely self-determined.

COMMENTARY.

Here is the description of conduct that is self determined. First there should be no kind of relation to outward things through

---

*Sanskrit rendering:

आस्रवति येन पुण्यं पापं वात्मनोऽथ भावेन ।
स तेन परचरित्र. भवतीति जिना: प्ररूपयन्ति ॥ १६४ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering:

य: सर्वसङ्गमुक्त: अनन्यमना आत्मानं स्वभावेन ।
जानाति पश्यति नियतं स. स्वकचरितं चरति जीव: ॥ १६५

affective states. On account of this freedom, thought is reflected upon Self. The fundamental faculties of *Jiva* are perception and understanding. If the self is perceived or intuited and understood to be constituted by perception and knowledge that thought is purely self-determined. *Jiva* that has that thought alone is said to have absolute self realisation.

166.

Next the very same *Svasamaya* is described in a different way.

चरियं चरदि सगं सेा जो परदव्वप्पभावरहिदप्पा ।
दंसणणाणवियप्पं अवियप्पं चरदि अप्पादेा ॥ १६६ ॥*

166. Whatever *Yogindra* being entirely free from affective states related to other things and firmly established in its own intrinsic nature, perceives himself to be identical with that which perceives and knows is said to have self-determined activity.

COMMENTARY.

Thus in order to instruct the disciple both according to *Dravyarthika* and *Paryayarthika Nayas* the two paths are described *Nischaya Ratnatraya* or the real jewel and *Vyavahara Ratnatraya* or the relative Jewel The real and the relative are related to one another as the ideal or end and the means to realise the same. Thus the ultimate goal is the real jewel.

167.

Next is the description of *Vyavahara Mokshamarga* or the relative path which is the means for the realisation of the ultimate end.

धम्मादीसद्दहणं सम्मत्तं णाणमंगपुव्वगदं ।
चिट्ठा तवंहि चरिया ववहारो मोक्खमग्गोत्ति ॥१६७॥†

**Sanskrit rendering*
चरितं चरति स्वकं स यः परद्रव्यात्मभावरहितात्मा ।
दर्शनज्ञानविकल्पमविकल्पं चरत्यात्मनः ॥ १६६ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering
धर्मादिश्रद्धानं सम्यक्त्वं ज्ञानमङ्गपूर्वगतं ।
चेष्टा तपसि चर्या व्यवहारो मोक्षमार्ग इति ॥ १६७ ॥

१ 'जीवादी सद्दहणं' ऐसा पाठ भी है ।

आसवदि जेण पुण्णं पावं वा अप्पणोध भावेण ।
सो तेण परचरित्तो हवदित्ति जिणा परूवंति ॥१६४॥*

164. On account of the pleasurable or the painful states of the *Âtma* there may flow in *Punya Karma* or *Papa Karma*. Such an *Âtma* on account of such states becomes the other determined. So say the *Jinas*.

COMMENTARY.

Conduct that is determined by outer things leads to bondage and blocks the way to liberation, for, the pleasurable mental states is the spring of *Punya Karma* and the painful mental state of *Pâpa Karma*, i.e. both merit and *demerit in their subjective and objective aspects* lead the soul to *Kârmic* bondage. Therefore if a *Jiva* experiences those mental states which form the springs of those *Karma* then for that very reason his conduct becomes other determined. He therefore becomes the other determined one.

165.

Then the author describes the characteristics of the self-determined Jiva or the Purshottama.

जो सव्वसंगमुक्को णण्णमणो अप्पणं सहावेण ।
जाणदि पस्सदि णियदं सो सगचरियं चरदि जीवो ॥१६५॥†

165. That Jiva which being free from relations to others, and from alien thoughts through its own intrinsic nature of perception and understanding perceives and knows its own eternal nature to be such, is said to have conduct that is absolutely self-determined.

COMMENTARY.

Here is the description of conduct that is self determined. First *there should be no kind of relation to outward things through*

**Sanskrit rendering.*

आस्रवति येन पुण्यं पापं वात्मनोऽथ भावेन ।
स तेन परचरित्रः भवतीति जिनाः प्ररूपयन्ति ॥ १६४ ॥

†*Sanskrit rendering:*

य. सर्वसङ्गमुक्तः अनन्यमनाः आत्मानं स्वभावेन ।
जानाति पश्यति नियतं सः स्वकचरितं चरति जीवः ॥ १६५

affective states. On account of this freedom, thought is reflected upon Self. The fundamental faculties of *Jiva* are perception and understanding. *If the self is perceived or intuited and understood to* be constituted by perception and knowledge that thought is purely self-determined. *Jiva* that has that thought alone is said to have absolute self-realisation.

166.

Next the very same *Svasamaya* is described in a different way.

चरियं चरदि सगं सो जो परदव्वप्पभावरहिदप्पा ।
दंसणणाणवियप्पं अवियप्पं चरदि अप्पादो ॥ १६६ ॥*

166. Whatever *Yogindra* being entirely free from affective states related to other things and firmly established in its own intrinsic nature, perceives himself to be identical with that *which perceives and knows is said to have self-*determined activity

COMMENTARY.

Thus in order to instruct the disciple both according to *Dravyarthika* and *Paryayarthika Nayâs* the two paths are described *Nischaya Ratnatraya* or the real jewel and *Vyavahara Ratnatraya* or the relative Jewel. The real and the relative are related to one another as the *ideal or end and the means to realise the same.* Thus the ultimate goal is the real jewel.

167.

Next is the description of *Vyavahara Mokshamarga* or the relative path which is the means for the realisation of the ultimate end.

धम्मादीसद्दहणं सम्मत्तं णाणमंगपुव्वगदं ।
चिट्ठा तवंहि चरिया ववहारो मोक्खमग्गोत्ति ॥१६७॥†

**Sanskrit rendering*

चरितं चरति स्वकं स यः परद्रव्यात्मभावरहितात्मा ।
दर्शनज्ञानविकल्पमविकल्पं चरत्यात्मनः ॥ १६६ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering

धर्मादिश्रद्धानं सम्यक्त्वं ज्ञानमङ्गपूर्वगतं ।
चेष्टा तपसि चर्या व्यवहारो मोक्षमार्ग इति ॥ १६७ ॥

१ 'जीवादी सद्दहणं' ऐसा पाठ भी है ।

170.

The *Samsâri Jivas* do not as a matter of course all attain *Moksha* only some of them are said to have that privilege.

जेण विजाणदि सव्वं पेच्छदि सो तेण सोक्खमणुहवदि।
इदि तं जाणदि भविओ अभव्वसत्तो ण सद्दहदि ॥१७०॥*

170. Because of the fact that the Self perceives and understands all things without limit it also enjoys infinite bliss. This fact that infinite knowledge and infinite bliss are inseparable is understood only by the *Bhavya*. The *Abhavya* cannot appreciate that, much less believe in it.

COMMENTARY.

All *Samsâri Jivas* are not fit to obtain the state of self-realisation. Here happiness is the absence of any kind of hindrance to the intrinsic activity of the self. Perception and understanding are the intrinsic nature of the self. Hindrance to the nature of the self therefore would be a kind of obstruction to either perception or knowledge. The perfected self is all knowing and all perceiving *i.e.*, has no limit to its nature of perception and understanding. The absence of hindrance naturally manifests in its positive aspect as infinite bliss. The logical consequence of *Kevala Jñâna* is *Ananta Sukha*. This truth is appreciated and accepted only by the faithful. The unfaithful ones are incapable of appreciating this truth. Therefore the path to salvation is available only to the former. Therefore only some of the *Samsari Jivas* but not all are fit to walk the path to *Moksha*.

171.

Darsana, *Jñâna*, and *Châritra* when conditioned by other things than Self may in a way lead to bondage. But if they are determined absolutely by the self then they form the direct antecedent of emancipation.

**Sanskrit rendering :*

येन विजानाति सर्वं पश्यति स तेन सौख्यमनुभवति ।
इति तज्जानाति भव्योऽभव्यसत्त्वो न श्रद्धत्ते ॥ १७० ॥

दंसणणाणचरित्ताणि मोक्खमग्गोऽत्ति सेविदव्वाणि ।
साधूहि इदं भणिदं तेहिं दु बंधो व मोक्खो वा ॥१७१॥*

171. Since *Darsana Jñâna*, and *Châritra* constitute the *Moksha Marga* they are adored by the wise. If they are determined be non-self they may lead directly to bondage or indirectiy to *Moksha*. But if they are determined by Self then they may lead to Moksha.

COMMENTARY.

Intuition, knowledge and conduct produce effects according as they are determined by the associated things. If they are associated with external things they may get associated with desire and aversion and thus may bring about *kârmic* bondage. But if they are associated with intrinsic and pure nature of the self, then they may directly and immediately bring about liberation A king for example because of his defective instruments political and military may lead to the strengthening of the enemy instead of annihilating him; or for example, *ghee* which is by nature of soothing effects may when associated with fire aggravate the *heat*. Similar is the case with the three jewels.

172.

Next the characteristic of *Sukshma Parasamaya*, or the subtle non-self or other determinedness.

अण्णाणादो णाणी जदि मण्णदि सुद्धसंपओगादो ।
हवदित्ति दुक्खमोक्खं परसमयरदो हवदि जीवो ॥१७२॥†

127. If an *Âtma* through ignorance believes that through awe and reverence to *Arahanta* and others he may attain emancipation from misery then he is only the lover of non-self or *Parasamayi*.

*Sanskrit rendering:
दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि मोक्षमार्ग इति सेवितव्यानि ।
साधुभिरिदं भणितं तैस्तु बन्धो वा मोक्षो वा ॥ १७१ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering:
अज्ञानात ज्ञानी यदि मन्यते शुद्धसंप्रयोगात् ।
भवतीति दुःखमोक्षः परसमयरतो भवति जीव. ॥ १७२ ॥

170.

The *Samsâri Jivas* do not as a matter of course all attain *Moksha* only some of them are said to have that privilege.

जेण विजाणदि सव्वं पेच्छदि सो तेण सोक्खमणुहवदि ।
इदि तं जाणदि भविओ अभव्वसत्तो ण सद्दहदि ॥१७०॥*

170. Because of the fact that the Self perceives and understands all things without limit it also enjoys infinite bliss This fact that infinite knowledge and infinite bliss are inseparable is understood only by the *Bhavya*, The *Abhavya* cannot appreciate that, much less believe in it.

COMMENTARY.

All *Samsâri Jivas* are not fit to obtain the state of self-realisation. Here happiness is the absence of any kind of hindrance to *the intrinsic activity of the self.* Perception and *understanding are* the intrinsic nature of the self. Hindrance to the nature of the self therefore would be a kind of obstruction to either, perception or knowledge. *The perfected self is all knowing and all perceiving i.e.,* has no limit to its nature of perception and understanding The absence of hindrance naturally manifests in its positive aspect as infinite bliss. The logical consequence of *Kevala Jñâna* is *Ananta Sukha* This truth is appreciated and accepted only by the faithful. The unfaithful ones are incapable of appreciating this truth. Therefore the path to salvation is available only to the former. Therefore only some of the *Samsari Jivas* but not all are fit to walk the path to *Moksha.*

171.

Darsana, Jñâna, and *Châritra* when conditioned by other things than Self may in a way lead to bondage. But if they are determined absolutely by the self then they form the direct antecedent of emancipation.

**Sanskrit rendering :*

येन विजानाति सर्वं पश्यति स तेन सौख्यमनुभवति ।
इति तज्जानाति भव्योऽभव्यसत्त्वो न श्रद्धत्ते ॥ १७० ॥

दंसणणाणचरित्ताणि मोक्खमग्गोऽत्ति सेविदव्वाणि ।
साधूहि इदं भणिदं तेहिं दु बंधो व मोक्खो वा ॥१७१॥*

171. Since *Darsana Jñâna*, and *Chârıtra* constitute the *Moksha Marga* they are adored by the wise. If they are determined be non-self they may lead directly to bondage or indirectiy to *Moksha*. But if they are determined by Self then they may lead to Moksha.

COMMENTARY.

Intuition, knowledge and conduct produce effects according as they are determined by the associated things. If they are associated with external things they may get associated with desire and aversion and thus may bring about *kârmic* bondage But if they are associated with intrinsic and pure nature of the self, then they may directly and immediately bring about liberation A king for example because of his defective instruments political and military may lead to the strengthening of the enemy instead of annihilating him; or for example, *ghee* which is by nature of soothing effects may when associated with fire aggravate the *heat*. Similar is the case with the three jewels.

172

Next the characteristic of *Sukshma Parasamaya*, or the subtle non-self or other determinedness.

अण्णाणादो णाणी जदि मण्णदि सुद्धसंपओगादो ।
हवदित्ति दुक्खमोक्खं परसमयरदो हवदि जीवो ॥१७२॥†

127 If an *Âtma* through ignorance believes that through awe and reverence to *Arahanta* and others he may attain emancipation from misery then he is only the lover of non-self or *Parasamayı*.

*Sanskrit rendering:
दर्शनज्ञानचारित्राणि मोक्षमार्ग इति सेवितव्यानि ।
साधुभिरिदं भणितं तैस्तु बन्धो वा मोक्षो वा ॥ १७१ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering:
अज्ञानात् ज्ञानी यदि मन्यते शुद्धसंप्रयोगात् ।
भवतीति दुःखमोक्षः परसमयरतो भवति जीवः ॥ १७२ ॥

COMMENTARY.

Arahanta and *Siddha* are free from every kind of perfection and are full of all good qualities. Love and devotion towards these may certainly be desirable but still by themselves they can never bring about *kârmic* liberation. The hope to obtain salvation only through devotion is *Parasamaya*. The person who has that hope is *Parasamayi*, the other determined one. The other determined means to be away from the ideal of self. When love and devotion to the perfect beings cannot take us nearer the goal, we need not even mention the utter uselessness of ignorant worship of alien deities with all the samsâric parapharnalia. Thus the author emphasizes the fact that even the love and devotion towards the perfect beings form a subtle kind of obstacle in the way of self-realisation.

173

The above mentioned reverence and devotion as they some times lead to bondage, do not constitute the path to *Moksha.*

अरहन्तसिद्धचेदियपवयणगणणाणभत्तिसंपण्णो ।
वंधदि पुण्णं वहुसो ण दु सो कम्मक्खयं कुणदि॥१७३॥*

173. The person who has reverence and devotion towards *Arahanta*, *Siddha*, their images, *Sangha*, and congregations will invariably get bondage with *Punya karma*, hence he can never achieve absolute annihilation of *karma.*

COMMENTARY.

The author minimises the importance of popular form of religious devotion and worship. The Traditional Jaina religion always emphasizes the value of faith and devotion towards the objects worthy of reverence. But our author views the popular faith from a higher point. From the true philosophical point of view such *Bhakti* will only lead to *Punya karma* and its consequent divine happiness. But *Punya karma* is still thraldom thoughthe shackles are made of gold and *Deva* happiness is still *Sansari.* Therefore

**Sanskrit rendering :*

अर्हत्सिद्धचैत्यप्रवचनगणज्ञानभक्तिसम्पन्नः ।
बध्नाति पुण्यं बहुशो न तु स कर्मक्षयं करोति ॥ १७३ ॥

karmic annihilation cannot be achieved by the person who has such faith and devotion alone.

174

The main obstacle in the path of self-realisation or *Svasamaya* is said to be *Rága* or affection.

जस्स हिदयेणुमत्तं वा परदव्वं हि विज्जदे रागो।
सो ण विजाणदि समयं समस्स सव्वागमधरो वि ॥१७४॥*

174. If in the heart of a *yogi* there is an iota of affection towards alien objects (even in an *Arahanta*) then, though he be well versed in all the *Sástras*, he would be incapable of appreciating his true Self or *Paramátma* through immediate experience.

COMMENTARY.

Devotion to external ideals may be useful up to a certain stage of development. The ideal of *Vitarága* is distinctly related to self. Absolute freedom from attachment is the meaning of *Vitarága*. Complete absence of *raga* is certainly inconsistent with attachment and devotion to *Arahanta* or *Siddha*. So far as self is concerned these ideal personalities are indeed external. The right ideal must be to attain perfect *Siddha* state oneself. This realisation of *Siddha* state cannot be reached by having attachment to external objects; hence the author emphasizes the importance of effort to transcend even this subtle kind of attraction however worthy the object of the ideal be. self and self alone must be the final and the ultimate ideal of spiritual evolution To have *Bhakti* which is a subtle attraction and then to believe that somehow the final good will be *Moksha* is to forget the importance of self-effort towards self realisation. According to the author then the traditional religious reverence, is only a stepping stone for the higher spiritual goal. He who shrinks from transcending the traditional orthodoxy is unfit to live in the higher plane. He is infected with the delusion that what is only a means is an end in itself. That what is merely relative is the absolute. That what is of temporary value bas eternal value.

*Sanskrit rendering:

यस्य हृदयेऽणुमात्रो वा परद्रव्ये विद्यते रागः।
स न विजानाति समयं स्वकस्य सर्वागमधरोऽपि ॥ १७४ ॥

175

The author enumerates the train of several evils that may be generated by that little iota of affection, above referred to.

धरिदुं जस्स ण सक्कं चित्तुब्भामं विणादु अप्पाणं ।
रोधो तस्स ण विज्झदि सुहासुहकदस्स कम्मस्स॥१७५॥*

175. To whomsoever there is no ability to bear the turmoil of the mind apart from and independent of the pure contemplation of self to him there is no possibility of preventing the *Karmas* born of pleasure and pain.

COMMENTARY.

There can be no devotion to Arahanta and others apart from an affective state, when there is affection the disturbance of the mind cannot be avoided. With the agitation of the heart the calm *of the self is lost and if the calm of the self is disturbed, it is not* possible to prevent the appearance of pleasure and pain and there is no escape from happiness and misery there can be no emancipation from *Samsara*. Affection however little is therefore the cause of this series of undesirable events.

176

One who has the ideal of *Moksha* must therefore completely eradicate every kind of desire from his heart.

तह्मा णिव्वुदिकामो णिस्संगो णिम्ममो य हविय पुणो ।
सिद्धेसु कुणदि भत्तिं णिव्वाणं तेण पप्पोदि ॥१७६॥*

176. Therefore he who aims at *Nirvana* must not say "I love this, this is mine," *Then he can very well be* devoted to his own true self which is *Siddha* or the perfect one. Through that same self-realisation he will attain *Nirvana*.

**Sanskrit rendering*:*

धर्तुं यस्य न शक्यश्चित्तोद्भ्रामं विनात्मानम् ।
रोधस्तस्य न विद्यते शुभाशुभकृतस्य कर्मणः ॥ १७५ ॥

†Sanskrit rendering:

तस्मान्निर्वृतिकामो निःसङ्गो निर्ममश्च भूत्वा पुनः ।
सिद्धेषु करोति भक्तिं निर्वाणं तेन प्राप्नोति ॥ १७६ ॥

COMMENTARY.

The great soul that understands the truth of the previous causal sequence from desire to turmoil of the mind, and from thence to *karma*, and finally to *Śamsara*, struggles to escape from the attraction of the environment and from the idea of ownership of alien things. When the relation of self to alien things either through attraction or owning is severed, then there is no possibility of desire springing up in the heart. No desire means no spriritual discord; spiritual harmony, repels *karmas*, prevention of *karmas* means disappearance of *Samsara*. Absence of *Samsara* certainly implies its opposite *Moksha*, hence the person that longs for spriritual perfection and kârmic emancipation must never say "This I love, This is mine."

177

The attitude of worship towards *Arahanta* and others, though it interferes with the immediate realisation of perfection is not altogether valueless, for it may ultimately lead to *Nirvâna*.

सपयत्थं तित्थयरं अभिगदवुद्धिस्स सुत्तरोइस्स।
दूरतरं णिव्वाणं संजमतवसंपओत्तस्स ॥१७७॥*

177. One may understand the true nature of *Tirthankara*, who is the basis of nine *Padârthas*. One may have interest in and devotion to the *Scripture* One may have self control and penance. With all these if one is not capable of realising his own true self, to him *Nirvana* is beyond reach.

COMMENTARY.

Even though a person is well versed in *Agamas* and well acquainted with the nature of reality, if he is ever much filled with devotion and worship to objective ideas, he will only secure the happiness of *Svarga* as the immediate fruit thereof *Nirvana* or *Moksha* is very remote and he can obtain that only by a tedious process of spiritual development. The immediate and direct antecedent of *Moksha* is the realisation of the true self, worship

*Sanskrit rendering :
सपदार्थं तीर्थकरमभिगतबुद्धेः सूत्ररोचिनः।
दूरतरं निर्वाणं संयमतपः सम्प्रयुक्तस्य ॥ १७७ ॥

of and devotion to any other ideal however worthy it may be is only a circuitous path to reach the goal.

178

Again the author emphasizes the fact that worship of the *Arahata* and others cannot be the immediate antecedent of *Mukti*.

अरहंतसिद्धचेदियपवयणभत्तो परेण णियमेण ।
जो कुणदि तवो कम्मं सेा सुरलोगं समादियदि ॥१७८॥*

178. The person who has love and reverence towards *Arahanta* and *Siddha*, their representations and the divine Word or *Agama*, however well he is engaged in the best form of *Tapas* so long as he is incapable of apprehending the true greatness of self on account of attachment to external ideals, will inevitably through his efforts enter only the world of the *Devas*.

COMMENTARY.

Whether now or hereafter the direct and immediate condition of *Moksha* is the apprehension of trueself and not attachment to external ideals. The person who has not grasped the self through all his efforts associated with worship and reverence will only secure the happiness of *Devas*. This is merely a higher state of *Samsāra* and not *Moksha*.

179

Then the author mentions the direct and immediate path to *Moksha*, thereby indicating that that is the meaning of the present Work.

तह्मा णिव्वुदिकामो रागं सव्वत्थ कुणदि मा किंचि ।
सेा तेण वीदरागेा भविओ भवसायरं तरदि ॥१७९॥*

179. Because of this truth that even the subtle attachment to external ideals hinders *Nirvâna*, let not the person who desires *Moksha* have any kind of attachment to things, living or non-living, desirable or undesirable, then he becomes the *Vitarâga*, the non-attached. Thus will he be able to sail across the ocean of *Samsara*

COMMENTARY.

The essential ingredient of the direct and immediate path to *Moksha* is the state of *Vitaraga* or non attachment. Attachment to alien persons and things deserving worship is something like burning sandal wood. It may smell sweet nevertheless it will burn. The subtle attachment to external ideals may lead to happiness but the very happiness will scorch the soul; hence the great person, who longs for freedom from *Samsara* must rid himself of any kind of attachment, must become a *Vitaraga*. Then will he be able to conquer the misery of Life and inherit the kingdom of *Nirvâna*.

This is the meaning of the above *Sutra* and the same is the purport of the whole book.

Pañchâstikâya, *i. e* it is not only the *Sutra Tatparya* but also *Śastra Tatparya* This aims to apprehend the nature of *Jinesvara*, the great victor, the all-knowing of infinite qualities and the *Vitaraga* or the non-attached.

It is called *Prabhuta* "well filled with the meaning" because it treats about the nine *Padârthas* and thus describes the nature of the systems of reality. Since it deals with the *Dravyas* or the existences it is also called *Dravyaniyoga*. It clearly explains the five *Astikâyas* the six *Dravyas*, seven *Tattvas*, and the nine *Padârthas*. It also examines the nature of bondage and of the bound, of liberation and the liberated. Lastly in the *Chulika* or the appendix there is a clear distinction between the absolute path and relative path, and also the indication of the fact that non-attachment is the direct and immediate condition of *Nirvâna* Non-attachment and perfect peace of the heart is the central doctrine emphasized by an embodied in this *Pañchâstikâya Prabhrita*. This *Vitaragatva* or the state of non-attachment is available only to that *Bhavya* or the right believer who appreciates the comparative merits of the two paths, relative and absolute *Vyavahara*, and *Nischaya*, but not to one who is incapable of appreciating the various aspects of truth and who clings to only a

particular and fractional aspect as the whole truth, *i.e.* one who believes in *Ekanta* aspect of reality is incapable of appreciating the ideal of *Vitarâga* and the difference between the absolute path and the relative path. He is far away from the goal. The true believer will certainly understand the compatibility and the harmony between the two paths and thus will try to realise the ideal of non-attachment or *Vitargatva* as the immediate condition of *Moksha*.

180.

The author ends the Work indicating his object in this composition.

मग्गप्पभावणट्ठं पवयणभत्तिप्पचोदिदेण मया।
भणियं पवयणसारं पंचत्थियसंगहं सुत्तं ॥१८०॥*

180. For the purpose of explaining the *Moksha Marga*, this work by the name of *Pañchâstikâya* containing the essentials of divine revelation is composed by me as actuated by *Bhakti* or devotion towards the divine Word.

COMMENTARY.

The author explains the purpose of his writing this work. The *Moksha Marga* or the path is revealed by Jina. But Divine revelation or the SASTRA is elaborate and extensive. In order to exhibit the path to the believers this short summary of the divine *WORD* is written with the name of *Pañchâstikâya Samgraha*.

Thus ends Book II of *Panchâstikâya*.

**Sanskrit rendering:*

मार्गप्रभावनार्थं प्रवचनभक्तिप्रचोदितेन मया।
भणितं प्रवचनसारं पञ्चास्तिकायसंग्रहं सूत्रं ॥ १८० ॥